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9TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE STUDY
CIDA: Canadian International Development Agency, a
Canadian government donor.
Critical mass approach: One of the three main identified
approaches for executing a training assistance project
(TAP). This type of approach is close to the usual train-
ing strategy followed by national civil service training
systems. The essence of this approach is to train a suffi-
cient amount of civil servants to induce the expected
change or improvement.
DFID: Department for International Development, a U.K.
government donor.
EC: European Commission, an organization of the European
Union, frequently referred to as the quasi-cabinet of the
EU. PHARE operates under the direct supervision of
the EC.
Elitist approach: One of the three main identified approach-
es for executing a TAP. The characteristic feature of this
approach is that it concentrates on high-level public
managers in order to increase TAP impact. The success
of this approach is questionable.
EU: European Union.
PHARE: The European Commission’s program for support-
ing post communist countries that are not part of the
former Soviet Union and the Baltic states. A similar or-
ganization, TACIS, has been set up for assisting coun-
tries of the former Soviet Union. Due to the almost iden-
tical structural and operational attributes of these two
organizations, statements about PHARE generally refer
also to TACIS.
PTD: Participant-training-day. A measurement of TAP out-
put. For a certain training course it is calculated as num-
ber of training days multiplied by the number of train-
ees trained. It is relied on for calculating a rough effi-
ciency measure. A detailed description and definition
of the term is provided in Section 2.1.3. of this volume.
Sustainability approach: One of the three main identified
approaches for executing a TAP. Sustainability-style
TAPs do not aim to train a significant amount of civil
servants. Instead, they mainly produce outputs that are
useful only if they are utilized in other, subsequent train-
ing activities, which are supposed to be financed and
run by the beneficiary government once the project it-
self has ended. Typically, a sustainability-type project
contains preparation of curriculum and training mate-
rials, a training-of-the-trainers element and perhaps some
“pilot training” courses. A larger-scale training could be
based on these outputs, but not part of the TAP itself.
Sustainability-type TAPs hardly ever turn out to be sus-
tainable in practice.
TACIS: See Phare.
TAP: Training assistance project. These are civil service train-
ing programs that are financed by foreign donor orga-
nizations for a certain period. A detailed description and
definition of the term is provided in Section 2.1.2. of
this volume.
USAID: United States Agency for International Develop-
ment, a U.S. government donor.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
I. Background
The research on which this volume is based was aimed at
evaluating the efficacy of civil service training programs fi-
nanced by foreign donors. These programs are referred to as
training assistance projects (TAPs). The objective of this study
is to assess the efficiency of TAPs, as well as their impact on
the public administration and civil service system of the ben-
eficiary countries. The research focused on the so-called post-
communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CEE/CIS) dur-
ing the time period between 1997 and 2000. The countries
of the CEE/CIS region have been going through a transi-
tion period, from communist, command economy systems
to democracies with free-market economies. These coun-
tries, therefore, have many similarities in terms of problems
and, to some degree, solutions. We have chosen to focus on
four countries of the region—Hungary, Lithuania, Roma-
nia and Ukraine—because they represent a high variance in
factors that may be relevant to TAP efficacy. The research
concentrated on the largest and most significant TAP do-
nors, which are, in alphabetical order: the Canadian Inter-
national Development Agency (CIDA), the U.K. Depart-
ment for International Development (DFID), the European
Commission’s PHARE/TACIS (PHARE), and the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID).
Despite the amount of resources spent on TAPs in the
region over the past decade, there have been surprisingly
few attempts to provide an overall assessment of their im-
pact. Indeed, one can only find a limited number of pub-
lished papers that are both theoretically and empirically
founded and aim at a broad assessment of TAP activities in
the region.
Four country teams were formed, to work with the initi-
ating team in implementing the study. In the course of the
summer of 2001, these country teams conducted research,
including a literature review and field work, in their respec-
tive countries. This work was supplemented by additional
studies, most of it field research, of three donors: CIDA,
USAID and PHARE. Though the research faced serious
difficulties, we attempted to rely on empirical evidence as
much as possible. We therefore used a limited scope of “sec-
ond-best” quantitative approaches, which involved sensitiv-
ity analyses, to test the plausibility and consequences of var-
ious assumptions regarding TAP efficiency. But overall, we
had to rely extensively on case-based evidence, observations
of the country team members and interviews with the stake-
holders.
The evaluation project presented in this book differs
from most evaluation exercises in a few important points:
• The scope of this research is much wider, in all dimen-
sions, than the standard evaluation exercise, which usu-
ally aims at assessing only one TAP, or a set of TAPs
from a single donor in a single country. The types of
questions asked by this research are also broader than
usual. We extend our study to questions about the kind
of factors and interest patterns that are responsible for
the TAPs’ characteristics, successes and failures—which
we identified in the fact-finding phase of the research.
• A typical evaluation study compares program results to
program objectives. But in our approach, the efficacy of
a program is understood solely from the point of view
of the beneficiary. In other words, a “desired” effect that
promotes the national interests of the donor country is
not treated automatically as a benefit, while an unin-
tended side effect advantageous for the recipient coun-
try is counted as a benefit.
• Civil service training is, of course, not only a donor ac-
tivity. It is also widely present in the beneficiary coun-
tries’ own public administration systems. Therefore, due
to our focus on the needs of beneficiaries, we found it
useful to compare TAP efficiency with that of civil ser-
vice training programs that were organized by the ben-
eficiary country’s responsible organs.
II. Findings on the Efficacy of TAPs
A number of micro-level—in other words technical and con-
tent related—differences between TAP courses and national
civil service training courses were identified. The most im-
portant differences were the following:
• TAPs focus more on skills improvement, unlike nation-
al civil service training, which focuses more on knowl-
edge transfer.
• TAPs are more practice oriented, while national civil
service training is theory oriented.
• TAPs concentrate on more general issues, as opposed to
national civil service training, which is specific to the
current circumstances of the beneficiary country’s pub-
lic administration.
• TAPs concentrate more on issues of management and
policy-making skills, instead of legal issues.
• TAPs are more interactive in style, as opposed to the
lecturing style that is characteristic of national civil ser-
vice training courses. This means that TAPs make wid-
er use of various interactive training techniques—such
as case studies, group work, etc.—and equipment—such
as flipcharts, overhead projectors, etc.
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Table 1
Key Characteristics of Training Assistance: Summary of Findings
Issue Donor Importance
PHARE DFID USAID CIDA
1) Dominant More of a critical More of a sustain- Not very Elitist  approach. The best strategy seems to be the critical mass approach. The elitist approach
project mass approach. ability approach, characteristic; can also be successful, if very carefully planned and implemented.
approach* with some elitist resembles The sustainability approach builds on assumptions that often don’t hold true
orientation. critical mass in the CEE/CIS context, therefore these types of projects are rarely successful.
approach.
2) Implemen- Project type implementationtation: For each project, the donor sets a project Project-type implementation—as opposed to a permanent implementation
tation framework, then contracts the implementing organization. structure—can lead to a number of problems, such as: rigidity caused by the strict
temporal and functional separation of strategic decisions and operative
implementation; limited project synergy; and experts’ limited awareness
of local policy and organization.
3) Project cycle Inflexible: More flexibility due to shorter planning and longer The longer the planning phase, the more severe the rigidity. Short implementation
Very long planning implementation phase. This is especially true of USAID. cycles, on the other hand, can decrease effectiveness, because, often, sustained
and short imple- efforts are needed to attain lasting effects.
mentation phase.
4) Selection of Non-EU imple- Organizations from the donor country are almost Relying exclusively on foreign implementing organizations and experts leads to
contractors menting organi- always used. very high expenses, problems related to the language barrier and problems related
zations might play to limited familiarity with the administrative system and the cultural environment.
some minor role.
5) Selection of The bulk of the tasks, especially in terms of expert costs, are fulfilled
implementing by Western experts.
experts
6) Transparency PHARE has a There is a large variance among field CIDA has an Lack of transparency prevents stakeholders, especially on the beneficiary side, from
and remarkably high offices located in different countries. acceptable level of overseeing and effectively influencing the assistance process.
accountability degree of trans- Usually, transparency is severely transparency.
parency. limited; even basic project information
is often treated as a business secret.
7) Training PHARE is often The content varies widely. There are some novel topics Training content is crucial. Deficiencies in TAPs arise due to the “one-size-fits-all”
content unresponsive to taught, which are also relevant, but much of the TAP approach, which incorrectly assumes that the same content is useful in all
expressed needs, content is not fully relevant or useful for beneficiaries. beneficiary environments; and due to the assumption that solutions that work
but the training is in the donor-country are adequate to beneficiary-country problems.
relevant because
EU accession has
high political
priority.
* The meaning of the three types of approaches are briefly reviewed in the section on terms at the beginning of this volume.
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• Unlike many national civil service training programs,
TAPs hardly ever end with an exam or any explicit mea-
sure of the knowledge or skills that the participants ob-
tained.
In seeking to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of
TAPs, we analyzed, by donor, the key features of TAP man-
agement that have an impact on their efficacy. The main
results of these findings with regards to individual donors
are summarized in Table 1.
In addition to identifying the above key factors of TAP
success, we estimated and compared the direct efficiency of
TAPs run by the various donors. The notion of direct effi-
ciency was measured as the unit cost of training: the amount
of money necessary to train one trainee for one day in the
given training project. This unit is called a participant train-
ing day (PTD). The direct efficiency of TAPs was compared
to that of national civil service training activities run by the
beneficiary public administrations.
Table 2
Unit Costs of Training by Donors and Beneficiaries
Characteristic unit cost for
Donors National civil service training
Donor USD/PTD Country USD/PTD
USAID 357 Hungary 20
CIDA 400 Lithuania 25
DFID 580 Ukraine 10
PHARE 300 Romania 15
/TACIS UK 142
The fundamental result of assessing unit costs of train-
ing was that one “unit,” or PTD, of TAP output is 12–58 (!)
times more expensive than that of a typical national civil
service training course. And this disproportion can be even
higher. For example, in the Ukraine, the ratio can be as high
as 1:250. This striking difference is even more surprising
because TAPs are usually designed and managed in a more
professional manner than national civil service training.
Our initial rough measure of efficiency may be mislead-
ing, because it is calculated on the basis of a rough output
indication. Naturally, a training day in a “good” training
project is worth much more than a training day in a poor
one, and the above PTD unit cost figure does not reflect this
fact. We attempted to account for potential factors that can
be quantified and may mean that TAP outputs are more
valuable than those of national training. In doing so, we
intentionally sought to overestimate the potential superiori-
ty of TAPs: We only considered those factors that may
increase TAP effectiveness and omitted those that would
decrease it, and we used unrealistically high values to assess
the effectiveness of TAPs.
But even after adjusting for the possible superior quali-
ty of TAPs, the above-mentioned robust differences in effi-
ciency are still present, though to a somewhat smaller
degree. After this adjustment, TAPs are “only” six-to-30 times
more expensive—in other words less efficient—than national
training. Still, the effect of training content was not ana-
lyzed quantitatively.
III. Further Conclusions
The findings presented in the previous section point to a
number of phenomena that lead to the sub-optimal perfor-
mance of TAPs. These, and other related deficiencies, may
appear in individual evaluation reports as errors in project
planning and management. But our findings revealed that
these “errors” are far too systematic and persistent to be sim-
ply due to accidents.
Instead, an alternative explanation for the systematic
occurrence of the same problems or “mistakes” is that goals
other than the improvement of beneficiary civil service are
followed by donors and implementing organizations.
Donors prefer to promote the interest of, and values and
approaches characteristic for, the donor country. Both the
donor and the implementing organizations are interested in
spending as much of the TAP budgets as possible within the
donor country. Furthermore, implementing organizations
are interested in maximizing their profit in TAP activities.
While this assumption might sound trivial to many, it is also
probably offensive for others. Some arguments supporting
the hypothesis are listed in Table 3.
Aside from pointing out the problems caused by TAPs,
the study also identified some apparently unintended bene-
ficial side-effects that arise due to the practice of using TAPs.
These positive effects do not come from individual TAPs—
which are limited in scope, time span and number of civil
servants trained—but instead are due to the accumulated
outcome of a host of various TAP activities. These benefits
include the following:
• TAPs help the beneficiary countries understand the
importance of training as a human resource develop-
ment tool and a means of public administration reform.
This appreciation of training was, and to some extent
still is, missing in the beneficiary countries.
• TAPs introduce new approaches to running public
administration. Throughout the region, a lack of sys-
tematic approaches, and a corresponding abundance of
ad-hoc and controversial decisions and actions, is a fun-
damental feature of the daily functioning of public
13
Table 3
The Function of Key TAP “Deficiencies” in Ensuring Maximum Economic Benefits for TAP Implementers
Phenomenon (“Mistake”) …and its Function in Maximizing Profits/“Rents”
The sustainability strategy that “teaches a man how to fish Sustainability-type projects allow a large proportion of project
instead of giving him a fish” is followed by many TAPs, funds to be spent on difficult-to-control expert work,
despite its high unit cost and low chance of success. instead of actual training.
Donors and implementing organizations seem to exhibit minimal True sustainability of the results of a TAP is not a necessary
interest in ensuring the sustainability of sustainability-type prerequisite of realizing the profit inherent in it, unless another
projects, especially after the project itself has ended. project is launched “to ensure its sustainability.”
The project-type implementation framework is followed, Applying a permanent implementation structure would exclude
instead of a permanent implementation framework, even though powerful pressure groups, such as Western consulting
a permanent framework is frequently more practical. organizations and “amphibious” freelance experts.
Implementing organizations and experts contracted This is the most obvious way to spend TAP funds in the donor
for implementing TAPs almost always have the same country of country. From the implementing organizations’ perspective,
origin as the donor. being contracted is a major prerequisite of realizing profits.
The transparency of activities is often minimal, and there seems It is a common interest of implementing organizations, experts
to be a “negative correlation” between unit costs and transparency. and the donor that the image of TAPs be attractive—and that
the pursuance of latent goals does not become too obvious.
administration. In addition, in many of the beneficiary
countries, an overly legalistic approach toward public
administration prevails. Public policy and management
approaches, which are the subject of much TAP con-
tent, may play an important role in gradually renewing
approaches, techniques applied and attitudes toward
public administration in the beneficiary countries.
• TAPs initiate a new, rational-purposive approach to
training. In this approach, training goals and objectives
are defined first, and content and methods are chosen
accordingly. The level of goal attainment is measured
via monitoring and evaluation, and other beneficial prac-
tices are followed. This approach is generally missing
from national training systems.
• TAPs introduce new training techniques that may in-
crease training efficiency in terms of transferring knowl-
edge and skills and enabling civil servants to use the
newly obtained knowledge in their everyday adminis-
trative practice. Here we refer to the dissemination of
the interactive training approach and application of re-
lated techniques, such as case studies, role-play, group
work, individual problem solving, etc.
IV. Recommendations
Recommendations for the Beneficiary Side
Most of the deficiencies on the beneficiary side stem from
general issues that cannot be changed within the narrower
scope of TAP issues. Such general problems include low
civil service wages, the high level of uncertainty in the tran-
sition period and the fact that neither individual nor organi-
zational actors within the national public administrative sys-
tem are really interested in turning TAPs into activities that
are truly useful for the country’s public administration sys-
tem. Therefore, the potential to significantly change how
TAPs are hosted by beneficiaries is limited. But some things
can be improved.
Recommendations—starting at the policy level and end-
ing at the management level—include the following:
Recommendation 1
The potential of TAPs to improve the civil service training
system should be utilized to the greatest extent possible.
1.1 The value of training as a tool of human resources
development needs to be recognized and acknowledged.
1.2 Beneficiary civil service training systems could be sub-
stantially improved by adopting certain elements of the
content and style of TAPs.
Recommendation 2
In deciding whether to host a given TAP or accept support
from a donor, not only the benefits, but also the costs, of the
TAP should be considered.
2.1 Recipients should be more aware of, and use, their bar-
gaining power with donors and implementing organi-
zations.
2.2 Administrative and similar obligations, and the result-
ing beneficiary costs related to hosting TAPs, should be
specified and considered in advance.
2.3 Care must be taken to avoid the possible harm that some
TAPs can cause to the beneficiary public administration.
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2.4 Requirements of national security should be observed
in dealing with TAP implementers.
2.5 Recipients should have a clear training strategy and pri-
orities, and they should try to put these priorities for-
ward in any TAPs that will be launched.
2.6 Large-scale TAPS should be given priority over small-
scale TAPs.
2.7 Appropriate trainee attendance should be ensured for
training courses.
Recommendation 3
Those personally involved in hosting TAPs should be more
familiar with the management and communication culture
of donors and TAP implementing organizations.
3.1 Obtain the necessary skills and attitudes to communi-
cate effectively with donors.
3.2 Not only the communication style, but also the motiva-
tion system and management practices of donors/im-
plementers, should be understood.
3.3 Having a devoted and motivated team, with appropri-
ate competencies, authority and infrastructure for ef-
fective TAP project management, along with central-
ized “docking” of foreign technical assistance, could sig-
nificantly increase the efficacy of running TAPs.
Recommendations for the Donor Side
Recommendations that may be utilized either by the donor
organization or an organization carrying out the project on
an operational level are as follows:
Recommendation 4
TAPs should be planned and managed with an awareness of
the recipient’s specific circumstances; in other words, one
size does not fit all.
4.1 In identifying beneficiaries’ needs and in devising solu-
tions, donors and TAP implementers should be prepared
for the formidable difficulties of understanding and deal-
ing with different administrative cultures.
4.2 Already existing training solutions and—especially—
content should be adjusted to meet the client’s actual
needs.
Recommendation 5
TAP goals should be realistic and achievable.
Recommendation 6
Project implementation arrangements should be geared more
towards ensuring better understanding of the beneficiary
environment.
6.1 Communication among foreign consultants working
in a given country on various projects should be pro-
moted.
6.2 Involvement of local experts in both the planning and
implementation phase of TAPs should be promoted.
6.3 Permanent experts, at the donor and implementing or-
ganizations, should be relied upon more often.
6.4 Donors should consider whether the “project arrange-
ment” is always the best way to implement TAPs.
Recommendation 7
Reducing training unit cost and, correspondingly, increas-
ing training volume may significantly increase TAP effec-
tiveness.
7.1 It should be carefully considered whether it is a good
idea to launch “sustainability-type” projects. Instead,
large-scale training courses may often be more fruitful.
7.2 Reliance on local resources can decrease costs.
7.3 Successful projects should be repeated, because this is
often more effective than elaborating new and question-
able projects.
Recommendation 8
The implementing organization should try to control as many
aspects of TAP implementation as possible.
8.1 The “advertisement” of the TAP should not be left up
to the beneficiary. Instead it should, at least in part, be
handled by the implementing organization.
8.2 The selection of trainees also requires special attention.
8.3 Donor and implementing organizations should try to
improve communication between various stakeholders
on the beneficiary side.
8.4 Whenever possible, projects should be started a few
months after elections, or at least not before elections.
8.5 Collaborators on the beneficiary side should be suffi-
ciently “motivated.”
8.6 Long-term utilization, or sustainability, of the TAP
should be ensured.
Recommendation 9
The beneficiary should not be saddled with an excessive and
useless administrative burden.
9.1 Steering committees should be made truly functional.
9.2 The number and duration of “stakeholder interviews,”
and the like, should be limited.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Public Administration
Technical Assistance
Addressing the social, economic, environmental and other
problems, of Central and Eastern Europe and the Common-
wealth of Independent States (CEE/CIS) in the first decade
after the transition naturally required determined and sus-
tained action from societies in the region. It is therefore not
surprising that analyses and recommendations pertaining to
future policies in these countries frequently point out the
urgent need to re-establish and strengthen their governance
capacity. Correspondingly, liberal democratic values and
principles of government took root. Meanwhile, at a lower
level related to the administration of government, a multi-
tude of constitutional, institutional and process and man-
agement reforms and development programs were launched.
Western donors played an important role in the admin-
istrative reform process from the beginning—usually through
various types of public administration technical assistance
projects. Considering the length of time that has elapsed
since these projects began, and the amount of aid that has
been spent in this area, it is surprising how little work has
been done to explore the field. Not much is known about
the actual process of administrative reform, its main features,
or even the important question of what sort of impact pub-
lic administration technical assistance has had in the region.
The existing information about the effectiveness of pub-
lic administration technical assistance projects comes from
two main sources: donor evaluations and scientific studies.
In practice, donor evaluations—conducted by, or on
behalf of, the donor organizations that fund these projects—
do not provide suitable information for establishing more
general conclusions. This is true for various reasons: Evalu-
ations are commissioned by the donors themselves, so it is
the donors who create the framework of these evaluation
projects. As a result, questions relevant for operative pro-
gram management are emphasized. Questions relevant for
beneficiaries and other external stakeholders, about the im-
pact and sustainability of the projects, receive less attention
in donor evaluations. Furthermore, since these evaluations
often have important practical consequences, there is an
understandable but definite pressure to emphasize positive
achievements while playing down failures. This tendency is
exacerbated by the substantive difficulties of evaluating public
administrative technical assistance. These difficulties include
the characteristic presence of vague and conflicting program
goals, intangible program outcomes and interference due to
vested professional and business interests and high-profile
international politics. In their 1994 study, Carlsson, Köhlin
and Ekbom provide convincing evidence and arguments as
to how and why donor organizations might actually “misuse”
the tools of evaluation. These authors maintain that it would
be more correct to perceive donor organizations as a loose
framework of interactions by a number of self-interested
individuals forming coalitions and alliances to realize their
own interests. Donors, therefore, use evaluations to promote
ambitions and aspirations that may not be linked, or may
even oppose, the official goals of their organization.1
Along with the above-described problems, there is
another reason why donor evaluations of public administra-
tion technical assistance projects do not provide adequate
information for broader study: Although “in theory” aid
programs are, if not primarily, at least in a substantial part,
about beneficiaries—their needs, problems and viewpoints—
these aspects do not appear in sufficient quality and quan-
tity in most evaluative works. There is an urgent need for a
deeper and more sophisticated view of the historical, social,
political, economic and cultural differences, including dif-
ferences between donors and beneficiaries and differences
between the “East” and the “West.” Without this, not only
beneficiaries but, to some extent, donors lose many of the
benefits of any aid money that is invested. And they even
run the risk that the aid may actually have adverse effects.
The philosophy of this study is characterized by a kind of
“beneficiary orientation.” The same is true of the team that
worked on it: Being researchers or practitioners from the
region, the people behind this study are closely tied to the
perspective of the people of the CEE/CIS region.
The other major source of information about public
administration technical assistance projects in the CEE/CIS
region, scientific studies on the topic, varies in breadth and
ambition. There are a limited number of such studies,
including Buss–Vaughan (1995), Cooley (2000), Dollar-
Pritchett (1998), Hesse (1996), Jenei–LeLoup–van den Berg
(2002), Wedel (1998), Ahonen (2002), Khapova (2002) and
Prigozhin (2002). More general, but still important, insights
are to be found in Carlsson-Köhlin-Ekbom (1994).2 While
these works point out a number of achievements of western
technical/training assistance, they are usually fairly critical
towards either the donor, or—much more frequently—
towards the recipient.
It is interesting to note that most issues highlighted by
these works—and most issues we will cover—were discussed
extensively decades ago, in the context of U.S. aid to the
developing world during the 1950s and 1960s. Important
studies were made into the so-called “development adminis-
tration” problem, especially by the Comparative Adminis-
tration Group, headed by F. Riggs. Studies produced out of
the work of this group include Montgomery–Siffin (1968),
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Brown (1968) and LaPalombara (1963).3 It is surprising that
the current discussion of the topic reflects so little of the
empirical and theoretical results of this vast and important
body of literature.
The key findings of existing literature on public admin-
istration technical assistance for the CEE/CIS region are
summarized in Table 4.
The above conclusions are typically drawn through case-
based observations of informed project participants—instead
of being based on systematic and methodologically sound
research. In sum, available knowledge on the role played by
Western public administration technical assistance projects
in the region suffers some important limitations:
• The substantive and methodological difficulties encum-
ber the application of clear and unbiased success crite-
ria. As a result, conclusions are often vague, uncertain
and controversial.
• The questions asked and the motifs followed are mostly
based on the donor’s point of view. Beneficiaries’ view-
points rarely show up in the design of evaluative research.
• Comparison of various donors, especially in a systemat-
ic manner, is fundamentally missing from the picture.
This is the case despite the fact that comparative work
would be essential to identify important factors of project
success and failure.
Table 4
Problems Identified by Existing Studies on Public Administration Technical Assistance for the Former Socialist Countries
Problems on the Recipient Side Problems on the Donor Side
• the general complexity, unpredictability and opacity • organizational politics pushes donors to sustain useless
of the political and social environment; or even harmful programs;
• moral/cultural difficulties: promises and agreements are • insufficient understanding of, and unresponsiveness to,
not kept, aid funds are misused; the problems of the client;
• clan-type, quasi-criminal networks superseding formal • one-fits-all-style, inappropriate consultancy products;
structures (in some CIS countries);
• the general inability of the beneficiary government to think
• the West puts money into its own pocket by sending
and act strategically;
its own consultants to the East.
• limited organizational capacity of the recipient country’s
public administration.
Problems on Both Sides and General Problems
• incompatibility of values, and thus, management practices and systems;
• limited ability to understand the other party’s point and to communicate effectively one’s own;
consequently, limited ability to cooperate effectively;
• presence of illegitimate personal or organizational goals—a result of which might be the self-sustaining process
of “cooperation for cooperation”;
• professional incompetence of cooperating partners, both Western consultants and local managers;
• creation of a robust and persistent “state of transition and reform” leading nowhere and thus conserving the status quo.
To address these challenges, this study will focus on a
specific, though important, sub-field of public administra-
tion technical assistance projects: those aimed at training
public administration personnel. This choice is explained in
the section below.
1.2 Civil Service Training
and Civil Service Training Assistance
Technical assistance, defined broadly as “helping others to
help themselves,”4 can take one of two basic forms when it is
provided for public administration. To put it rather simplis-
tically, this assistance can either take place in a pure training
setting or as a consultancy, which implies a different rela-
tionship between the client and the assistance provider. There
has been very little discussion of the former type of assis-
tance, civil service training. Most of the research and evalu-
ation efforts referred to in Table 4 either focus on the gener-
al realm of public administration reform and development
of the region or on consultancy type activities. This study
will focus on civil service training assistance. The position of
this subject area, within the broader realm of foreign aid, is
illustrated in Figure 1.
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Foreign Aid
(development aid, military assistance, technical assistance)
Technical Assistance (TA)
Public Administration TA
(Civil Service)
Training Assistance Projects
(TAPs)
In preparing this study on public administration tech-
nical assistance, researchers chose to focus on the sub-field
of civil service training and development for several reasons:
While assistance in the form of a consultancy and
general public administration technical assistance have been
the subject of some overarching reviews, civil service and
civil service training systems have been discussed much less.5
Furthermore, civil service training is important because
the new institutions and new practices being established in
CEE/CIS will only be operational if those people who run
them are both able and willing to do so. Training offers a
fundamental means of systematically giving workers capa-
bilities and motivation to do things in a new and different
way. Creating the concepts, institutions and procedures
capable of providing adequate training to the entire civil
service is a central task for operation of the government
machinery in CEE/CIS countries. The authors therefore
believe training is a central tool of human resource deve-
lopment within the public sector. Training is also important
in the broader policy field of public administration reform
and development. Despite this importance, training is
undervalued, not only by beneficiary governments but also
as a topic of research.
Another reason to study civil service training is that the
output produced by training projects, while being difficult
to evaluate, is substantially more tangible than the output of
consultancy-type projects. Thus it is much more plausible
to assess and compare training projects with one another.
This latter point deserves additional attention for this par-
ticular study, because it is comparative in nature: Assistance
projects that have taken place in various beneficiary coun-
tries, with funding from various donors, will be compared
with one another.
Along with the above-mentioned reasons for the focus
of this study there is also a personal element among the fac-
tors motivating and justifying the research. In this case, it is
the basic discontent of the authors with their experience in
the field of public administration technical assistance in the
CEE/CIS region. The authors have gained this experience
working as researchers, consultants or, sometimes, actual
participants in such projects. Our purpose is not only to
demonstrate deficiencies inherent in the field of civil service
training assistance. We also hope to go beyond pure descrip-
tion and enhance the understanding and explanation of a
segment of reality, with a possible further aim of improving
the situation.
1.3 Questions Asked and Structure
Followed in This Volume
As explained above, this study will concentrate on the less-
often studied area of civil service training. The focus of the
study will be sharpened further through attempts to address
certain key questions. The general questions posed by this
volume are as follows:
• Question 1:
In what state are the civil service and civil service training
systems of these beneficiary countries at the end of the first
decade of transition?
There is little information on how the civil service train-
ing systems of these countries developed during the
Figure 1
The Subject of the Study
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1990s and what their developmental stage is now.
Although this issue is not the core focus of this study, it
still sets the basic context in which Western assistance
takes place, and it is the subject of this assistance.
• Question 2:
What are the important characteristic features of assistance
projects—and the training these projects provide?
This brings up some related questions: How can vari-
ous donors be ranked according to these important
features? And, how do these features influence the effi-
cacy of foreign technical assistance?
• Question 3:
How truly effective are the activities of the various donors?
This is the central question of this study. In order to
deal with this question, we must answer a few prelimi-
nary questions, including: How can efficiency be
defined and quantified? What is the basis of compari-
son—should we compare donors to each other, or to
the nationally organized training activities? Should costs
be weighted against the immediate output of number
of trainees trained for a certain period—which is rela-
tively easy to measure—or should costs be judged against
outcomes and impact on the beneficiary’s public ad-
ministration system, which is a much more relevant but
much more difficult-to-measure variable?
The genre of this study is intended to be somewhere
between that of an evaluation report and a “standard” aca-
demic work. The targeted audience includes stakeholders
from both the donor and the beneficiary community—
executives, policy makers, field managers and technical ex-
perts. Accordingly, theoretical arguments will be kept to a
minimum and will be subordinated to the basically practical
orientation of the study. Similarly, a formal, full-fledged lit-
erature review is omitted; instead, references to relevant lit-
erature are made where necessary.
The volume seeks to answer the above questions in the
following structure: Chapter 2 presents the background and
the methodology of the research and the specific questions
that will be asked. Chapter 3 concentrates on Question 1,
by describing the key features of the civil service training
systems of the recipient countries. Chapter 4 deals with the
second main question, by identifying the relevant variables
potentially affecting success and failure of training assistance
projects. Chapter 5 addresses Question 3, by giving a com-
parative analysis of the efficiency of training assistance
projects. Chapter 6 gives an overview of the results and draws
some further conclusions on the basis of previous analyses.
In Chapter 7, we give a number of recommendations.
This volume often makes reference to a number of
papers prepared within the framework of the current research.
These papers have been made available on the web site of
the publisher, at http://www.osi.hu/lgi. These papers offer
grass-roots-level insight into the problem by presenting a
number of specific cases. This study will refer to four papers
on the four countries researched—Hungary, Lithuania,
Romania and Ukraine—and three papers on three selected
donors, the Canadian International Development Agency
(CIDA), the European Commission’s PHARE/TACIS pro-
gram and the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID). Material from the cases will serve, in part, as
illustrations, but the cases will also supplements key points
made in the book. For more details on the organization of
the research, see the relevant subsection in the next chapter.
Throughout this volume, certain types of information
are structured into standard formats. Comparative infor-
mation on specific donor or country characteristics are pre-
sented in similar tables, which we call “comparative tables.”
In cases where some kind of ordering within these compar-
ative tables seemed to be meaningful, the ranking of coun-
tries/donors is indicated with numbers in the first column
of the table.
Another format for presenting information on particu-
lar examples is to pull out specific cases at certain points in
the text to highlight them as illustrations of the points we
are trying to make.
2. CONCEPTS, SCOPE
AND DESIGN OF THE STUDY
2.1 Basic Concepts Used in the Study
The subject of this evaluation is civil service training assis-
tance projects (hereinafter referred to as TAPs) in the so-
called transition countries of CEE/CIS. In the following sec-
tion, we provide a brief explanation of the important terms
we will use in this study.
2.1.1 Civil Service and Civil Service Training
Civil servants, in this study and in most of the countries
involved in the research, are salaried employees of public
administration who work in the offices of central and local
governments. Thus, according to our definition, elected
politicians, such as members of parliament, ministers and
mayors, are not civil servants. Similarly, so-called public ser-
vants, like teachers, nurses and doctors in public hospitals,
are not civil servants. Furthermore, the personnel of uni-
formed services, the army, the police, etc. are not part of the
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civil service. Throughout this study, this definition of the
term “civil servant” is adhered to consistently, though we
are aware that, in different legal and historical contexts, this
term is often used with a somewhat different meaning, or is
not used at all.
The notion of central government encompasses minis-
tries and government agencies that have nation-wide juris-
diction but not ministry status, as well as related central public
administration organizations, such as cabinet offices or the
president’s office. Local government includes all other gov-
ernment organizations, local and territorial, irrespective of
whether these organizations function as relatively autono-
mous municipal self-governments or so called “de-concen-
trated organs,” which are hierarchically subordinated to a
central agency.
The term “civil service” thus primarily refers to the hu-
man dimension of public administrations. In fact, one could
say that the civil service is the human-resources element of
public administration. Key policy and administrative issues
related to the operation of the civil service are usually dealt
with by various legislative instruments, laws and other regu-
lations covering the civil servants and their employment.
A central function assumed by any civil service system
is the continuous, systematic development of its human
resources. The recurrent and central element in developing the
human capital available for public administration is training.
In the context of this study, training means those activ-
ities which:
• aim at inducing a change—be it cognitive, behavioral
or oriented more towards skills or attitudes—in the
individual civil servants;
• chiefly consist of a purposefully planned and imple-
mented, systematic effort by specialized experts, usually
trainers, in a specialized setting, usually training;
• take place in a well-defined, limited scope in terms of
participants, time allotted, goals and subjects covered.
Thus, by training we mean all types of training,
whether it be interactive or lecture format and whether it
focuses on knowledge or skills development, etc. But school
education, provided by secondary schools, colleges and uni-
versities awarding diplomas, is not considered training. We
consider training to be only those activities that are imple-
mented in a “classical training setting,” so that consultation
and conferences are not included in the term either.
Training activities are implemented continuously in ev-
ery civil service system of the region. These civil service train-
ing activities can be funded/managed by the “national,” (i.e.
beneficiary) government or its relevant organs. In such a case,
it would be called “national civil service training.” The
totality of knowledge, skills, attitudes and/or behavioral
changes that are supposed to be transferred by a given train-
ing event is called “training content.”
2.1.2 Training Assistance by Foreign Donors
But not all training is part of the national civil service train-
ing system. In most countries of the region, foreign bilateral
and multilateral assistance, predominantly from the West,
plays a key role in civil service training. It is exactly these
types of programs, or TAPs, that form the basic subject of
our study.
What is a TAP? Within this research project, TAP
refers to programs that satisfy the following criteria:
• training is provided;
• the training is entirely, or to a substantial extent, for
civil servant participants;
• the training is financed exclusively, or mostly, by
foreign, Western, donor organizations.
Donor activities that satisfy the above criteria are called
TAPs. But in some cases, where it seems justified, the defini-
tion is applied a little more “flexibly,” so as to include, for
example, training activities based on study trips.
An additional issue is the practical classification of TAPs.
How can one identify a TAP and separate it from other do-
nor activities? In this field, one faces at least three different
sources of difficulty:
a) Ideally our focus is on “pure” training projects. But there
are several foreign aid programs that contain a certain
proportion of training activity, along with several other
types of activities, such as other kinds of technical assis-
tance, institution building, etc. These are called “mixed
projects.” In this case, the definition of the TAP is nar-
rowed down to include, as much as possible, only the
training component.
b) A related version of the problem mentioned above oc-
curs when the project includes a large start-up training
element—such as the preparation of curricula and train-
ing materials, training of trainers etc.—which is expect-
ed to operate and yield a “profit,” or benefits, chiefly in
the longer term. This type of TAP will be called a “sus-
tainability-style TAP,” because its real values appear only
if the training is run several times in the future, after the
TAP itself has ended. Sustainability-style TAPs will be
discussed in detail later.
c) TAPs may be difficult to identify, even among projects
whose only purpose is training. Frequently, training is
provided for a mixed group of trainees, such as civil and
uniformed personnel of some public organizations,
mayors, elected officials and civil servants of local gov-
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ernments. The problem in these cases is that only a part,
and in quite a few cases an unidentifiable part, of the
trainees are civil servants. In order to address this issue,
we first attempted to identify the quantity of civil ser-
vants within the group of trainees and, based on the
available information, we decided case-by-case if the
given training project can be regarded as a TAP.
2.1.3 The Three ‘E’s
of Training Assistance Projects
Most evaluation studies in the TAP field break down the
notion of a TAP’s value or quality into such analytically dif-
ferentiated dimensions as, for example: operative, direct ef-
ficiency; effectiveness; impact; and sustainability. These cri-
teria are usually measured by the standards set forth in the
given program’s planning documents, or terms of reference.
When talking about the effectiveness or the efficiency of a
given activity, organization or, more generally, system, it is
not unusual to envisage it in terms of a simple input-output
model. We principally follow this framework, outlined in
Figure 2.
Feed-back: results compared to goals
System/
transformation
process
Outputs
(Measured in
paticipant
training days)
Outcomes/
impact
Longer term/
indirect effects
Inputs
Money/human and
material resources,
political support, etc.
Policy objectives:
Improved
public
administration
Training project/policy
Efficiency:
Ratio of outputs to inputs
Economy:
Sparing use of resources
Effectiveness:
Relation of outcomes to goals
Efficacy: these 3 “E”s together
Figure 2
Concepts Related to Training Efficiency and Effectiveness
Training input is conveniently measured by the finan-
cial resources used to produce the activity. This is justified as
long as all, or at least most, inputs are assigned a financial
value, and no substantial indirect or spillover costs occur.
Training output is the immediate product generated by
the training activity. It is generally measured in participant
training days (PTD), which is the number of training days
times the total number of participants.6 A great advantage of
this measure is that, unlike other measures, such as number
of participants, etc., PTD enables one to sum up the out-
puts of different training activities in an adequate manner.
But it is also clear that many important quantitative features
of training programs’ output cannot be grasped by this sim-
ple output measure. This problem is solved, at least theoret-
ically, by the introduction of the concepts of “outcome” and
“impact.”
The outcomes of a program or activity are its conse-
quences, actual benefits or harm, from the point of view of
the goals of the project or those of the beneficiary civil ser-
vice system. This notion emphasizes the wider, more indi-
rect and longer-term consequences of the program, as op-
posed to the more visible and immediate ones called outputs.
The term “impact” is used with a similar content, but this
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term emphasizes even more strongly the indirect and long-
er-term nature of project consequences.
The classical “three ‘E’s” of policies and programs—
economy, effectiveness and efficiency—can be interpreted
in relation to these notions. Economy is the extent to which
the project uses its resources in a sparing and non-wasteful
manner. Efficiency, on the other hand, refers to the rela-
tionship or ratio between total inputs consumed—which
includes resources rather than simply costs—and outputs
produced. This is sometimes expressed by the formula: effi-
ciency = output/input. In our case, this ratio usually takes
the form of PTD/USD. Unit costs of training, on the con-
trary, relate to the same issue but from a different perspec-
tive. Unit costs are essentially the reciprocal of efficiency, so
that unit costs equal total input per total output. For our
purposes, that means that, generally, unit costs = USD/PTD.
The third “E,” effectiveness, refers to the utility of the given
TAP for the country’s civil service system—in other words,
the extent to which the given training program is able to
improve the administrative capacity of a recipient countries’
civil service system. This measure may, or may not, coincide
with the stated goals of the given project. The “three ‘E’s” of
economy, efficiency and effectiveness together will often be
denoted as “efficacy.”
2.1.4 Main Players in the National Civil Service
Training System and TAP Field
For the sake of clarity, we list the terms used to describe the
key institutional actors in the TAP field:
• “Donors”—sometimes also called aid agencies—are the
organizations outside the national civil service system
that provide financial resources for TAPs. Donors also
manage these programs, either on a bilateral or multi-
lateral basis. Typically, donors determine the overall
objective of a TAP and, possibly, other key characteris-
tics of the TAP.
• A “TAP implementer” is the organization generally re-
sponsible for the practical implementation of a TAP.
This implementation often, but not always, occurs in a
contractual relationship with the donor.
• “Trainees” or “participants” are those trained within any
training program.
• “Docking organizations” is an umbrella term referring
to those national, in other words beneficiary-side, orga-
nizations involved in the management of TAPs. A dock-
ing organization could be a government office that de-
fines training needs or recruits trainees for a certain TAP.
• “Beneficiaries” are the entities receiving the aid. The
notion of beneficiary can often be split into two: 1.) the
people trained; and 2.) the institution responsible for
the TAP management on the beneficiary side. In some
contexts, the term may refer to the countries that are
receiving aid, or their governments. These countries or
governments are also sometimes called “recipients.”
• Finally, we may differentiate at certain points of the text
between the “donor side,” which refers to all institu-
tions involving the donor, and the “beneficiary side,”
which refers to institutions involving beneficiaries or
recipients.
2.2 The Methodological Background
and Approach of the Study
Both the evaluation of training programs and the evaluation
of foreign aid programs involve a number of practical and
theoretical difficulties. And the difficulties can be even worse
in evaluation of training programs that are implemented as
foreign aid. These issues are reflected in the relevant litera-
ture to a varying degree. While some of these difficulties
have been discussed in the past to a significant extent and in
detail, others have been largely neglected. In the forthcom-
ing section, our intention is to give a brief overview of exist-
ing issues, practices and results—and to place our study with-
in the “universe” of existing approaches.
2.2.1 Evaluating Training Activities
Unlike administrative systems in CEE/CIS, most Western
administrative systems have a relatively long history of em-
ploying evaluation as a field of applied social science. There
is definitely some degree of scholarly diversity, which is mainly
due to different epistemological approaches and/or different
emphases in, and interpretations of, an evaluator’s work.7
There is also a substantial unity with regard to the practice
of evaluation: The questions asked, the methods applied and
the roles assumed by evaluation practitioners converge both
in time and space.
But the picture is more controversial when it comes to
the evaluation of training activities. Most theoretical and
practical work in assessing training and education programs
falls into one of two different types of disciplinary app-
roaches.8
The first type of disciplinary approach is characterized
by a relative adherence to the “classical” view of evaluation.
This approach is best exemplified by Kirkpatrick’s often-
cited work, which has formed the basic point of reference in
training evaluation methodology in recent decades.9 To put
it very briefly, Kirkpatrick’s four-level model seeks to find
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an answer to the question of a training’s effectiveness on
four distinct levels, hierarchically built on one another. These
four levels of investigation are:
1) Immediate reaction of participants: Did they like the
program? Did they think it was useful?
2) Learning: Did the participants actually acquire the
knowledge or skills that the training was intended to
transfer?
3) Behavior on-the-job: Did the participants’ behavior, as
exhibited in their work settings, actually change in the
required direction?
4) Final results in the organizational context: Did the ex-
pected positive changes occur in the actual working of
the organization? Did its efficacy improve?
While the first, more immediate, levels of investigation
are generally a necessary condition for the ultimate usefulness
of training, they are not sufficient. That is, training is
successful only if all four levels of questions are answered
positively. The techniques or methods for answering these
questions are fundamentally identical with those found in
the general area of evaluation research. Depending on the
ambitions of, and the resources available for, the evaluation,
experimental, quasi-experimental and non-experimental
research designs are applied. These types of research typically
rely on questionnaire surveys conducted with program
participants or other stakeholders, program files and more
qualitative information, such as stakeholder interviews.
Although the four-level model of training evaluation has been
subjected to criticism from various directions in recent years,
the model still functions, to a large extent, as a standard
approach of practitioners in the field.
The other influential approach in training evaluation is
rooted in economics. It uses statistical and econometric meth-
ods to calculate—on the basis of earnings, productivity in-
crease and similar data—the economic value of training ac-
tivities, in terms of increases in human capital, using
non-experimental research design. This approach is more
often used in relation to macro-level policy issues. For
example, it is influential in the work of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the
World Bank. These calculations typically rely on data show-
ing expected increases in trainees’ earnings. The weakness of
this approach is that it makes “strong” assumptions about
the competitive and undistorted nature of the labor market.
This weakness is magnified when it comes to the strictly
regulated labor market segment of governmental em-
ployees.
It is generally agreed that evaluations of the efficiency
and effectiveness of training is especially prone to both the-
oretical and practical difficulties, whether choosing the former
or the latter approach. Our approach to the problem resem-
bles the classical evaluation model described first. This is
justified by four factors: 1) the micro-level focus of our study;
2) the complete implausibility of the free-market assump-
tions of the economic approach in the context of CEE/CIS—
or any—civil service “labor markets”; 3) the type of data
and information available for the purpose of the research;
and 4) the general practice of the TAP evaluation field, which
restricts itself to classical—in other words, non-economic—
evaluations.
Before further describing our approach, we will first
examine another basic ingredient of our problem field: the
arena of evaluating foreign aid programs.
2.2.2 Evaluating International
Technical Assistance
As mentioned above, there are few existing endeavors into
the evaluation of technical assistance—especially TAP activ-
ities—in the CEE/CIS region, and existing evaluative work
faces numerous difficulties.
Compared to evaluations of most types of foreign aid,
evaluations of public administration technical assistance are
less likely to use quantitative, “scientific” methods. Aid pro-
grams in the fields of environment, energy, transport, health,
social work and other areas are usually evaluated using os-
tensibly more rigorous methods of social cost-benefit analy-
sis, evaluation research and similar approaches. But techni-
cal assistance programs, especially those aimed at improving
the performance of the governmental sector, are rarely, if
ever, evaluated on such sound methodological bases.
This contrast is not attributable to the specifics of the
international aid field. Instead, the less scientific approach
to evaluating public administration technical assistance is
caused by the fundamental problems and constraints in
understanding—let alone quantifying or evaluating from
a wider, systemic point of view—sequences of events oc-
curring within the arena of public administration. It is no
wonder that most such evaluations rely on first-hand obser-
vation and/or other methods that are less rigorous and more
intuitive and qualitative. In establishing, supporting and
presenting evaluative and analytical statements of public
administration technical assistance, it is more common to
use expert ratings or qualitative-judgmental assessments.10
This methodological choice seems justified in many respects.
Despite this fact, and despite the problems outlined above,
our approach to evaluating TAPs has certain ambitions
extending somewhat beyond the mostly intuitive and quali-
tative way of drawing and presenting conclusions.
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This ambition is reflected in two features:
• First, it is clear that many statements, opinions and ob-
servations are difficult to support with “empirical evi-
dence” in the stricter, positivist sense of the term. In the
field of public administration, statements like “X is more
frequent than Y” are rarely supported by the probabili-
ty distributions of the quantified variables X and Y, mea-
sured under different circumstances for a large sample.
Many of the more qualitative methods, like case stud-
ies, “participatory observations,” etc., do not offer a ba-
sis for such rigorous measurement. Despite these diffi-
culties, we strive, wherever possible, to offer an insight
for the reader into at least some of the facts from which
we draw our conclusions. Thus, we try to benefit from
the strengths of qualitative methods. Accordingly, in
examining hypotheses, we use not only case-based, qual-
itative evidence, but also findings and conclusions of
other evaluative studies and research, analytical trains
of thought and, at some points, more intuitive consid-
erations rooted in the first-hand observations of some
of our interviewees, our colleagues and ourselves.
• Second, great effort is made to quantify as much as pos-
sible. Epistemological and practical problems attached
to quantification are manifold, and these problems are
extensively exposed and discussed by both academics
and practitioners of evaluation.11 In our view, the bene-
fits of at least some degree of quantification outweigh
the costs. Nevertheless, the lack of “facts,” let alone hard
data, poses great difficulties and forces the analysis to
apply some unusual or creative solutions at some points.
This creative approach is mostly used in some of the
central findings that are based on the comparative analysis
of different training programs’ efficiency. The methods ap-
plied in doing this are detailed in the introductory section of
the relevant chapter (Chapter 5). At this point, it suffices to
say that a lack of sufficient data is, we hope, counterbalanced
by the robustness of key findings and the use of a number of
analytical approaches and means of argumentation.
2.2.3 Beneficiary Orientation
Most evaluative exercises in the field of public-administra-
tion-related international aid are, understandably, specified,
commissioned, funded and used—or rather, not used—by
the donor organizations themselves. Beneficiaries rarely if ever
engage in such activities for a variety of reasons, the more
obvious ones being: lack of an evaluation culture, lack of ac-
cess to vital information, lack of expertise and, most impor-
tantly, lack of financial resources available for this purpose.
This situation causes many problems. One major prob-
lem is the resulting incompleteness and one-sidedness of our
view on, and knowledge of, TAPs—their actual role and their
effects in the beneficiary countries. A more practical prob-
lem is the lack of empirically grounded, systematic guid-
ance, which could assist beneficiary countries’ governments
and docking organizations in dealing with public-adminis-
tration-related foreign aid. Such guidance could also help
beneficiaries represent their interests more effectively. This
is important not only for the beneficiaries but also for
donors: Many of the problems inhibiting the representation
of beneficiary interests in the TAP decision-making and
management process are, or should be, simultaneously per-
ceived as problems by the donors as well. Our purpose and
attitude towards this evaluation is reflected well in the words
of Pollitt and O’Neill who, in the context of EU aid pro-
grams, note: “One way of avoiding the question of who an
evaluation is for is to claim that it is for all stakeholders […]
Our findings, and our wider knowledge of the evaluation
literature, leads us to be dubious of this proposition. […]
This echoes academic doubts about the fashion for multi-
stakeholder evaluations.”12
The approach of this study is explicitly based on a
degree of “beneficiary orientation.” But this orientation is,
by no means, intended to carry any kind of covert or other-
wise illegitimate bias in favor of beneficiaries as opposed to
donors. Instead, it aims at reflecting more the beneficiaries’
views, criteria of judging TAPs and interests in their process
of implementation.
The specifics of the “beneficiary orientation” approach,
as opposed to the “donor orientation” that is used for most
evaluations, are reflected in several features:
For one thing, the composition of the “evaluation
agenda” and the types of questions being asked are some-
what changed by the beneficiary orientation. In this study,
the beneficiary countries’ individual circumstances, includ-
ing institutional, legal, cultural, historic and other specifics,
are examined in greater detail and are given more weight
than usual.
Furthermore, the bases and standards used in making
judgements or comparisons are also somewhat different. For
example, measures of effectiveness of a program typically
compare results to the program designer’s goal, as laid down
in the planning documents. In our approach, the “effective-
ness” of a program is measured solely in relation to the ben-
eficiary country’s needs and interests.
While it might be an expressed and legitimate policy of
a donor to promote the national interests of the donor coun-
try, or to activate and nurture consulting companies and
other such professional organizations, these effects will not
be counted as benefits in this study. Looking at programs
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from the beneficiaries’ viewpoint can also change opinions
about the adequacy of training content. From the perspec-
tive of the donor, what is important is whether the actual
training content is adequate to the objectives of the TAP.
For example, a donor wants to know that a TAP aimed at
providing training in applying municipal bond systems con-
veys that knowledge. But from the perspective of the benefi-
ciary, the question is whether the given TAP actually has
a significant positive effect on the public administrative
system. For example, the beneficiary is more concerned
whether training in municipal bond systems really promotes
the situation of local governments. In an extreme example,
the training may, hypothetically, promote practices that are
prohibited by law in the beneficiary country.
2.3 Technical Aspects of The Research
2.3.1 Scope
As to the geographical scope of the research, four countries
have been chosen in order to represent the highest variance
across the most important factors that may be relevant as
explanatory variables of TAP characteristics—most of all their
efficacy. The four countries are: Hungary, Lithuania,
Romania and Ukraine. Naturally, the number and the
selection of countries reflect the material and technical con-
straints of the research.
Within the given time and geographical boundaries,
many donors have been active in the TAP field. Therefore
some “filtering” was inevitable. Only the most important
donor organizations and TAPs funded by these organiza-
tions were included in the investigation. The sample of “most
important donors” surveyed in the research was identified as
those donors providing training for the greatest number of
civil servants, or those having the largest annual total TAP
budget. But, in cases where it seemed justified, relatively
“smaller” donors were included too.
The list of donor organizations analyzed includes the
European Commission’s PHARE/TACIS program (herein-
after: PHARE), the U.K. government’s Department for In-
ternational Development (DFID), CIDA and USAID.13
While there are other significant donors in one or the other
of the four examined countries, the donors mentioned are
active in all of these countries. This is the reason why these
donors were included in the research, while others were not.
The main temporal focus of the investigation is the time
period of 1997–2000. But, in order to assess trends and long-
er-term developments, we needed to make reference to some
points in the 1990-97 period, as well as to the present time.
The manuscript was closed in August 2002.
2.3.2 A Closer Look at the Basic Questions
of The Research
It would be dishonest and implausible to say that, prior to
the study, the authors hadn’t had any opinion about the
subject matter of the research. Of course the research did
not start on a “blank page”: The authors had previous expe-
rience in the field of TAPs—as experts working for these
projects and also working on behalf of beneficiaries, as mem-
bers of the docking organizations hosting these projects. They
therefore had a number of basic and intuitive observations,
which influenced the choice of questions and variables—
and thus the design of the research. A non-exhaustive list of
these observations is as follows:
1) TAPs are often only of sub-optimal usefulness due to
such problems as: inadequate selection of trainees; in-
adequate training content; cultural controversies, espe-
cially regarding the expectations of trainers and train-
ees, which inhibit effective learning; and inflexible and
cumbersome project management.
2) TAPs tend to be very expensive and, thus, considering
the previous point, inefficient. For example, the absurd
situation in which a civil servant receives training that
costs as much as three years’ salary of the given civil
servant can happen easily. Training can have high unit
costs because: expert costs related to project prepara-
tion and training development are high, both in relative
and in absolute terms; and the implementation meth-
ods of training events—such as study trips abroad—
have a high resource requirement.
3) TAPs tend to be consistent in that, despite the above
problems, they are implemented by contracted organi-
zations and experts from the same country as the donor.
This is so, even if many—although certainly not all—
of the problems with TAPs, such as cultural and lan-
guage problems, high expert fees and related costs, are
directly linked to this practice.
4) There is frequently an air of secrecy around TAPs, even
for those local experts who are otherwise intimately in-
volved in their management or implementation. This is
primarily the case when it comes to such “sensitive” is-
sues as budget details of the project at hand.
These observations were thought to apply to the differ-
ent donors to a varying degree. But, with a few exceptions,
such as cumbersome project management, these problems
apparently plagued projects funded by all donors to a sub-
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stantial degree. When designing and implementing the
research, the authors made efforts to give a real chance for
these observations to be disproved or weakened when exam-
ined on a much broader empirical basis. Although most of
these statements remained applicable on the broader empir-
ical basis, after investigation with the stronger methodolog-
ical techniques of the current research, not all statements
held true. As later chapters of this volume will show, some
of these observations have limited validity, and a number of
additional points emerged that had not been anticipated
beforehand.
2.3.3 Research Design
As explained above, this study will use the individual TAP as
the primary unit of analysis and explore the population of
TAPs run by four key donors in four countries. It was antic-
ipated that insufficient access to data would create a major
obstacle in the research. As a part of the problem, it was
thought to be unrealistic to either perform data collection
for the whole population of TAPs or to apply a formal sam-
pling procedure. Therefore a “softer” approach was applied:
On the basis of available information, the field research was
to identify the “dominant,” “typical” value of the various
variables. In the case of some key quantitative variables, such
as the unit cost of training, the distribution of the variable
was sought by identifying “relatively low,” “typical” and “rel-
atively high” values. It is noted here that, in some countries,
certain pieces of data are not based on official statistics. Some-
times these statistics do not exist for areas such as civil ser-
vice personnel and wage data. In these cases, informed judge-
ments and estimations are used.
The comparative character of the research is maintained
by looking at a given, standard set of TAP characteristics
and comparing them across various sub-sets of TAPs. The
research examines training events within the various benefi-
ciary countries and those run by various donors, comparing
TAPs along these two dimensions simultaneously.
It was anticipated that, in some cases, the lack of data
would encumber this comparison. In other words, many cells
of the imaginary four-donors-by-four-countries table would
remain empty. Therefore, in addition to a specific TAP, the
country and the donor became important units of analysis,
too. For example, it makes more sense to examine the evalu-
ation practices on the analytical level of the donor than on
the level of individual TAPs.
2.3.4 The Research Process
Data and other types of evidence and arguments used in the
study stem from two sources. One of them is the field re-
search that took place in the first phase of this study. The
other is written data from a variety of sources.
The process of the field research was organized in the
following manner:
1) In the first, “inception,” phase, a detailed technical pro-
posal was prepared. The proposal envisaged that four
country teams would be involved, one team per benefi-
ciary country under study. The proposal consisted of a
detailed “Issue Paper” explaining the problem, its inter-
pretation, the methods and concepts used and the terms
of reference to be used. It also contained a description
of country teams’ expected outputs and a proposed
project schedule.
2) Then four experts, one per country, were identified and
contracted as the “country team leader” of the respec-
tive country. Because they were managers or experts of
key institutions of civil service training, these experts
had substantial experience in the civil service training
field of the given country. In addition, it was required
that they have a similar familiarity with TAPs and pub-
lic administration foreign assistance in general. Within
the framework of this research project, they were gener-
ally responsible for the fulfillment of the field research
tasks defined in the terms of reference of the research,
for identifying and contracting further collaborators and
for managing the budget allocated for the field research.
3) Subsequently, the appropriate material was sent to the
country team leaders and discussed at a project meet-
ing. The donors to be selected for detailed analysis were
also determined at this project meeting. The methods,
the supporting methodological materials and the sched-
ule were finalized after the meeting.
4) During the summer of 2001, empirical data collection
performed by the country teams took place. It consisted
of the completion of:
• one “Country Information Sheet” per country;
• three to five “Donor Information Sheets” per coun-
try, depending on the number of relevant donors
present in the given country as well as data avail-
ability.
These sheets were in fact highly structured question-
naires to be filled in by the country teams on the basis
of a number of interviews conducted with beneficiary
and donor side stakeholders, documentary analysis, lit-
erature review and Internet research.
5) Gathering of donor-related information in the four ben-
eficiary countries was supplemented by research con-
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ducted at certain donors’ headquarters, namely, at
CIDA, USAID and PHARE. This research, conducted
in Winter 2001–Spring 2002, was based on face to face
or telephone stakeholder interviews, document analysis
and Internet research. The results of this research were
summarized in one “Donor Paper” per donor.
6) On the basis of the research conducted in the four coun-
tries, four “Country Papers,” one for each country, have
been prepared by the country teams. These papers sum-
marize, with a flexible format and content, the main
points and results of research by the country teams. The
Country Papers are published at the electronic publish-
ing site of the publisher of this volume.
Table 5 summarizes the main quantitative characteris-
tics of the field research.
The other source of information was a number of project
files and documents, evaluation reports, research articles and
Table 6
Number of Training Projects Mentioned (“M”) and Analysed in Detail (“A”)14
PHARE USAID DFID CIDA Total
M A M A M A M A M A
Hungary 83 28 — — 7 6 — — 90 34
Lithuania 80 2 — — 6 1 1 1 87 4
Romania 9 3 4 2 — — — — 13 5
Ukraine 1 1 2 2 4 1 3 2 10 6
Total 173 34 6 4 17 8 4 3 200 49
papers, etc. reviewed by the authors of this volume. This
research did not produce any “intermediary products,” like
the Information Sheets produced by the country teams. In-
stead, this information was utilized by directly incorporat-
ing it into the analyses. (Table 6)
3. CIVIL SERVICE
AND CIVIL SERVICE TRAINING
IN THE RECIPIENT COUNTRIES
In this chapter, we discuss some major issues regarding the
civil service systems of the four countries being analyzed.
Then we describe the national civil service training systems
of the four countries. The main questions asked refer to the
legal and institutional background, major procedural char-
acteristics, major actors and their responsibilities and typical
characteristics of national civil service training courses, espe-
cially obligatory courses.
Table 5
Number of Interviews Made with Donor (“D”) and Beneficiary (“B”) Side Stakeholders
PHARE USAID DFID CIDA Other* Total
D B D B D B D B D B
Hungary 1+ 4+ — — 2+ 2+ — — — 1 10+
Lithuania — 2+ — — — 2 1 3 — — 8+
Romania 1 2 1 3 — — — — — 3+ 10+
Ukraine — 3 — — 1 2 1 1 — — 8
Headquaters 2 — 1+ — — 4 — — — 7+
Total 4+ 11 2+ 3 3+ 6 6 4 — 4+ 43+
* LGI in Hungary, Matra in Romania. Plus sign (+): Other, unnamed interviewees—typically trainees, or discussions with
various persons that happened outside this project. Names, positions and/or titles of interviewees are available from the publisher.
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3.1 Civil Service in Recipient
Countries—Regulation and Reality
The parliaments of each of the four countries analyzed had
adopted a law on civil service/public service by the year 2000.
These laws were adopted in Hungary in 1992, in Lithuania
in 199915, in Romania in 1998 and in Ukraine in 1993.
Because the civil service laws in Lithuania and Romania were
adopted as late as the 1997–2000 period of this investigation,
the legislation in these two countries had only a limited ef-
fect on national civil service training in the period that is the
focus of the research. The Hungarian law was amended sev-
eral times, and in 2001 there were major changes, including
significantly increased civil service wages and modifications
in the form and function of compulsory advanced training.
At the time the research was conducted, the Lithuanian gov-
ernment was considering whether to virtually abolish the
merit-based civil service system. These changes, however,
fall outside of the time scope of our research, thus we do not
go into detail on recent developments but return to the 1997–
2000 period.
At least two out of the four laws analyzed were developed
with foreign assistance. The Lithuanian law was developed
with the active assistance of PHARE, whereas development
of the legislation in Romania was assisted by DFID and
PHARE. In the case of PHARE, assistance was accompa-
nied by political pressure from the European Commission
Delegation to introduce a merit-based civil service system.
Most of the laws analyzed define civil servants as offic-
ers working in the offices of the central, territorial and local
governments. The Lithuanian law is somewhat different,
since it regulates the public sphere in general, including public
servants, the armed forces, etc. The Ukrainian law includes
such political positions as the prime minister, ministers of
the cabinet and mayors of local governments within the body
of the civil service. This group is estimated to amount to
about 10 percent of the total civil service personnel.
The laws contain most of the elements that a merit-
based civil service regulation would normally contain. Such
elements are, among others, a grading system, a career sys-
tem, a kind of a performance appraisal system, a system of
selection and recruitment and guarantees against unfair re-
dundancies or dismissals. A type of a grade-related pay sys-
tem is also present in all four countries. It seems that all
these laws are somehow copies of “Western solutions.” The
laws “import” most of their crucial elements, such as the
subsystems of merit-based civil service systems.
But these elements are not “polished” to perfection by
practice and do not really function together smoothly as a
real system. For example, the analysis of the Hungarian civil
service law, which has perhaps been tested the longest, shows
that a civil servant’s career path is not based on their person-
al appraisal; their personal appraisal is not based on their job
description, let alone work performance; and the allocation
of training opportunities to a civil servant is not adequately
based on their planned career. In other words, while the
various subsystems are in place, they do not operate in syn-
ergy, and, therefore, individual elements do not appropri-
ately perform their function.
• In Hungary, a relatively strict grading system is in place. Civil
service grades usually depend on education level and years of civil
service experience. But grades are determined on the basis of the
education level and work experience of the individual civil ser-
vant, rather than on the requirements for the specific position. Such
explicitly stated, written requirements rarely exist at all. Thus a
Hungarian civil servant with a master’s degree in sociology will be
in Grade I, the highest grade, even if he or she fills a position where
a secondary-level education in agriculture is the specified require-
ment—if there is any specified requirement at all.
While the civil service laws postulate a purely neutral
civil service, the specific regulations of the laws do not effec-
tively protect civil servants from wide-spread and harsh forms
of political intrusion.
• The Ukrainian Civil Service Law is especially ambiguous in the
regulation of political interference. Whereas the law stipulates that
civil servants must be politically neutral, the same law includes
purely political positions, such as ministers and mayors, within the
civil service.
All the laws define the civil service as a politically neu-
tral body of paid officials. But the system of legal guarantees
is not strong enough. Of course, laws cannot do much if
they are not followed, if they are neglected or if fraud is
widespread—as is the case, to a greater or lesser extent, in all
four countries. Indeed, our country teams unequivocally
noted that civil service positions, especially the higher man-
agerial positions, are the spoils of the winning political par-
ties. Moreover, even if the same party appoints a new minis-
ter, major changes may appear in the management of the
ministry. These changes can extend two-to-four levels down
from the highest civil service management status. In other
words, these positions depend on personal confidence. It is
somewhat characteristic that, while the philosophy of the
civil service laws are reminiscent of the British civil service
system, the practice is closer to the U.S. system, or even goes
beyond that in terms of politicization.
The political and personal dependence of managerial
civil service positions has a great impact on the implemen-
tation process and the outcome of TAPs. The lack of
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neutrality results in a high turnover rate that affects TAPs in
at least the following three ways:
• Trainees may be forced to leave the civil service soon
after the training ends. This is generally a major source
of ineffectiveness in TAPs. Many TAPs concentrate on
managers as potential trainees, because they hope to
achieve greater impact this way than by training lower-
level civil servants. But there is a high chance that the
trained managers will be laid off after a change in polit-
ical leadership.
• A somewhat extreme, but still characteristic, case of personnel change
is that of a PHARE TAP that provided training for a relatively
large number of civil servants in the 1992–1995 period. In 1996,
one year after the project ended, evaluators found that only about
one fifth (!) of the trained persons were still in the civil service.
• The beneficiary counterparts of donors are usually in a
managerial position. It is quite common that the previ-
ous national contact person is laid off or forced to leave
the civil service after elections, and the donor, or the
contracted implementing organization, has to restart
with another contact person.
• In a few cases, the newly appointed government was
suspicious about the donor and/or implementing orga-
nization assisting the previous government, and there
was no neutral local agent or civil servant who could act
as a liaison between the docking organization and the
beneficiary government.
Another major element of the civil service system is re-
muneration. The remuneration system has direct impacts
on TAPs, perhaps most importantly because of the extreme-
ly low level of civil service salaries. These wages are low com-
pared to any relevant reference group. Wages are low not
only in comparison to Western wages but also in compari-
son to the private sector wages of the country concerned.
The wage gap between the public and the private sector is
especially high among relatively young, well-educated pro-
fessionals who speak at least one foreign language, which is
a typical target group of TAPs.
In Table 7, we provide some comparative data on the
civil service wages in the region.16
It seems quite typical in the region that managerial sal-
aries are much higher than “ordinary” civil servants’ salaries.
From the TAPs’ aspect, low wages result in high turnover
rates with a similar impact to that described above: There is
a high turnover in national counterpart personnel and a low
retention rate for trainees in the civil service.
Another way in which the civil service remuneration
system has a direct impact on TAPs is that donor organiza-
tions have to cooperate with a poorly motivated administra-
tive body. Obviously, working morale is lower among poor-
er paid workers. As the common saying goes: “If you pay
peanuts, you’ll get monkeys.” Donors often find that civil
servants at the national docking organizations do not fulfill
their obligations on time, or at all; promises are not kept, or
workers even deny that the promises were made; meetings
are unexpectedly cancelled at the last minute, etc. If two
persons work on the same project, one on behalf of the do-
nor or implementing organization, another on behalf of the
national public administration, it is somewhat reasonable to
expect that they are paid similarly—that they receive a com-
parable wage for comparable work. But, if one person earns
more than USD 300 daily, while the other earns USD 150
monthly, the same rationale works in the opposite direc-
tion: It is reasonable to expect that the lower wages will lead
to lower performance. In addition to the rational aspects,
low wages may also induce frustration and greediness in the
TAP environment. These ill-effects can be expected to fur-
ther decrease the performance of national civil servants.
3.2 National Civil Service Training
Systems: Procedures and Structures
3.2.1 Legal Regulation of the Field;
Compulsory and Non-compulsory Training
Practically all civil service laws have a reference to civil ser-
vice training. Training is typically treated as both a right and
Table 7
Monthly Salaries in the Recipient Countries on Various Levels of the Civil Service [USD]17
Country Clerical Decision-making Managerial
Hungary 120–200 (150) 140–350 (220) 350–450 (400)
Lithuania 160–300 267–527 527–1,000
Romania 50–400 (150) 360–460
Ukraine 50 72–115 (90)
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an obligation of civil servants. All four civil service laws state
that it is the civil servant’s right and obligation to take part
in training courses that provide the knowledge and skills
necessary to carry out the civil servant’s task lawfully and
efficiently and enable him/her to serve the public interest to
the highest possible degree.
In some cases, the laws, or secondary legislation, deter-
mine that civil servants are eligible for, or are required to
participate in, training courses of a certain length within a
certain period.
Comparative Table 1
Regulations on Civil Servants’ Training Eligibility
Hungary According to the cabinet decree on national civil
service training in Hungary, civil servants are
entitled to receive 30 hours of training within
every four-year period.
Lithuania The Lithuanian law approaches the issue from a
budgetary angle. Budgets of public administra-
tion organizations shall contain a line for national
civil service training, and the amount earmarked
for training shall not be lower than 1 percent of
the civil service wage bill at the organization.
Romania The issue was not regulated during the period of
the research.
Ukraine In Ukraine, civil servants are required to get a passing
grade in a retraining program once every five years.
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Comparative Table 2
Obligatory Training Courses and/or Exams
Hungary In Hungary, all civil servants—except for those holding a degree in public administration, law or economics—must pass
the so-called General Civil Service Exam within one-and-a-half to two-and-a-half years of entering into the service.
About 90 percent of the candidates take part, before the exam, in three-day preparatory courses. Ninety percent of the
content of the exam, and thus the preparatory training, pertains to law. Those in managerial positions are required to pass
the Advanced Civil Service Exam. The content of the advanced exam is also centered on legal issues. About half of those
who take the advanced exam participate in a preparatory course before-hand. Ministries may determine obligatory exams
and/or training for the narrower segment of civil servants working in a given field, irrespective of whether the civil
servants are employed by the central government or a local self-government.
Lithuania In Lithuania, the law determines three different types of obligatory national civil service training: initial training, continuous
(in-service) training and training for senior civil servants. Training development, delivery and testing is performed by the
Lithuanian Institute of Public Administration. Civil servants are required to pass the initial training and exam when they
step up from the lowest level of a given category to the next level. Ministries may determine obligatory exams and/or
training for the narrower segment of civil servants working in a given policy field, irrespective of whether the civil servants
are employed by the central government or a local self-government.
Romania In Romania, ministries may determine obligatory exams and/or training for the narrower segment of civil servants working
in a given policy field, irrespective of whether the civil servants are employed by the central government or a local self-
government. However, there is no general obligatory training and/or exam for civil servants.
Ukraine In Ukraine a relatively sophisticated national civil service training system exists. There is a two-week-long program that is
generally obligatory in the civil service. The program includes three parts: a legislative part, which makes up about 30
percent of the content; a management part, which also makes up about 30 percent of the content; and a professional part,
which contains some legal elements as well and makes up about 40 percent of the content. All participants are required to
take a final examination. The training and examination are based on a centrally developed curriculum, and both are carried out
by a centrally controlled network of regional training facilities. Twenty-seven such facilities exist all around the country.
Ministries may require an obligatory exam and/or training for the narrower segment of civil servants working in a given
policy field, irrespective of whether the civil servants are employed by the central government or a local self-government.
Most of the countries’ relevant regulations determine
some forms of obligatory training and/or require the suc-
cessful passing of certain exams.
There are some general characteristics of obligatory train-
ing in the region that could be summed up as follows:
• Obligatory training sessions end with exams. In other
cases, training may be simply an optional opportunity
to prepare for an obligatory exam. The method of ex-
amination is similar to university exams.
• Content analysis of the compulsory training measures,
as well as their strong reliance on examination, shows
that training focuses on knowledge transfer, rather than
skills improvement or attitude change.
• It seems, at least in Hungary and Ukraine, where com-
pulsory training has been in place for a longer period,
the topic of law is a major element of this type of train-
ing and examination.
There is no separate central training budget for training
in the region. The only exception is Hungary, where such a
budget was established in 1999, with quite modest funding.
The typical means of financing training in all four countries
is that public administration organizations earmark training
costs in a separate line in the organization’s budget within
the “personnel expenses” section. Another way of financing
training is to finance the training provider directly from the
central budget. This practice is quite significant in Ukraine
and is present to some degree in Hungary and Lithuania.
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3.2.2 Responsibilities, Activities and Actors
From an institutional point of view, there is a great similar-
ity among the four countries. The set of responsible author-
ities is almost identical. Theoretically, the cabinet—and/or
the president’s administration—is responsible for the formu-
lation of an overall, national civil-service training policy. How-
ever, no well-developed, sound and consistent national civil
service training policy exists in any of the countries analyzed.18
It is usually the interior ministry that is responsible for
policy formulation, implementation and control of imple-
mentation.
Generally, obligatory courses are centrally designed. The
training materials, usually manuals, are centrally produced
and distributed. For other, non-compulsory courses, train-
ing curriculum and training materials are typically created
by the training provider.
We found no evidence that a general, wide-ranging na-
tional civil service training needs assessment has been car-
ried out by the competent national authorities in any of the
countries. But, in some cases, foreign donors financed such
activities, either as part of a larger training project or as a
separate project. For instance, we have heard about three
needs assessments, with varying scope, carried out in Roma-
nia within two years. Nonetheless, we found no evidence
that any of these needs assessments has ever really been uti-
lized by the national government.
It is more common that governments determine, in some
less structured way, their main priorities.
So-called priorities sometimes turn out to be overly
general: They embrace practically everything, so they can
hardly be considered priorities.
On the general issue of demand for training, the coun-
try teams mentioned that there is low interest in training,
Comparative Table 3
Civil Service Training Policy and Implementation Responsibilities
Hungary Whereas national civil service training policy is in the portfolio of the Ministry of Interior, civil service management
training is in the portfolio of the Prime Minister’s Office. A special body, the Council for National Civil Service Training,
operating under the Ministry of Interior, has a major part in the utilization and allocation of the above-mentioned central
training budget.
Lithuania Until 2000, the Ministry of Public Administration Reform and Local Authorities was responsible. Since 2000, the
Ministry of Interior is responsible for policy formulation and implementation.
Romania The National Agency of Civil Service (NACS) is the responsible authority. The NACS was directly subordinate to the
cabinet. Later on, its supervising authority became the Ministry of Interior.
Ukraine Ukraine is an exception to the rule in this regard. The responsible body is the Chief Committee of Public Service at the
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. This committee is responsible for the co-ordination of the overall training policy
development and implementation. On behalf of this committee, one of its members determines curricula and training
materials to be adopted. All of these are obligatory for sub-national training centers. To deliver a training activity, this
committee adopts the training centers’ budget and finances their activity through the State Treasury system.
Comparative Table 4
Official List of Training Priorities
Hungary The priorities were determined by a cabinet resolution in 1999, and a reporting system was set up to monitor how many
civil servants are trained in the priority areas. Priorities are as follows: a) EU-related issues, including general EU training
of all civil servants; b) foreign language skills; c) computing skills; d) management skills; e) law-making skills. Despite the
diversity of priorities, legal knowledge is still the focus of obligatory training courses, and even EU training. EU training
forms an overwhelming majority of the centrally managed courses.
Lithuania The government is required by a recent law to set up a national civil service training strategy. Other public administration
institutions, in turn, are required to create annual training plans that reflect the general training strategy, as well as the
specific needs of the organization and the civil servant. These requirements are spelled out in the civil service law adopted
in 1999. We have not been able to collect information on its implementation yet.
Romania We found no official list of priorities in Romania.
Ukraine The previously mentioned Chief Committee of Public Service at the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine set up the following
training priorities: a) management skills; b) communication skills; c) legal knowledge; and d) specific professional knowledge
and skills.
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and sometimes even resistance toward participating in train-
ing courses. Training may be regarded as a “penalty” rather
than a reward. This issue seems to be more serious in Ukraine
and Romania, but it is present quite significantly in Hunga-
ry and Lithuania, too.
We found no evidence that evaluation of the national
civil service training system, or evaluation of compulsory
courses, is present in the countries examined.
• Hungary seems to be an exception to the lack of evaluations, be-
cause there was an evaluation of the so called General National
Civil Service Training system, one of two generally compulsory train-
ing courses. But this was rather more of a research activity initiat-
ed by researchers than an evaluation required by the stakehold-
ers.19 The evaluation results and recommendations were not utilized,
and the report was, at least in the initial and most relevant period
after its completion, practically classified.
Some training providers may ask trainees at the end of
the course to fill in a questionnaire and collect feedback on
trainees’ impressions. However, even this limited effort can
be considered an exception rather than the rule in national
civil service training environments.
Another way to classify civil service training in the coun-
tries studied is according to the level of centralization in-
volved in managing training. One may reasonably require a
precise definition of, or even a measurement method for,
the term “centralization.” When we talk about a “central-
ized” system, we mean it uses centrally directed public train-
ing providers instead of other means of providing training,
such as courses given by for-profit and non-profit organiza-
tions. We cannot provide a measurement method, because
there is no quantitative data available. The authors must rely
on intuition, and we can provide only a qualitative explana-
tion. Our ranking with explanation is presented in Com-
parative Table 5.
• We know of a few cases in Hungary, for instance, where a former
trainee utilized TAP training to set up a small enterprise and offer
training for a market price. Meanwhile, the government’s institu-
tional memory has completely forgotten about the TAP.
• Due to the lack of an established national civil service training
institution in Romania, TAP courses could be replicated only by
for-profit and non-profit organizations.
Donors play quite a significant role in financing civil
service training, especially in terms of inputs, or funding,
but also in terms of outputs, such as number of civil servants
trained or PTD. There is no reliable quantitative data that
would allow a sound assessment of the proportion of TAPs
within the total national civil service training activity. In
Hungary, where access to data was the best, about one fifth
of total civil service training spending in the country comes
from foreign donors, and between 1–3 percent of the total
PTD stems from TAPs. Comparison is, of course, even more
difficult than description of an individual country. Howev-
er, based on information we could obtain, we set up the
ranking, presented in Comparative Table 6 in ascending or-
der, by the proportion of civil service training that is nation-
ally organized compared to the number of TAPs.
Comparative Table 5
Ranking of Countries According to the Level of
Centralization in Civil Service Training Infrastructure
1. Ukraine Ukraine has a relatively well-established and
institutionalized training system, providing gene-
ral, obligatory training sessions. Aside from this
system, we could not  identify additional relevant
training providers or other major training courses
in the national civil service training field.
2. Hungary Hungary could be regarded as the second most
centralized system, with its obligatory courses and
relatively stable training network. At the same
time, there is a wide training market open for for-
profit providers. Indeed, we estimate that about
one third to one half of the training needs are
satisfied by such training organizations. Major
training fields dominated by for-profit organiza-
tions are those of skills improvement—such as
computing, language skills, communication,
etc.—and finance.
3. Lithuania Lithuania made the first steps towards the estab-
lishment of a centralized training system in 1999.
4. Romania Romania, on the opposite pole, seems to lack all
these characteristics. Instead, for-profit and non-
profit organizations seem to dominate the supply
side of the national civil service training market.
Meanwhile, the demand side hardly exists.
The degree of centralization of the national civil service
training system may be a crucial factor in determining the
success of TAPs, especially when it comes to long-term TAP
impact. It must be clear that different environments require
different strategies for success. In a centralized system, do-
nors or implementing organizations can only achieve a long-
term impact and sustainability if the TAP is somehow inte-
grated into the national civil service training system. In a
decentralized environment, on the other hand, curricula and
training materials could be picked up by profit-oriented train-
ing providers and offered in the national civil service train-
ing market.
We emphasize again the ultimate uncertainty of the as-
sessment. However, we are more confident regarding the
first and the last position.
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Comparative Table 6
Proportion of Nationally Organized Training versus TAPs
Hungary There were only two major donors active in the investigated period, and it was only PHARE that was present with several
TAPs. PHARE is present in all four countries, but there are several other donor organizations in the three other countries.
Additionally, Hungary runs a centralized training system that affects almost all civil servants, and there is also a wide
private-market supply of civil service training.
Lithuania Lithuania is considered more developed and less dependent on foreign aid in general terms. Additionally, the new law
established a central training institute and formed the Public Administration Training Association, a group of already-
existing educational institutions that are accredited to provide national civil service training courses. Furthermore, there
are three types of obligatory training. However, the law was only adopted in 1999, at the end of the investigated period.
By the year 2000, the central training center could train only 1,000 civil servants annually, which seems to prove that
national civil service training is quite weak. Meanwhile, several donor organizations are present in the country.
Ukraine Ukraine has a long-established national civil service training system. Its institutional background seems relatively firm,
and obligatory courses were run during the investigated period. At the same time, foreign donors are also strongly present
in the country. But we are still somewhat uncertain whether it is Lithuania or Ukraine where TAPs play a more important
role within civil service training.
Romania In Romania, there were several donors quite active in public administration reform and, within that, TAP activity was quite
significant. At the same time, no centrally coordinated network of national training institutions exists. Nor are generally
compulsory national civil service training courses determined. The establishment of a National Training Agency has been
planned for several years, with the active involvement of PHARE, but it has not been implemented yet. According to the
plans, the agency, and over 50 percent of its activities, would be financed by foreign donors in the first three years of its
existence. Our country team reported that, though the civil service training supply side is relatively strong, with non-
profit and for-profit organizations offering a wide range of courses, the demand is close to zero. The reasons for the slack
demand are two-fold: a) the lack of understanding of the importance of quality training; b) more importantly, the lack of
money to finance training. We took into consideration all these issues when judging Romania as the most dependent on
foreign money in financing civil service training.
3.3 Cultural Environment
The culture of trainees, and of their general public adminis-
tration environment, determines their behavior in training
courses and determines how they value various aspects of
training. Usually, the general national civil service training
practice forms the values, attitudes and expectations of civil
servants towards training. National civil service training
sets up the general standards. If civil servants experience a
lecture-style training, aimed at transferring legal knowledge,
they may be convinced after a while that this is the ideal
training. Designers and trainers of national civil service
training courses are instinctively aware of the cultural envi-
ronment in which they work. This cannot be said about
designers and trainers of TAPs. Below, we address some
cultural issues that may directly influence the success or fail-
ure of TAPs.
Training is generally undervalued and perceived by civil
servants of the region as a burden rather than an opportu-
nity. Civil servants are frequently over-burdened by every-
day work. Participation in a three-day training course can
mean a civil servant must catch up on other responsibilities
by working overtime, in the evenings or on the weekend.
Furthermore, the value of training is rarely recognized by
ordinary civil servants. This leads to a situation where there
is no inherent, widely shared demand for training on the
part of individual civil servants. Frequently, the training
courses that are popular are those that may help civil ser-
vants to leave public administration and find a job in the
private sector. Such training events could be, for instance:
project management, public relations and media relations,
interpersonal communication—or simply language and com-
puting skills courses.
It is also less-often recognized by the potential trainees,
or even their supervisors, that participation from the begin-
ning to the end of a training course is necessary. It may eas-
ily happen that someone sits in on the morning of the first
day of a training course, then leaves at lunchtime because he
receives a call from his boss. He might send someone to
replace him on the second and third day of the course, and
this substitute might not be able to stay on the afternoon of
the third day. Absenteeism is probably more common with
TAPs than with national civil service training, especially the
obligatory training courses that end with an exam. Some
human-resources managers suggest that the cost of training
should be passed on to the trainee if he or she leaves the
course—or else the trainee’s supervisor should pay, if the
supervisor interrupts the training. No such enforceable rule
currently exists in any of the observed countries. In the case
of TAPs, it would be possible to sign an agreement with the
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trainees or the beneficiary public administration organiza-
tion, or both, setting out the obligations of the trainee, on
one hand, and the training provider, on the other. This agree-
ment could also specify certain sanctions if one party—
practically speaking, the trainee or the beneficiary organiza-
tion—fails to fulfil their obligations. However, we have not
found any such functioning arrangement among the ana-
lyzed TAPs, even though various evaluations suggested such
a system. The reason may be that drawing up such an agree-
ment requires immense knowledge of the beneficiary’s civil
service system—knowledge that is usually missing on the
donor’s side.
Another cultural issue is the training method. Lecturing
has been the typical, and thus generally accepted, method of
training in the region. Indeed, training is often regarded as a
“small-scale,” “on-the-job” form of university education.
• A good example of the tendency toward university style classes can
be seen in Ukraine. There, the regulation differentiates between
three types of training: training, re-training and in-service train-
ing. The first two categories are practically full- and part-time
university education. The major training institution, the Ukrai-
nian Academy of Public Administration, provides a master’s
degree in public administration.
• Similarly, in Romania, various government initiatives to set up a
central training institution always involved plans for an academic,
university-style institution, rather than a training-type institution.
• In Hungary, the Hungarian Institute of Public Administration
was originally a semi-academic research institute. The institute’s
training function was added later. It still does not have any full-
time professional trainers among its personnel.
Interactive training may be quite frustrating for ordi-
nary civil servants. These trainees expect that the trainer will
provide them with the necessary knowledge by telling them
important things that can be written down and learned.
Generally, trainees expect that the trainer knows everything
and that they will learn from this wise person. When civil
servants find out that their trainer does not answer ques-
tions directly, but instead passes the question on to other
trainees, the civil servants can become suspicious. Trainees
can be doubtful about learning from other trainees instead
of one wise person who stands in front of the group, lectur-
ing. This situation can result in frustration, aggression, or
even in trainees leaving the training venue.
There is often disagreement over the different percep-
tions that donors and beneficiaries have when it comes to
the relevant skills of the trainer. In the donor’s culture, a
trainer should be an expert in the process of training itself.
Training expertise requires specialized skills that can be ob-
tained through learning and practice. Once this expertise is
obtained, a trainer may provide training in a very wide range
of fields, according to the view of most donors. But, in the
beneficiary’s culture, training is not regarded as a set of spe-
cific skills or a profession. Only immense knowledge of the
topic at hand is thought to qualify someone to train others.
In this culture, only the content of the course is valued. These
two contradictory approaches may easily lead to conflict.
Actually, a trend towards increasing understanding of
the values of interactive training can be detected in the re-
gion. In our view, TAP activities played a crucial role in
making decision-makers and stakeholders in the field of na-
tional civil service training, as well as the trainees themselves,
aware of the value of an interactive training style. In fact,
this may be one of the most important, unintended, side
effects of TAPs in the region.
But an interactive training style may not always be the
best approach. Interactive training may function well if train-
ees have some experience in the field, so that they can share
their experience with one another. Yet TAPs frequently ad-
dress new issues, or introduce new approaches, so they may
cover areas in which trainees have no prior experience. In
the U.K. or Sweden, training in efficient project manage-
ment could easily be provided in an interactive setting. But,
for civil servants who perceive public administration as sim-
ply executing laws—civil servants who have never worked
on projects and who possibly do not even understand the
concept of a project—interactive training as a first step in
learning may not be appropriate. Similarly, purely interac-
tive training in policy making may be dangerous if the word
“policy” is not explained carefully first, because the whole
concept is largely unknown in the region. Even the word
denoting the concept of policy has only existed in many
Continental languages for a relatively short period of time,
if at all.
Generally, we believe that the trainer is expected to have
some knowledge of the content area of the training. It seems
to us that, sometimes, training is held in an “interactive”
way to disguise the trainer’s lack of competence in the sub-
stantive field of the training. On several occasions, we have
witnessed the situation where the trainer actually turned out
to lack any educational background or work experience in
the subject area of the training.
It must be emphasized that all the cultural issues listed
above may not necessarily appear as a problem. Actually,
most of these issues will not arise during an individual TAP.
Still, it is necessary that trainers be prepared for one or more
of these culture-related problems.
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4. KEY CHARACTERISTICS
OF DONORS AND THEIR TAPS
In the following section, we will describe and compare the
four donors examined: CIDA, DFID, PHARE and USAID.
As envisioned in the introductory chapter, the analysis fo-
cuses on characteristics having a significant impact on the
efficacy of TAPs.
These characteristics will be presented below in the fol-
lowing structure:
1) weight and presence;
2) dominant strategies;
3) what knowledge and skills are to be transferred: the train-
ing content;
4) management and organizational framework and prac-
tices of TAPs;
5) technical aspects of the training process;
6) some cross-cutting issues of flexibility and client orien-
tation of TAPs.
4.1 Weight and Presence
In the CEE/CIS region, the four donors analyzed may be
ranked with regards to their weight as presented in Compar-
ative Table 7.
The basis for determining donors’ presence in a benefi-
ciary country is vague. It could be measured by the amount
of money spent on TAPs, the number of civil servants trained,
the number of total PTD or some kind of overall impact
indicator. Because hardly any of these indicators are avail-
able for any donor in any of the four countries, we relied on
our country teams’ assessment to measure presence of vari-
ous donors.
It is noteworthy that, except for PHARE, all of these
donors are from Anglo-Saxon countries. This fact reflects
the general donor landscape. Anglo-Saxon donors generally
play a crucial role in the region, and, consequently, they are
important in the TAP field too. Paradoxically, the majority
of the recipient countries followed a public administration
model different from the Anglo-Saxon one. For instance,
Hungary has always been greatly influenced by the German
public administration model, and Romania is more influ-
enced by the French model. Overall, the communist public
administration systems were also in line with the bureau-
cratic-Continental model rather than with the Anglo-Saxon
public administration model.20 It is generally considered log-
ical that, when undertaking reforms in countries where public
administration is to be rebuilt from scratch, a first step in-
volves setting up the bureaucratic-style frameworks—such
as strict accountability systems, clear communication lines,
division of competencies, etc. These structures play a crucial
role in most of the Continental public administration sys-
Comparative Table 7
Ranking of Donors by Their Presence in the Region
1. PHARE PHARE is undoubtedly the most important donor in the TAP field, regardless of which of the potential indicators listed
above are used. This donor was analyzed in all the four countries, and all the country teams describe it as the most
significant donor in the TAP field. The weight of PHARE, especially in public administration reform, is strengthened by
the fact that it is an EU organization, and most of the countries analyzed are striving to become members of the EU.
Accession countries do not have any real freedom to decide whether they need the offered technical assistance or not. If
a technical assistance program is not utilized, the country is accused of revealing low “absorption capacity.” Low absorption
capacity of EU funds, in turn, may disqualify a country from accession to the EU. Thus, the foreign affairs administrations
of these countries exercise strong pressure on the national administrations to utilize PHARE funds already earmarked,
even if there is no need for them, or the project turns out to be controversial.
2. DFID It seems that DFID is also strongly present in the four countries analyzed. It was the only major donor identified in
Hungary besides PHARE, and its presence was quite significant in Romania and Ukraine and, to a somewhat lesser
degree, in Lithuania. DFID activities were analyzed in three out of the four countries. The Romanian team indicated that
it is one of the most important donors, though the team did not devise a “donor sheet” on DFID. However, the British
donor has changed its priority structure since the beginning of our researched period. As a result, DFID is gradually
leaving the “Visegrád countries” of Central Europe and shifting its activities to the South and East. Meanwhile, more and
more DFID resources are devoted to Africa and Asia, and to poverty reduction, as opposed to public administration
reform assistance in CEE and CIS countries. DFID seems to concentrate on central rather than local government, and
this may make its presence even more visible than other donors, who focus their activities more on local governments.
3. USAID USAID seems to be present more actively at the local government level than other donors. Thus, it is quite possible that
our country teams undervalued its presence. Still, USAID seems to be one of the major TAP donors in the region, most
of all in Romania and Ukraine. This donor has not been present in Hungary since the late 1990s.
4. CIDA It seems that CIDA is the “smallest” of the four major donors analyzed. Nonetheless, CIDA’s TAPs seem to be more
successful than the “average TAP.”
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tems, but they are generally less sophisticated in the Anglo-
Saxon countries, and their presence has further decreased
since the New Public Management movement appeared.
Thus there seems to be an inherent contradiction between
the specific needs of the beneficiary countries in the given
period and the assistance that donors can offer. We will re-
turn to this issue in the section on training content.
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4.2 Dominant Strategy
The term “strategy” is used to mean the concept or logic of
how a given training project would reach its desired goals.
Formulating a strategy involves making assumptions about
the environment of the organization where a training project
will take place. It also involves making assumptions about
those possibilities and restrictions, within this environment,
that are relevant to the goals that the person formulating
strategy hopes to achieve. Therefore, each strategy implies a
given set of basic assumptions regarding the operating envi-
ronment of the training project, as well as a corresponding
perception of the role of the TAP.
Strategy is not only important because it fundamentally
affects the chance of a given TAP to succeed. It is also worth
analyzing because there are important differences between
the training strategy that various TAPs seem to follow. It is
not only individual TAPs that have different strategies from
one another. Various individual donors tend to rely more
heavily on one particular strategy, which is called the “dom-
inant strategy” of the given donor. With regards to the broad-
er realm of public administration technical assistance, Dav-
id Brown identified a more detailed and analytical typology
of strategies.21 The one applied here, though it resembles
that of Brown, is more practical and operational in nature.
Three training strategies were identified. In the follow-
ing subsections, each of these three strategies is analyzed and
briefly evaluated.
4.2.1 The ‘Sustainability’ Approach
“If you give a hungry man a fish, he can feed himself for a
day. If you teach him to fish, he can feed himself for life.”
This saying expresses the philosophy behind the sustainabil-
ity strategy. From the point of view of the knowledge trans-
ferred, this means two things:
• The knowledge transferred is relevant and useful in solv-
ing the recipient’s problem.
• The knowledge has a unique, restricted nature in that
it is only in the possession of the donor, not of the
recipient.
We will describe the first of these two qualifications as
the “usefulness” of a training project, while the second qual-
ification will be described as the “uniqueness” of the project’s
content.
If these assumptions hold true, then the best way to
maximize the efficiency of technical assistance is not to “give
fish,” caught by high-salary fishermen from the donor coun-
try, but rather to “teach fishing,” which minimizes the use
of expensive resources. Consequently, this strategy intends
to focus efforts on creating scarce resources of expertise, which
are integrated into the national training system of the bene-
ficiary country after the original project ends. But, if any
one of these two assumptions does not hold true, then the
project will be useless.
“Sustainable projects” do not actually produce a signif-
icant volume of training output. Instead, they mainly pro-
duce outputs that are useful only if they are utilized in other,
subsequent training activities. A typical instance of this strat-
egy is presented by “training-of-the-trainers” projects. This
is what Brown calls the “multiplier effect strategy.”22 With
sustainability-type training projects, there is also an overlap-
ping set of projects that produce new training curricula and
training materials—which are usually “tested” in a small
“pilot project.”
Using this technique is rational and justified as long as
the above two assumptions hold true. After all, creating train-
ing resources, including trainers and training materials, is
definitely one of the cheaper and more efficient methods of
transferring scarce and valuable expertise from the donor to
the beneficiary public administration realm.
The fishing analogy may help us identify potential prob-
lems with the sustainability strategy. The hypothetical “how-
to-fish course” will work only if each of the following as-
sumptions are fulfilled:
• The method of fishery learned works in the hungry man’s
homeland. This means, for example, sea-fishery should
not be taught in a land-locked country.
• The fishing equipment is inexpensive, or the hungry
man has enough money to buy it.
• The hungry man knows and accepts that fishing really
has the potential to soothe his hunger—in other words
the man likes fish.
The first of the above three assumptions refers to the
training content. In this regard, the sustainability strategy is
very similar to the classical ideology behind technical assis-
tance, in which relatively advanced Western expertise that is
fundamentally missing from the beneficiary’s repertoire is
used to bridge the wide gap between the current situation
and what is technologically possible. Examples of this kind
of assistance might include helping a country create a flood
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control system, helping establish basic medical services or
helping set up a central bank.
It is a fundamental question underlying the assessment
of all Western public administration technical assistance to
the CEE/CIS region whether public administration solu-
tions propagated by Western donors are indeed purely “tech-
nical,” in this classical sense of the word. The preliminary
answer given to this question at this point is that this is rel-
atively seldom the case. CEE/CIS countries in this regard—
and in many others as well—are fundamentally different from
third-world countries, which have been, and generally still
are, the typical beneficiaries of Western technical assistance.
In addition to the subsequent section on training content,
we will return to this issue in the concluding chapter, ap-
proaching the issue from a broader perspective.
The second of the above three assumptions—that once
he is taught how to fish, the hungry man will have the mate-
rial means necessary to apply these capabilities in practice—
is also questionable. In most CEE/CIS countries, before the
economic transition and the resulting fiscal austerity of the
1990s, there used to be a relatively well-developed training
system, including permanent facilities and staff. Most of this
infrastructure disappeared in the first years of transition, due
to deep budget cuts in all fields of government. The lack of
money still is a major obstacle in reestablishing civil service
training systems. In addition to these practical difficulties,
in the initial years of the transformation, and to some extent
even now, there was an ideologically and politically moti-
vated attitude that “nothing from the dark past should be
used in the future.” This attitude contributed to the prob-
lem of decreasing training capacity. So did restrictions on
public service expenditures and personnel that the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund put on countries throughout the re-
gion in the 1990s.
Aspects of the third assumption, that the man will want
to use what he has been taught to catch fish, have already
been discussed in the chapter on the cultural characteristics
of beneficiary civil service systems. It is by no means certain
that the role and importance of training as a method of hu-
man resource development is understood and accepted by
the beneficiary public administrations.
In addition to questions rising from the three basic as-
sumptions behind sustainability-style TAPs, there is also cause
for doubts about this strategy due to some other technical
factors. The most important factor may be the poor project
administration that occurs both on the donor and on the
beneficiary side—an issue that will be discussed more in the
subsequent section on TAP management. In the course of
the field research, the authors’ previous experience with ad-
ministration problems was strongly reinforced: Not only the
training participants, but even the lists of the participants’
names, proved to be unavailable within one or two years of
a project’s completion. The same holds true for training
materials produced. It is clear that, if the resources of train-
ers and training materials produced by a sustainable-type
TAP cannot be accessed, then they will not be utilized—
even if someone wants to utilize them.
In sum, the plausibility of the assumptions underlying
the sustainability strategy is questionable in the CEE/CIS
context. No wonder the actual findings of the field research
show a very unfavorable picture of sustainability-type
projects. Although it was a specific task of the field research
Comparative Table 8
Degree of Sustainability of Sustainability-type Projects and the Underlying Reasons for the Existence
or Lack of Sustainability
PHARE The few sustainability-style TAPs run by PHARE do not seem very sustainable. In Lithuania, where we could obtain
detailed information, we found that most of the project documents were not available, only two or three out of the 50
trained trainers served later as trainers,23 and none of the courses were repeated, due to the lack of demand. The Romanian
team also found that most participants who were trained as trainers do not actually serve as trainers later.
DFID In Lithuania, sustainability-type projects were relatively successful, but the opposite is true in Hungary. The major
difference was that the TAP in Lithuania was deployed at the central civil service training institute of the country. All
training materials were left with the institute, and the trained trainers were employed by the institute. Some of the courses
have been repeated at least once since the initial TAP ended. But, in Hungary, various TAP elements were deployed at
organizations—an agency and two ministries—that were not heavily involved in training. Due to a lack of familiarity
with the relevant Hungarian laws, about half of the trained trainers were not legally eligible to train civil servants. None
of the courses have been repeated since the TAP ended, which was a year before this volume was written.
USAID Our Romanian team notes that, because the implementing organizations prefer contracting individual trainers as opposed
to, for example, contracting local training organizations, there is less of a chance for true sustainability. The reason for this
is that the “institutional memory” of training organizations is much more effective than that of individuals.
CIDA No relevant information was available.
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to locate sustainability-type TAPs that were indeed sustain-
able, there were hardly any.
A closer look at donor practices, especially those of
DFID, may help us to understand better the “sustainability
approach”—and it might provide us with some clues on how
to reduce the chances that this approach will fail.
In sum, practical experience seems to support theoreti-
cal considerations. Sustainability-type projects are, in fact,
rarely sustainable. Practical experience—which is reviewed
above and will be addressed below in the section on addi-
tional features of the strategy context—also supports our
reservations about the availability of TAP documents. Be-
cause these documents, including curriculum and training
materials, rarely survive long after the initial TAP, it is diffi-
cult or practically impossible to reconstruct training that is
supposed to be repeated by national organizations.
But we did find at least one way of increasing the
overall efficacy of the sustainability approach. Analyzing the
differences between the relative success in Lithuania and the
lack of success in Hungary of two DFID sustainability-
type TAPs, the crucial factor seems to be that the Lithua-
nian project was given to a civil service training institution
with a relatively stable, central position in civil service train-
ing. Thus, the professional and infrastructure background
was given, and TAP documents were available at a hub for
the country’s public administration. Both the institution
itself and the trained trainers were interested in offering the
courses elaborated under the original TAP. Furthermore,
even if the curriculum and training materials were not fully
available—because a detailed curriculum in the form of a
new trainers’ manual was not prepared—the trainers could
rely on their memory to reconstruct, and thus repeat, the
courses.
4.2.2 The Elitist Strategy
The elitist strategy, called the “power elite strategy” by
Brown,24 concentrates scarce project resources on the high-
est possible echelon of the civil service. The theory behind
this strategy is that, once the top layer is convinced about
the necessity and possibility of change—and is endowed with
the necessary abilities—the desired change in the public ad-
ministration can happen much easier. People in leading po-
sitions in the civil service may have a greater effect on public
administration because their influence on procedures is, of
course, much greater. Additionally, positive side effects may
occur via various mechanisms: The managers may later send
their own subordinates for similar training events or may
require them to obtain the same knowledge or skills through
other means. In order to fulfil the supposedly high expecta-
tions of the target groups, elitist projects are developed and
implemented with relatively high expenses.
Out of the four analyzed donors, CIDA and DFID seem
to rely strongly on the elitist approach.
Clearly, from a budgetary point of view, the national
civil service training systems themselves can handle the train-
ing of a relatively small number of high-ranking officials.
Consequently, with regards to its underlying assumptions,
international donors using this strategy are focusing on the
importance of the training content transferred. In this way,
the elitist strategy is very similar to the sustainability strate-
gy: Donors assume that the main contribution of elitist-type
assistance projects is, again, not the material resources
necessary for training but the transfer of unique and valu-
able Western expertise. The key difference between the “sus-
tainability” and the elitist strategy is that fishing is not taught
to everyone in the hungry man’s country—it is only taught
to the leaders.
Therefore the problems of the elitist approach are sim-
ilar to the problems already enumerated with regards to the
sustainability strategy. In many cases, either the uniqueness
or the usefulness of the content transferred is questionable.
In addition to questions about the training content,
there are some more technical problems with this strategy,
including the following:
• Donors practically compete for the attention of high-
level civil servants. The higher the rank of a civil servant
is, the more donors compete for the attention of the
person. In practice, this simply means that administra-
tive state secretaries are quite unlikely to attend training
courses, and the same can be said about their deputies
and ministry directors, though the chance is higher that
directors appear than state secretaries. Instead, lower
ranking officials are usually trained as if they were se-
nior ones. But this practice means that the implementa-
tion of the elitist strategy deviates from some core guide-
lines of the given strategy.
• In the case of the Lithuanian Public Administration Development
in the Baltic States (PADBAS) project, our country team noted
that project efficiency was diminished because senior management
did not become interested in participating in the training. The
main objective of this project, therefore, was not achieved, and is
not likely to be achieved in the future, either. The composition of
the trainee groups, both during project implementation and subse-
quent replication of the training program, did not meet the objec-
tive of the project—to train top civil servants. Although training
was supposed to be limited to top managers in the first year, only
54 percent of those receiving training were from the target group.
In the second year, this number rose slightly, and 62 percent of the
trainees were from the target group. In the second year, the manag-
ers from regional and local administrations were also eligible to
apply, a situation that boosted attendance.
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• Some additional problems result from the cultural and
working environment that is typical for senior civil ser-
vants. Many senior officials do not really attend courses
to learn, but do so instead for other, symbolic or de-
monstrative reasons. Risk avoidance is high in the case
of senior civil servants, and they tend not to use their
new knowledge if doing so could result in the slightest
risk to their position. And, even if senior civil servants
are ready to use their knowledge, they do not have much
time to do so.
• Bakenova quotes a failed element of the Public Administration
Reform (PAR) project reported by CIDA officials. Mayors of nine
Ukrainian cities were brought on a study tour to Canada to re-
ceive training in policy and practical issues related to municipal
operations. Soon it became perfectly clear that participants did not
have any interest in the subject. The project managers realized that
“it would have been more beneficial to bring professionals in the
field of municipal policy issues.”25
• Lazareviciute claims that most of the top managers seem to be un-
interested in attending TAPs.26
Considering the above-mentioned problems, the elitist
approach rarely has the kind of beneficial impact on TAP
efficacy that some on the donor side tend to believe, or at
least to state. Our impression is that the invitations for, and
involvement of, high-ranking officials in TAP activities are
not about increasing efficacy. Rather, the intention is to
improve the prestige and good image of the donor and its
TAP, particularly when it comes to influencing the views of
decision-makers back in the donor’s home country.
4.2.3 The Critical Mass Strategy
The critical mass strategy operates on the assumption that
there are no easy solutions for success, and the above-men-
tioned strategies will not be sufficient to tackle the funda-
mental problems of the host civil service. This strategy is
based on the belief that the crucial bottleneck in national
civil service training is not the access to unique Western ex-
pertise. Instead, constraints hindering adequate training are
considered to be factors like a lack of money, poor attention
to policy and an insufficient supply of “policy entrepreneurs”
or legal-institutional background. If this assumption is true,
then what assistance projects should do is simply train a mass
of civil servants large enough to achieve a qualitative differ-
ence in the public administration system.
Besides being a TAP strategy, the critical mass approach
closely resembles the approach used by the national civil ser-
vice training systems. The reasons donors give for not using
this strategy more often is either the high cost of mass train-
ing or the need for a sustainable impact. Without entering
into a deeper analysis of these arguments at this point, we
note only that the argument on high costs is countered by
the fact that several national civil service training projects
train a large amount, sometimes more than 10,000 civil ser-
vants, using the kind of budget that would only be sufficient
to train 100–200 trainees in a sustainability-type TAP.
4.2.4 Evaluating Strategies and Locating Donors
in the ‘Strategy Space’: A Summary
In the above sub-sections three strategies were identified.
Our general findings on these strategies could be summa-
rized as follows:
• The sustainability strategy has a relatively low potential
to be successful. This low potential is due to circum-
stances that apply in a largely uniform manner across
time and space.
• The elitist strategy is also problematic in many cases.
Still, it seems that, if it is carefully planned, and trainees
are carefully recruited, the elitist strategy has a better
chance to succeed than the sustainability strategy.
• The assumptions behind the critical mass strategy seem
to fit the beneficiary environment best of all. This strat-
egy, therefore, has the highest potential to succeed.
It is emphasized that these assessments of the success
potential of the various strategies are contingent on time and
space. In other words, they apply only to the transition peri-
od of the 1990s in the CEE/CIS region.
Another comment with regards to the interpretation of
what a “strategy” actually is should also be made here: The
term strategy does not so much refer to what is accomplished
as it refers to what is intended. Therefore, the central factor
determining the strategy followed by a TAP is not whether
it (i) creates resources that are expected to be put into use by
the beneficiary after the project ends, (ii) trains senior civil
servants or (iii) trains a lot of people. The decisive moment
is the basic assumption underlying the given TAP. In other
words, a TAP’s strategy is determined by whether the project
is conceptualized as (i) a project transferring unique Western
expertise by creating adequate training resources, (ii) a project
transferring unique Western expertise by implanting this
expertise into the elite of the civil service or (iii) a project
contributing material, organizational and/or financial resour-
ces to solving the problems of the beneficiary civil service.
This means, for example, that a project designed to train
senior civil servants in how to negotiate effectively can be
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considered an elitist project or a critical mass project—de-
pending on the concept or the logic of the project. Of course,
the underlying concept is likely to exert an important effect
on a lot of features of the TAP: what the training content
will be, who will provide the various services necessary for
implementing the training event, how these services will be
provided and so on. It is the total of these features that helps
one determine what the underlying philosophy/role percep-
tion of the given TAP actually is.27
Comparative Table 9 shows the typical donor practices
that we found.
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Comparative Table 9
Strategies Applied by the Donors: A Summary
PHARE PHARE, more than any other donor, relies on the critical mass strategy. PHARE can afford to use this strategy and
frequently has to do so. PHARE is by far the largest donor by all indicators, but especially as far as overall TAP budget is
concerned. PHARE finances large-scale language and general EU training activities in Hungary with 3,000–4,000 trainees.
It is not only PHARE’s financial capability but also the political and administrative necessity of its mission that inspires
this kind of mass training. It is in the EU’s interest to ensure that civil ser-vants in the various fields are prepared to imple-
ment the EU law immediately after accession. Sustainability-type TAPs funded by PHARE are relatively rare. In Hungary,
we found that 2 percent of PHARE’s TAPs followed the sustainability strategy, while in Lithuania, 5.7 percent followed
this strategy. Interestingly, the unit cost of sustainability-type TAPs is somewhat smaller than the average—apparently
because sustainability TAPs funded by PHARE also aim at training a relatively large number of participants. For example,
in the case of the one Hungarian sustainability-type TAP funded by PHARE, 700 persons were trained. The elitist
approach is present in PHARE activities only to a limited extent, though we could not collect quantitative data in this
regard. PHARE concentrates on training officials who will implement EU laws, either as bureaucrats or as specialists in
various public offices. This goal requires a critical mass strategy rather than an elitist approach.
DFID DFID favors both the sustainability and the elitist approach. This donor is by far the most active of all those analyzed in
running sustainability-type TAPs. We found that all of the DFID TAPs we analyzed in Lithuania, and two thirds of those
analyzed in Hungary, were sustainability-type TAPs. We had no reliable information from Romania and Ukraine, where
TAP elements are usually embedded in mixed projects. Though it is not based on incontestable evidence, an analysis of
existing budget data seems to indicate that the unit cost of sustainability-type TAPs is significantly higher than that of
non-sustainability TAPs. According to the Lithuanian country team, sustainable-style TAPs cost twice as much as non-
sustainable ones. DFID also frequently applies the elitist approach. We estimated that, in Hungary, the proportion of
managers participating in DFID TAPs, from among all TAP participants, was much more than 30 percent—and quite
likely more than 50 percent. In Lithuania, this proportion was even higher, around 80 percent. A small, non-representative
sample of one course group in a Ukrainian TAP funded by DFID revealed that 33 percent of the participants were
managers. Although DFID often aims its courses at top managers, this aspiration rarely succeeds.
USAID USAID’s approach could most often be characterized as following the critical mass strategy. We found no evidence that
this donor ever chose to follow the sustainability approach. Only our Romanian country team mentioned some practices
that might be considered part of the sustainability approach. USAID’s TAPS are also not characterized by a strong elitist
approach. This is apparently because this donor aims its TAPs at local, rather than central public administration.
CIDA CIDA’s strategy is characterized by highly individualized, “elitist-like” TAPs. This approach requires great effort invested
in every participant. Such investment only gives good returns if the participants are of relatively high rank. In one project
analyzed, the Baltic Economic Management Training Program, the selection criteria limited the course to managers only.
But the selected participants were mid-level managers, rather than top-level managers. Nonetheless, it seems that the
program helped participants to gain promotion in their public service careers, and some of them later gained top positions.
Out of a small, non-representative sample from a course list of a Ukrainian TAP funded by CIDA, we found that 45
percent were managers. CIDA’s TAPs were not typical sustainability-style projects. But—in an interesting and quite
unique phenomenon among donors—CIDA was ready to finance a project in Ukraine that was almost identical to
another one run previously in the Baltic states.
Conclusion PHARE seems to follow the critical mass strategy, and, to some degree, so does USAID. DFID is the leading user of the
sustainability approach. CIDA seems to follow an elitist approach, as does DFID, to a somewhat lesser extent.
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4.2.5 Some Additional Features
of the Strategy Context
There are certain features of the CEE/CIS context that have
a deteriorating effect on all kinds of training activities, but
the extent of this effect varies. In the case of certain strate-
gies—usually the sustainability and the elitist approaches—
the effect is more severe, while it might be less of a problem
if the critical mass strategy is followed. These deteriorating
features are as follows:
• There is high turnover in the civil service. The annual
civil service turnover rate, in our estimation, is well over
10 percent in the region. The turnover is especially high
among civil servants who are in managerial positions,
who speak foreign languages or who have skills for which
there is a market demand in the private sector—such as
training or management skills. This is also usually the
group targeted by projects based on the sustainability
and elitist strategies. So these types of TAPs can be ex-
pected to have a lower-than-average success rate in CEE/
CIS.
• In Hungary, which is far from being the “worst country” in this
regard, statistical data show that the administrative state secretar-
ies and their deputies, who are supposed to represent administra-
tive stability in the central government machinery, hold their posi-
tions for an average of about two years.28 This means that, during
a four-year election cycle, two administrative state secretaries are
recruited and discarded by the politico-administrative process.
• The Lithuanian country team notes on the PADBAS project of DFID
that “top civil servants trained in the program did leave their posts
at one or another point in the future. Although exact data on this
is not available, both the [British] Embassy and the representatives
of LPA [the docking organization] mentioned that this was a real
hindrance in sustaining the impact on the civil service.” 29
• Organizational arrangements are fluid. The docking
organization that worked on the given TAP may be abol-
ished, its function changed, etc. Policy and training pri-
orities may change quickly. These factors mean that
TAPs that invest heavily into producing valuable out-
puts are at a disadvantage, because their outputs—
whether these outputs are trained trainers, training ma-
terials or more knowledgeable senior civil servants—have
a limited chance to exert their beneficial effects to their
full potential.
• The inappropriate selection of participants of training
projects is often a problem as well. Selection is usually
left to the beneficiary civil service. Since low organiza-
tional capacity is a basic justification for running TAPs
at all, and, furthermore, there is little incentive for the
beneficiary-in-charge to perform this task effectively, it
is no wonder that the selection is often inappropriate.
This problem is often exacerbated by other ones, such
as the language problem or the unavailability of senior
officials. Clearly, the larger the investment into one train-
ee, the larger the loss caused by inappropriate selection
of trainees.
• The already mentioned fact that there is little or no
understanding of the role and value of training also con-
tributes to the failure of the sustainability approach and
the elitist approach.
4.3 Training Content
In this section, we list descriptive pieces of information on
how TAPs differ from nationally organized civil service train-
ing courses, which we call “national training courses” for
brevity. We analyze differences among the main clusters of
TAPs, from the point of view of content. Then we provide a
review on practices determining TAP content. On a more
analytical level, we investigate the adequacy of TAP content
to beneficiaries’ needs and circumstances. At the end of this
section is a subsection in which we attempt to assess the
validity of the—generally shared, though usually implicit—
view of the donors that the real value of TAPs is the unique
know-how they bring into the beneficiaries’ public adminis-
tration system.
4.3.1 A Comparative View of Training Content
Needless to say, various civil service training courses, as well
as various TAPs, differ greatly from one another. Still, there
are some general differences between nationally organized
training on one hand and TAPs on the other. The most
important of these differences are as follows:
• TAPs focus more on skills improvement or attitude
change, as opposed to knowledge transfer.
• TAPs are more practice oriented, as opposed to nation-
al training courses, which are more oriented toward the-
ory. National courses are usually very similar to univer-
sity lectures, regarding both their content and style.
• TAPs concentrate more on general issues that are not
bound to the circumstances of a given country’s public
administration, whereas national training courses are
strongly tied to the present situation in the given country.
In the first half of the 1990s, typical TAP topics includ-
ed operation of a market economy and the role of the public
sector within such an economy. More recently, TAPs are
likely to address various issues of public management and
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public policy—topics that are typically covered by TAPs
in the 1997–2000 period under analysis. TAPs are also
likely to have an “international” focus, especially TAPs run
by PHARE. PHARE’s TAPs provide general and sector-
specific EU knowledge, but they are not the only ones with
an international focus. All donors investigated promote
international approaches and presentation of “international
best practices.”
National training courses, on the other hand, tend much
more to reflect the domestic “status quo,” and they tend to
focus on the legal regulation and everyday practice of the
given field. Indeed, teaching currently valid laws of the coun-
try is a major topic in all countries studied.
It is worthwhile noting here that the choice of content
has a direct impact on several other elements of training
courses. For example, skills improvement, some would
argue, requires stronger reliance on an interactive training
style, including the application of such methods as case stud-
ies, group work, etc. Skills-based content and interactive
training styles are much more characteristic of TAPs than
national courses. Meanwhile, knowledge transfer, such as
the teaching of legal texts that is typical of national training
courses, lends itself to a course followed by an exam, to test
the amount of knowledge transferred. Such an exam would
be more difficult in the case of skill-improvement courses.
Not surprisingly, we found that national training courses
quite frequently end with an exam, whereas we could hardly
find any exams among TAPs.
After determining the general characteristic differences
between the content of nationally organized training and
TAPs provided by donors, we turn now to the question of
how TAPs differ from one another. Ukraine faces, in many
respects, different problems from those faced by Hungary,
and the same is true of Romania and Lithuania. These coun-
tries have a different past, they have different political and
constitutional systems, and the structure of public adminis-
tration and administrative procedures are different. Some of
these countries have finished privatization and gained a rel-
atively stable and productive market economy, while others
are only now facing the challenges of economic transition.
And there are many other differences. Thus, it is reasonable
to expect that the characteristic focus of TAPs differ among
the four analyzed countries.
Nonetheless, we found the major “clusters” of TAPs
can be related to donors rather than to beneficiary coun-
tries. In other words, it is the differences among donors,
and not the recipient countries, that determines major dif-
ferences in typical TAP content.
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Comparative Table 10
Typical TAP Content by Donor
PHARE Since 1998, PHARE has concentrated its efforts on conveying knowledge regarding the structures and functioning of the
EU as well as the EU laws (the acquis). The training content provided by PHARE is mostly knowledge, frequently legal
knowledge, and it is closest to that of typical national civil service training content. In addition, PHARE projects provide
professional-technical training for those performing special services, such as border guards and veterinary control officials,
in order to enable these civil servants to carry out their functions within the EU. In the past few years, PHARE has also
helped launch some large-scale language TAPs. The special professional training and language training were applied in
countries that were expected to join the EU in the first round.
DFID DFID is active in transferring experience and practices that have proven to be successful in the British public administration
environment. DFID is the leader in spreading methods of “New Public Management” as applied in the U.K. Such
courses include those on citizens’ charter and performance appraisal in Hungary, agencialization in Ukraine, etc. DFID
is also quite active in training capacity building via training of trainers programs and support for existing training institutions.
USAID USAID promotes the objectives laid down in its strategy, one of which is spreading U.S. values as well as U.S. approaches
and practices. This donor seems to be more present than other donors in the economic sphere, including projects on
privatization, restructuring of the banking sector, etc. Within public administration, USAID does more than other
donors in providing training for local government officials on public finance, U.S.-style budgeting techniques, management
of municipal revenues and assets, etc. Furthermore, USAID promotes solutions that assure that local governments operate
in a more responsive, accountable manner, with a stronger citizen-client orientation. It is only USAID that runs programs
allowing countries of the region to learn from each other’s experience. For example a USAID project in Ukraine included
study trips to Poland.
CIDA Two of the three analyzed CIDA projects were about economic policy development, and they included Canadian university
instruction and some study trips to Canada. Another TAP assured that Ukrainian civil servants learn from Canadian
administrative practices.
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Comparative Table 11
Needs Assessment Practices of the Donors
PHARE PHARE practice in this regard has changed greatly since 1998. The earlier PHARE program was said to be demand-
driven. From 1998, PHARE became accession driven. Hence the main objective of the EU PHARE became, “to assist
the candidate countries in their preparation for membership in the EU.” This implies that the planners in the PHARE
program assume that they know better than the beneficiary countries themselves what sort of training is needed. To some
extent, this is the case indeed. Therefore, paradoxically, PHARE meets beneficiary training demand much more than
before.
DFID DFID also carries out some form of needs assessments. In addition, DFID has a full-time expert on public administration
systems in the region. This expert plays a significant role in determining needs.30 Nonetheless, it was clear that the content
of the Hungarian project did not reflect wide-spread demand within the Hungarian public administration. Our Lithuan-
ian team describes a DFID TAP in which a managerial competence framework was elaborated based on the results of
Lithuanian civil servants’ training needs analysis. In spite of this, the content of the training courses did not reflect the
results of the needs analysis, but was based on some of the British experience adapted to the Lithuanian situation. We
found no evidence of any systematic consideration of how, and with what kind of modifications, those methods can be
used in the very different public administration environment of the CEE and CIS countries.
USAID USAID also carries out needs assessments. However, as Bakenova critically notes: “needs have been already identified
before the actual consultation takes place and the donor [USAID] already knows what the areas of intervention should be.
However, in order to meet diplomacy criteria and present TAPs not as an imposition but as assistance programs, and in
order to receive official consensus from national stakeholders, those consultations are necessary.”31
CIDA CIDA does not rely heavily on needs assessment in determining training content. Bakenova provides a five-element
bulleted list on sources of information that are utilized.32 None of these refer to needs assessment. Beneficiary needs are
supposed to be identified “by Canadian embassies in the region.” Still, CIDA runs a very successful program in the Baltic
states, at least in terms of participant satisfaction. This program was based on a proposal from the Dalhousie University.
The program’s success was not due to careful needs analysis before the project started. Instead it is probably attributable
to the sensitivity of the leader of the implementing organization during the implementation phase. This sensitivity
allowed the organization to tailor individual programs to individual trainee needs.
4.3.2 How is the Training Content Determined?
The fact that typical TAP content is more characteristic of
the donor’s orientation than that of the beneficiary raises
the question of how TAP content is determined, and by
whom.
It is generally agreed that TAPs should reflect the bene-
ficiaries’ needs. Indeed, it is a frequent complaint that none
of the beneficiary countries have elaborated a national civil
service training strategy that would allow donors to offer
TAPs that match local priorities. The only country out of
those analyzed that elaborated such a strategy was Hungary,
which developed a relatively precise list of training priori-
ties. Unfortunately, by the time this list was developed, all
donors had left the country except for PHARE. And PHARE
projects have not been demand driven since 1997. Thus we
could not obtain any information as to how donors would
act if such a strategy really existed.
Presently, training needs assessments are considered
major tools of determining adequate TAP content in the
beneficiary country. After analyzing needs assessment ap-
proaches of the donors, we could not detect crucial differ-
ences. But we did find that donors are often actually looking
for problems that the donor or one of its potential imple-
menting organizations can solve—using already existing and
to-be-sold solutions.
This is why donors can sometimes identify training
“needs” that greatly surprise those, like the authors, who
regard themselves as relatively well-informed about the re-
gion and its typical training needs.
Regarding the needs assessment practices of various
donors, we sum up our findings in Comparative Table 11.
Although it is often emphasized by the donor and/or
the implementing organization that the curriculum and train-
ing materials are specifically prepared for the beneficiary’s
environment, we found that the curriculum and the train-
ing material is frequently the reselling of existing know-how
with some modifications made to “adapt to local circum-
stances.” This adaptation may simply mean that “foreign
names are changed to Romanian ones.”33
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4.3.3 Adequacy of TAP Content
in a Beneficiary Environment
It seems that the following practices are quite wide-spread:
• A kind of “one-fits-all” approach is present. Similar,
TAPs, with or without some minor modifications, are
utilized in various countries, irrespective of the specific
situations of these countries.
• Donors and the contracted implementing organizations
tend to provide training that is based on values, ap-
proaches and practices present in the donor country.
These solutions are presented as the “international” best
practice, to be used within and by the beneficiary’s public
administration.
• In sharp contrast with some donors’ claims, TAP activ-
ities are, more often than not, supply-driven rather than
demand-driven. TAP content is determined by the do-
nor. This content is frequently part of a general strategy
or else it is based on offers or suggestions from would-
be implementing organizations.
These practices raise the issue of adequacy of training
content for the beneficiary’s needs and circumstances. Some
examples of the actual situation highlight this problem.
• There have been quite a few TAPs—together with large-scale con-
sultancy activities—on the introduction of a civil service ethics
code. Such TAPs took place in almost all the CEE and CIS coun-
tries. In our view, the function of the ethics code is to give civil
servants guidelines in areas that are not regulated in the laws—
moral issues that must be laid down in societies with a pluralist
culture and value system. Therefore, extensive efforts designed to
build an ethics code seem somewhat inadequate, or at least prema-
ture, in the CEE/CIS environment, where, in some countries, even
basic elements of an appropriate legal regulation of the civil service
is missing. Even where these basic laws exist, they are not always
executed, and they are infringed upon regularly by the government
itself. As we have noted, CEE/CIS is a region where civil servants
earn a few dollars a day. Of course adopting well-formulated ethics
codes is cheaper than increasing civil service wages,34 but the latter
approach is surely a more promising means of fighting corruption.
It is difficult to believe that—in a situation where basic laws are
missing or regularly infringed upon, where corruption is wide-spread
and well-known and where organized crime plays a significant
role in the economy and politics—an ethics code could have a ma-
jor impact. Still, millions of dollars were spent on projects focused
on ethics codes.
• Project management training is another example. Project manage-
ment training may be of limited use in administrative systems that
seldom use the project model—as is the case with most public ad-
ministration organizations in Continental systems. A PHARE
project in Hungary taught project management for projects financed
from EU structural funds. In this case, the training was relevant,
because EU funds are utilized within the framework of projects,
and the target group consisted of civil servants who will work on
those projects in the future. Unfortunately, it turned out that knowl-
edge of project management would be necessary only about five
years after the TAP took place. An almost identically “premature”
case is quoted by our Lithuanian country team.
• Certain methods of “New Public Management,” including agen-
cialization and performance contracting are another example of
training content that may be inappropriate for the beneficiary.
New Public Management might be  a good way to increase effi-
ciency by allowing greater managerial discretion and market-type
mechanisms. It also greatly relies on creativity. But in a period of
confusion and corruption, when billions of dollars in national prop-
erty is disappearing, allowing managers more discretion and en-
couraging creative thinking may not be the best way to solve prob-
lems. TAPs that encourage New Public Management may increase
confusion and further weaken accountability arrangements—there-
by creating more problems than they solve.
Even though the authors are convinced of the inade-
quacy of the above-mentioned training topics—and could
easily provide examples of the problems with these topics—
they also admit that others may present convincing counter-
arguments. What is really embarrassing is that such discus-
sions have not taken place, at least not to the authors’
knowledge.35 Millions of dollars have been spent on train-
ing in topics whose applicability, let alone usefulness, was
not seriously considered. Millions of dollars were spent on
TAPs that may have been useless and, in quite a few cases,
may have even been harmful to the beneficiaries.
The donors often seem to neglect the fact that a solu-
tion that works in one certain environment may fail in an-
other. This issue was widely discussed in the 1960s, when
problems of Western aid to developing countries in Africa
and other continents became apparent.36 It is somewhat sur-
prising that these findings about development administra-
tion have been so easily “forgotten” by the donors. Indeed,
rarely does anyone seriously consider the applicability and
the suitability of using a solution from country Y in the so-
cial and administrative environment of country X.37 We
found the following three potential outcomes of this kind of
knowledge transfer:
• Implanting alien approaches into the public adminis-
tration system may stir the status quo in a positive di-
rection and may lead to introduction of practices that
were previously not utilized but turn out to be useful.
In this case, the TAP has a significant positive impact.
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• Another possibility is that the “immune system” of public
administration will throw out the “alien body.” The
beneficiary’s administration may simply reject the for-
eign concepts conveyed in the training. In this case, the
overall impact of the TAP is zero or insignificant. Our
impression is that this may be the most typical case.
• In some cases, the newly implanted knowledge just in-
creases the internal confusion of the public administra-
tion system in transition. In these cases, a TAP causes a
significant negative impact.38 This type of TAP outcome
is not at unknown. Learning approaches and practices
that cannot be used in a given administrative environ-
ment may frustrate civil servants. An even worse situa-
tion can arise if the civil servant still tries to apply the
learned methods and causes administrative confusion
or dysfunction—or breaks the laws or organizational
rules.
We believe that the training content should reflect the
specific needs of the beneficiary. At the very least, the fol-
lowing aspects should be taken into consideration when the
TAP content is determined:
• Continental administrative systems: Administrative sys-
tems of all the CEE/CIS countries follow the so-called
Continental administrative tradition. The term “Con-
tinental” is widely used in Europe to differentiate from
the Anglo-Saxon political-administrative systems. Some
general differences include: multiparty systems, as op-
posed to two-party systems, and the resulting coalition
governments, with all their consequences; the differences
between the Continental legal system and common law,
including the concept of public/administrative law; and
the Continental concept of public administration as a
branch of government responsible for executing laws,
which makes for a very legal approach to public admin-
istration and the administrative culture. It seems quite
problematic that, except for PHARE, the main funders
of TAPs are Anglo-Saxon donors, who, as we have not-
ed, are quite eager to promote their own practices, re-
gardless of the applicability of Anglo-Saxon methods to
Continental systems.39
• Historic background and its consequences: All countries
left behind a communist period in their near past, and
this determines some of their major needs. Nonethe-
less, a decade after the communist systems collapsed,
the differences between these countries seem to grow.
Some countries gained independence after several de-
cades of forced unity. Other countries were never inde-
pendent—or were only independent centuries ago—and
now have to establish not only a state but also a nation-
al identity. The countries of the region also differed in
the past as far as access to Western administrative know-
how. Scholars, and even practitioners, from countries
like Poland or Hungary attended conferences and had
relatively open access to Western literature from the
1960s and 1970s. Other countries, like the Baltic states,
were mostly isolated from the Western impact, but were
always culturally oriented towards the West, so once they
gained freedom, they could easily keep up with Western
solutions. Meanwhile, scholars and practitioners in some
other countries still do not have easy access to informa-
tion about Western solutions—due to cultural, linguis-
tic and political barriers.
• Transition situation: It is useful to understand that all
these countries are still in a state of transition. Although
this factor may be the most important of those we have
listed, it would be difficult to define here what transi-
tion means, and what its consequences are. Just a few
consequences of transition include a high level of polit-
ical, legal uncertainty; uncertainty of values and admin-
istrative hierarchy; a rapid rate of change, including
policy priority changes, which result in an unpredict-
able atmosphere; corruption; and economic austerity.
If these aspects are taken into consideration when the
TAP content—and, for that matter, management arrange-
ment—is determined, TAPs can be more useful and can have
a greater impact than they do now.
4.3.4 Uniqueness of the TAP Content
in the Beneficiary Country
Donors and implementing organizations—especially those
pursuing the elitist or the sustainability strategy—like to
depict TAPs as a major way of transferring know-how that
otherwise would not be available in the recipient country.
According to this point of view, the specificity of the know-
how, and not the cost of training, makes the real value of a
TAP.
We examine the above assumption from both a practi-
cal and then a more theoretical point of view, by addressing
two key questions:
• Is the content of a typical TAP always so unique in the
beneficiary country’s training practice? This is an impor-
tant question because the above assumption is made
dubious by the finding that TAP contents are, in fact,
rarely unique.
• What is the relationship between the uniqueness of a TAP
and the value of the given TAP? The preliminary answer
to this question is that there is a negative relationship
between the uniqueness of TAP content and the value
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of the TAP. Thus, even if the content was in fact
unique—which is usually not the case—this would prob-
ably not increase the value of the given TAP but rather
decrease it.
With respect to the first question, we found that TAP
topics are almost always somewhat new, at least compared
to the existing compulsory training courses and to the typi-
cal non-compulsory national civil service training topics. But
if we approach the issue from the “supply side” in the given
country, the answer is different. Several, perhaps most, of
the TAP courses offer know-how that is already available in
the beneficiary country. High-quality courses are available
in the training market of the countries concerned for sub-
jects like management and communication and negotiation
skills development. In several other fields, such as policy-
making, economics and the overwhelming majority of EU
issues, the know-how is available at the universities, research
institutes and think tanks of most, though not necessarily all
beneficiary countries. In most cases, this know-how could
be bought at a much lower price, in the local language and
in a form that is indeed adapted to the specific target group.
Still, the know-how is brought and bought from abroad.
Of course, one could argue that the for-profit training
providers, who typically sell their services to private compa-
nies, cannot reflect the specificity of public administration.
A counter-argument could be that, frequently, the same is
true of TAP implementing organizations: They often do not
reflect the specificity of public administration systems—
especially the public administration system of the benefi-
ciary. The argument against universities may be that univer-
sity instructors cannot provide real interactive training, which
is also true, though many TAPs in the content area con-
cerned are usually lecture-type TAPs, like PHARE training
on EU issues.
Another, perhaps more valid, argument against hiring
local trainers might be that donors would face more difficul-
ties in controlling local implementing organizations.
It could also be argued that the TAPs bring a wide range
of topics to the national civil service training field that were
missing earlier, and that this is the most important aspect of
TAPs. For example, while communication skills training is
widely present in the private sphere, it is almost unknown in
public administration. This argument is accurate. TAPs not
only bring in new and relevant topics to the national civil
service training field, but, with their prestige in the benefi-
ciary country, they may also contribute to the understand-
ing of the importance of these topics within national civil
service training systems.
Indeed, we found that one major, though unintended,
positive impact of TAPs in general is that they draw the at-
tention of decision-makers to potential training topics that
are useful in the beneficiary environment but have not been
part of the national training system before.
The second key question, about the relationship between
the uniqueness of the knowledge and the value of a TAP,
can be answered with a more theoretical approach.
The impression gained in the course of the research was
that this relationship is negative. The more unique a train-
ing topic is in the beneficiary country, the less likely that it
will be useful. After all, it is reasonable to expect that the
most needed training topics have already been introduced
into the national civil service training system. In other words,
it is reasonable to expect that beneficiary governments are
able determine the most needed pieces of training content,
and they finance courses with exactly these pieces of content
from their limited financial resources.40 Very unique topics
may be difficult for trainees to understand and even more
difficult to utilize in a potentially alien environment. In brief,
the greater the uniqueness of the training content, the great-
er the probability of inadequacy, and thus, project ineffi-
ciency.
A similar trade-off can be detected between TAP effi-
ciency—as we use the term—and general uniqueness of train-
ing. The less unique a course is, the lower the level of inputs
required. If a course already exists, and it only needs to be
repeated in order to train additional civil servants, the mon-
ey needed for curriculum and training material development,
and other such expenses, can be saved.
Given both of the above arguments, it could be said
that a more effective and efficient TAP scheme would be to
run/finance courses whose content was determined mostly
by the beneficiary government—perhaps with assistance from
foreign experts but not with total dominance of these ex-
perts, as is the present case. Furthermore, TAPs should be
part of the beneficiary’s training system. This would allow
for training of more civil servants, with content that is re-
garded as really important by the beneficiary. Another way
to increase TAP efficacy would be to repeat successful TAPs
for an additional, perhaps larger, pool of civil servants.
Both approaches assure a large probability that the train-
ing will be adequate and also relatively cheap. In other words,
these approaches would assure a higher level of overall TAP
efficacy than presently exists. And yet we found no evidence
of either a foreign donor financing useful national training
or of a repeat offering of a TAP that had proven successful.
Explaining the reasons for this somewhat surprising state of
affairs requires considerations that are not related to train-
ing content. We will therefore address this situation later in
this volume.
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4.4 TAP Management
It is not easy to draw a solid line of demarcation between the
functions of managing the donor and the functions of man-
aging the donor’s TAP. This is true especially because many
key features of how a TAP is managed are highly character-
istic and specific to the donor of the project. Thus, “TAP
management” is, to a large degree, determined by “donor
management,” which involves addressing the policies and
organizational culture and practice of the given donor.
For this reason, it is relevant and meaningful to analyze
how TAPs are managed in a comparative, cross-donor man-
ner. In the section that follows, the term “management” re-
fers to a set of practices that are expected to ensure the achieve-
ment of the broad goals that the donor has decided upon,
and for which the donor has provided the necessary funds.
TAP management involves devising a detailed plan of activ-
ities; acquiring and ensuring adequate material, expertise,
administrative and other resources; arranging these resourc-
es into an adequate organizational framework; setting up
the necessary system of external and internal controls; etc.
In this section, six features of TAP management will be re-
viewed:
1) the organizational setting of TAP implementation—the
project framework;
2) time span and the resulting inflexibility of assistance
projects;
3) selection of contractors;
4) transparency of operations;
5) administrative burden on the beneficiary;
6) the role of personality.
4.4.1 The Basic Organizational Setting
for Implementing Assistance: The Project
Framework and its Consequences
Practically all TAPs analyzed were implemented by external,
third-party organizations, contracted for the limited task of
implementing the given project. In other words, implemen-
tation takes place in a so-called project framework. Unlike
the other characteristics of TAP management, the project
arrangement is so regular and general among various do-
nors, and it is so common for those who work in the inter-
national aid field, that it may seem meaningless to discuss it.
But this arrangement does have an impact on TAPs.
Even though nearly exclusive reliance on third-party
implementing organizations is currently the norm, their pres-
ence is a relatively new phenomenon. For example, in the
great development era of the 1950s and 1960s, most U.S.
aid programs were implemented by permanent personnel.
Meanwhile, the inclusion of third parties, which at the time
primarily included universities and individual experts, was
considered almost an interesting innovation.41 Some orga-
nizations—such as OECD and Support for Improvement
in Governance and Management in Central and Eastern
European Countries (SIGMA)—still presently rely on more
permanent implementation structures, including permanent
experts.
Many might consider it an outmoded approach to im-
plement assistance using permanent organizational frame-
works—called “hierarchy” in the terminology of neo-insti-
tutional organization theory—instead of a project framework
with contractors—a so-called “market” setup.42 But the
alternative, using temporary, project-type frameworks, has
numerous and far-reaching consequences.
Some of these consequences flow directly and unavoid-
ably from the inherent nature of the project type implemen-
tation framework. These consequences are uniform among
the various donors. For example, because launching a new
assistance project means hiring a new contractor, essential
experience accumulated and lessons learned during previ-
ous projects will be lost or go unutilized.
The remainder of this sub-section concentrates on the
consequences of the project framework and how they occur.
First we give an overview of what a project-type implemen-
tation framework is and how it differs from its main alterna-
tive, the bureaucratic implementation framework. Then we
present some arguments, which are rooted in organization
theory and devise general criteria for deciding whether to
rely on the project type or the bureaucratic implementation
framework. In the end of the section, the key consequences,
both beneficial and detrimental, of the project-type imple-
mentation framework are enumerated and assessed.
What is a Project?
Distinctive characteristics of the project framework are as
follows:
• The planning and the implementation phase of the
project are strictly separated.
• Main, strategic features of the assistance—including its
goals, objectives, budget, target group, schedule, etc.—
are clearly defined and determined during the planning
phase, well before activities start.
• Activities are planned for a given and limited time frame.
• The above-mentioned main, strategic features of the pro-
ject assistance cannot be changed during the implemen-
tation phase, or at least it is very difficult to make changes.
• Strategic and operational decisions are not only sepa-
rated by time. Strategic decisions are usually made by
the donor, with some involvement from the beneficiary.
Operative decisions are generally made by the imple-
menting organization—again, with some involvement
of the beneficiary.
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• Implementing organizations are typically chosen on a
competitive basis, utilizing “market-type mechanisms.”
• It is the donor who chooses the implementing organiza-
tion in a bidding process, and, once that choice is made,
the donor finances the project.
• The bidders calculate their offers based on the proposed
plan—in the form of terms of reference—presented by
the donor.
• The donor makes its choice among bidders by compar-
ing cost to benefits. Benefits are estimated mainly on the
basis of the bidders’ experience in the field and/or the
region.
A Theoretical Perspective on the Question of Project
vs. Permanent/Bureaucratic Implementation Structure
As noted a few paragraphs earlier, in a previous historical
epoch, public administration technical assistance was gener-
ally provided using permanent organizational structures for
implementation. In other words, hierarchy and bureaucracy
(in the non-pejorative sense of the word) played a crucial
role, instead of market forces. As the overview of CEE na-
tional civil service training activities presented in Chapter 3
suggests, the recipient countries, unlike TAPs, strongly rely
on hierarchy-based implementation arrangements.
The practicing policy maker or manager is not “left alone”
by management theory when it comes to choosing between
these two alternatives. Organization theory offers some gen-
eral guidelines and criteria that help decide which solution
has a higher potential to succeed under various circumstances.
Some of these perspectives are presented below.
Management theory would classify TAPs, and most other
types of foreign assistance to the governmental sector, as a
“knowledge based industry”—in other words an industry
that is very much dependent on human expertise. Accord-
ing to Mueller-Dyerson a key problem of managing such
knowledge-based organizations involves the organization’s
need to control its assets.43 While the organization is able to
control much of its physical assets almost completely,
employees, and most of all experts, are much more difficult
to control.
In the past few years, both researchers and practitioners
have shown an increasing recognition of the problems of
strategic control over an organization’s knowledge or expert
base. The study of strategic management recommends three
basic solutions that an expert organization can use to ad-
dress these problems, with the first solution being a prereq-
uisite of the next two:44
• Increase the reliance on internal sources of expertise, as
opposed to contracting experts externally.
• Increase the “asset specificity” of the expert resource base,
by promoting the specialization of experts and their
knowledge and skills.
• Create morally-based, non-opportunist teams. This
latter objective can be mainly achieved by creating
sustainable and enhanced career and reward systems
that emphasize continuity—and also by nurturing a
strong, supporting professional and organizational
culture.
All of these three recommendations prescribe organi-
zational solutions that, in many key respects, strongly con-
tradict the usual project arrangement of TAPs, and instead
favor permanent implementation arrangements—which are
also known as “bureaucratic” or “hierarchy-based” arrange-
ments in other terminology.
A somewhat different viewpoint is offered by the neo-
institutionalist school of organization theory—rooted in
transaction cost economics. Still, this viewpoint further
undermines the alleged supremacy of the project arrange-
ment in the TAP context.45 According to this argument, a
central question of “organization” as a general phenomenon
is whether any given economic transaction should be per-
formed within the framework of two basic alternative forms:
either markets or hierarchies. For example: In most organi-
zations, a taxi service is regularly bought from external ser-
vice providers, performing the given transaction using “the
market,” while executive management positions are filled
internally, by one or more employees of the organization,
using “hierarchy” as the framework for the given transac-
tion.46
For each economic transaction, an organization must
decide whether to rely on markets or hierarchies. According
to the theory, this fundamental question is answered on the
basis of the overall costs attached to it. These costs—the so-
called “transaction costs”—are costs of all types that are borne
by any actors in relationship to the specification, the negoti-
ation, the monitoring and enforcement and the actual deliv-
ery of the given transaction. Referring to the previous exam-
ple, the taxi service is bought on the market. It appears the
service is easy to specify, because “a taxi is a taxi”; it is easy to
negotiate the terms of the transaction, because the only pa-
rameter is the price; and it is easy to monitor the transac-
tion, because the taxi drives to the required location and the
customer pays the bill. On the other hand, business unit
managers are rarely contracted as external service providers,
or consultants, because this transaction is almost impossible
to specify, monitor or enforce.
What kind of normative advice can be derived from these
considerations for an organization that faces a “make or buy”
decision? How should a manager decide whether a given
product or service should be “contracted out”—in other
words bought on the market—or provided internally, by a
sub-unit of the given organization? Williamson suggests that
hierarchy, rather than market, should be relied on if:
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• The exchange of the given product or service—the
“transaction”—involves a high level of uncertainty. A
degree of uncertainty is inevitably conveyed by any trans-
action, because the provider may go bankrupt, may fail
to provide the required type of goods in the required
quality and manner, may break the law and pursue op-
portunistic behavior, etc.
• It is difficult to specify the required product or service
in an exact, legally enforceable manner and doing so
requires a large input of expensive expert resources, such
as lawyers and auditors.
• The given transaction takes place relatively regularly.
For example, a small school does not need to employ a
full-time lawyer if it only requires a few days per year of
legal expertise.
On the other hand, a market-type solution, or contract-
ing out, is more beneficial if the transaction is simple, easy
to define and enforce and takes place relatively infrequently.
Applying these criteria, hiring a taxi service clearly seems to
be best bought on the “market,” while large-scale, regular
civil service training assistance, run by Western donors, is
something that should be chosen according to “hierarchy.”
Pros and Cons of Market versus Hierarchy
When applied to the real problems of training assistance,
the above, rather theoretical considerations translate into
quite tangible and practical consequences of choosing “mar-
ket” instead of “hierarchy.” These consequences can be briefly
summarized as follows:
• Clarity of organizational goals: The project approach
seems to be clearer about such cornerstones of assistance
activities as objectives, target group and time frame of
the TAP. Meanwhile, in the bureaucratic arrangement
of national civil service training, the explicit definition
of the training is often missing, and, frequently, even
the awareness of what exactly the training is aimed at is
also missing. In a bureaucratic setting, procedures, in-
puts and activities are usually much more important than
overall objectives. Indeed our empirical evidence seems
to support this observation. We could not find any na-
tional civil service training program, including the gen-
erally compulsory ones, that had clearly defined policy
goals and objectives. The authors’ subjective evaluation
is that TAPs seem to be generally superior to national
civil service training in this respect. But this, and other
pros of the market arrangement that one might expect
to occur on the basis of public choice and organization
theory literature—such as the reduction of bureaucratic
dysfunction, goal displacement and “budget-maximiz-
ing bureaucrats” and the resulting increase in organiza-
tional efficiency—are counter-balanced by a number of
other factors listed below.
• Short term thinking or insufficient degree of continuity of
assistance efforts: In general, public administration should
be characterized by continuity. It is a common experi-
ence that any change in the public administration sys-
tem, especially in most Continental systems, requires a
significant amount of time. The limited time span of
TAPs is somewhat at variance with this aspect of public
administration, because training is also usually some-
thing that should be continuous. TAPs, evidently, only
provide training for a finite amount of time. Theoreti-
cally, in the long-term, the national civil service train-
ing system should ensure the continuation of training
activities. But this may be difficult, mainly because the
national government may not have the necessary resourc-
es for continuous training.47 There are only exceptional
cases where either a donor or a beneficiary continues to
finance successful training courses for which great de-
mand was evident by the time the TAP’s implementa-
tion period was over.
• Severely limited organizational learning and project syn-
ergy: Fluctuation among implementing organizations is
high, which can cause the following problematic sce-
nario: TAP “A” is implemented by one contractor, who
learns hard and valuable lessons about the working en-
vironment, clients and problems specific to a given type
of assistance. Then TAP “B,” which is very similar to
TAP “A,” is implemented by another contractor, who
starts the cumbersome and costly learning process anew.
In sum, implementing organizations can only do a lim-
ited amount of learning and correcting failures.
• Measurable aspects and results of project activities are over-
emphasized, while intangible aspects tend to be neglected:
Contracts must be framed in tangible, operational terms.
Therefore, a contract-based relationship between the
donor and the implementing organization naturally leads
to a situation where the implementing organization is
evaluated on the basis of its outputs, most of all on quan-
titative output measures. For example, implementing
organizations need to make statements like: “One hun-
dred civil servants were trained in performance apprais-
al.” Consequently, real project outcomes and qualita-
tive aspects are de-emphasized.
• Information asymmetry: A textbook case in which mi-
croeconomic theory predicts the outcome of market
competition to be sub-optimal is present when the sup-
plier and the customer have unequal or asymmetric in-
formation regarding the features of the product or ser-
vice to be exchanged. Relevant expertise and the general
ability to implement a TAP effectively and efficiently
definitely falls into this category: It is much more diffi-
cult for the donor to actually assess the quality of service
that will be offered by the bidders than it is for the bid-
ders themselves. This situation introduces a problem that
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renders the outcome of a market-based donor-imple-
menter transaction sub-optimal, even if it is based on a
truly open market relationship.
• Inflexibility of operations: Strict separation of planning
and implementation may have several advantages, but
also some disadvantages. One of the biggest problems is
the resulting rigidity of the training project. The imple-
menting organization may face several difficulties that
require substantial changes in the planned objectives,
activities, etc.—especially because of the volatile and
uncertain project environment offered by the recipient
public administration systems. The strict organization-
al and temporal separation of planning from implemen-
tation makes the flexible and quick adaptation to such
changes nearly impossible. The modification of the
project plan requires intensive communication and co-
ordination between the implementing organization and
the donor, and later, among various segments of the
donor organization. Generally, a major modification
may require as much, or even more time, than the whole
project planning phase originally required. The result-
ing high transaction costs act to discourage changes that
prove to be clearly necessary during the implementa-
tion phase.
• Quasi-market instead of real-market arrangements: The
reliance on project-type implementation, or contract-
ing out, is justified both theoretically and empirically
by the beneficial effects of market competition among
potential contractors. This competition ensures that the
most efficient service provider is contracted. But the im-
plementation of a TAP requires that the bidders possess
a set of rare and specific capabilities. Among the most
important such capabilities are: relevant experience in
the given subject field, experience in the beneficiary
environment, an expert pool willing and able to travel
and work in the region, experience in working with the
given donor and knowledge of the given donor’s opera-
tional rules and procedures. These requirements greatly
limit the number of potential bidders, and thus—on
top of the above-mentioned anti-competitive effect of
information asymmetry—they encumber true market
competition. In fact, instead of true market competi-
tion, an oligopoly, or even a monopoly, can emerge: A
few insiders who know “the rules of the game” may share
large segments of the TAP implementation market
among themselves.
In sum, organization theory suggests good reasons to
harbor doubts about the expedience and universal applica-
bility of the project-type implementation framework of TAPs.
From the theoretical perspective of neo-institutional organi-
zation theory, permanent, hierarchy-based implementation
structures often seem to be more viable in implementing TAPs.
From a comparative perspective, it is important to note
that there are some questions that follow from the project-
type implementation framework that can be, and are, an-
swered in different ways by the different donors. For exam-
ple, the extent of rigidity caused by the cyclical nature of
projects can be quite different in the case of TAPs run by
various donors, depending on the donors’ practices. The
means of selecting contractors has a similarly high impact
on TAP success. These issues, which have a character vary-
ing across donors, are discussed in the next two sub-sections.
4.4.2 Time Span and the Resulting Inflexibility
of the Project
As was briefly mentioned in the previous sub-section, assis-
tance activities experience a certain amount of rigidity be-
cause all donors rely on the project-type implementation
arrangement. The extent of this rigidity varies, due to varia-
tions in the typical time span and schedule of the project
cycle.
The project cycle can be divided into two main parts.
The first part is project planning. During this period, deci-
sions are made about all the major elements of the TAP,
including objectives, target group, major outputs, draft sched-
ule of activities, etc. The second major part is the implemen-
tation phase. In between these two periods, there is usually a
tendering procedure, when the overall project plan, typical-
ly in the form of a terms of reference, is advertised, bidders
submit their proposals and the donor decides which bidder
will be the implementing organization. At this point, we will
analyze the time span of the process. When performing this
analysis, we regard the bidding process as part of the plan-
ning period and not part of the implementation phase.
Here again, we find a difference between PHARE and
the three other donors analyzed. Compared to the projects
of other donors, PHARE projects are characterized by a sig-
nificantly longer planning phase and a shorter implementa-
tion phase.
The length of the planning phase is an important issue
in such a dynamic and uncertain environment as public ad-
ministration in the CEE/CIS region. Topics of importance
change quickly. A major problem related to a project cycle
like that of PHARE is that, when a training topic is especial-
ly vital, the national government cannot wait for PHARE
TAPs to be introduced some two or three years later.
As for implementation, promoting change in public
administration takes a longer time. Furthermore, good train-
ing with relevant content usually requires a continuous sup-
ply to be effective. Both considerations suggest a longer im-
plementation phase.
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Comparative Table 12
Time-span and Inflexibility in the Project Cycle:
PHARE versus Other Donors
PHARE The planning phase of a PHARE TAP takes about two years, if everything goes smoothly. The first step takes about one
year or more and results in the signing of a so-called “financing memorandum,” a general plan for PHARE activities in the
beneficiary country. Heil writes in this regard: “It is interesting to note that, since 1998, all annual financing proposals
have been finalized by the Hungarian authorities no later than May. Still, the signing ceremony had to wait until mid-
December. This means that the internal decision-making procedure of the EU—during which the financing memorandum
was no longer modified—took about as long as the whole cycle from the first project ideas to the finalized proposal!”48
Due to the great level of uniformity within PHARE, the system is practically identical in the other countries, though
Hungary may be a bit more successful than the average in dealing with EU administration. Once the financing memo-
randum is adopted, detailed project plans, called “project fiches,” can be developed. These are also subject to careful and
time-consuming scrutiny by the delegation of the EU. Once the project fiche is adopted, the terms of reference can be
prepared and submitted again to the delegation. If the delegation adopts the terms of reference, the bidding process can
start. At this point, the beneficiary may expect that there is only another three-to-four months before the implementation
can start. We must note here that the process described above is a relatively new and simplified one. At the beginning of
the research period, the so called “DIS system” required the development of a financing memorandum, a “strategic plan”
and then a “work program,” on which the terms of reference had to be based. By contrast, the implementation phase of
PHARE projects is exceptionally short. The implementation period may be between 12 and 24 months. Typical TAPs are
18 months long.
DFID, Other donors require a shorter planning period and a longer implementation period. A five-year implementation period
USAID, is not at all exceptional for USAID projects. DFID TAPs are typically two-to-four years long. CIDA TAPs are about three
CIDA years long. We could not find any major difference in the planning period among the three donors. All of them require a
shorter and simpler planning procedure. The British donor had an image of being especially flexible and quick in responding
to local needs. However, this has greatly changed with the much more “strategic” approach introduced with the establishment
of DFID. And flexibility was reduced even further by DFID’s policy of relating its assistance effort to other, larger donors,
especially the EU.
4.4.3 Who Implements TAPs?
Another problem identified above is the limited competi-
tion among potential contractors, and the resulting loss of
efficiency of the market-based, project-type implementation
arrangement. As was the case with problems caused by project
time-span, the extent of the problem of limited competition
differs from donor to donor.
In the following paragraphs, the focus of the problem’s
analysis is narrowed down to one specific question: To what
extent are beneficiary-side implementing organizations and
beneficiary-side experts involved in implementation? The
importance given to this question is justified by the fact that
it has implications beyond the issue of competition. For ex-
ample, the question is also important because, as is discussed
at various points in this volume, TAP efficacy is often strongly
limited by the inadequate awareness of specific beneficiary
needs and circumstances. This situation arises because local
experts, who obviously know the local context much better,
are usually under-utilized in TAP implementation. Another
reason why it is important to look at the relative exclusion of
local experts from TAP implementation is that this exclu-
sion is surprisingly systematic, and it is difficult to explain
on the basis of overt, “official” TAP policies or principles.
The fact that TAPs generally tend to be implemented by
contractors and experts from the same country or region as
the donors will be an important element of the argumenta-
tion presented in the conclusion of this volume.
The selection of the implementing organization of a giv-
en TAP takes place in the bidding and contracting phase of
the project cycle. In this process, a lot depends on how widely
the terms of reference was advertised, how the scope of po-
tential bidders is limited, what aspects are taken into consid-
eration when the contracting decision is made, etc.
A review of donor practices during bidding procedures
seems to indicate a general tendency toward explicitly or
implicitly excluding organizations originating in the benefi-
ciary country, while favoritism is shown toward organiza-
tions from the donor country.
Once the implementing organization is selected and
contracted, another question is the selection of experts, both
consultants and trainers, taking part in the actual imple-
mentation. This is a general practice, because most imple-
menting organizations don’t possess a pool of experts who
are both appropriate and available for performing the vari-
ous specialized tasks involved in the given project. From the
point of view of quality, the way experts are contracted for a
given project is a key question.
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Comparative Table 13
The Origin of Implementing Organizations
PHARE Rules of PHARE do not explicitly prohibit contracting organizations from the beneficiary country. Nonetheless, we
found no single case in which a TAP was carried out by an organization originating entirely from the recipient region. We
suppose that it is the large number of intricate and specific rules that deter beneficiary-origin organizations from bidding
for PHARE TAP contracts. We found that organizations of the recipient country may appear as members of a consortium,
which is always led by an organization originating from the EU. There are other cases where “local branches” of international
firms, like International House, DHV Hungary or Bishop and Chalmers Lithuania, were contracted. Smaller projects, with
a value of less than USD 300,000, are usually carried out by so-called framework contractors, without the bureaucratic
bidding procedures. There were 13 such framework contractors, all of which were of EU origin.
DFID According to the previous official rules of DFID, contracts could only be awarded to organizations of U.K. origin. This
rule was changed to one that allows only organizations of EU origin. Still, all the implementing organizations mentioned
by our country teams were from the U.K.
USAID We found that, for all the projects mentioned, the contractor was of U.S. origin. In the field of training, USAID works
with two organizations, one for the CEE and another in the CIS countries. Additional U.S. companies may win other
projects—such as mixed public administration development—through a limited competitive bidding procedure.
CIDA All implementing organizations of the four projects mentioned in our research were of Canadian origin. The CIDA web
site emphasizes that the majority of foreign aid has actually been spent within Canada, on financing Canadian organizations
and individuals.
Conclusion There is a general tendency among donors to contract donor-country-origin organizations as TAP implementers, irrespective
of whether this requirement is laid down in the donors’ official rules or is only an informal practice. This fact is considered
natural and is rarely, if ever, questioned in the donor community.
• The trainees themselves may be impressed because they
are being trained by the “big names” in the field, names
who they know from the local scene.
• Local trainers may handle the audience much better than
foreign trainers, who usually face the problems of cul-
tural and language gaps.
It is surprising that, despite all the advantages of relying
on local trainers in curriculum development and/or train-
ing, local experts are utilized to a relatively low extent.
One possible reason why TAPs do not use local experts
to a greater extent may be the low quality of local trainers,
who may either have poor training skills or limited knowl-
edge of training content. Indeed, experienced local trainers
in the national civil service training field are relatively rare.
Either they lack the knowledge and understanding of the
public administration system, as is the case with trainers from
the private sector, or they lack the experience in interactive
training techniques, as is often the case with lecturers in the
field of public administration.
• In Hungary, high-quality professional trainers can be found at
various training organizations that provide services for banks, man-
agement of private companies etc. But there are almost no full-
time trainers, let alone trainers with interactive training experi-
ence, within the relatively well-established network of organizations
providing national civil service training.
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Local experts can be involved either in identifying the
exact training objectives and in elaborating the training cur-
riculum and training materials or adapting them to local
needs, or they can be involved as trainers who actually pro-
vide training. There may be several advantages of including
local experts or trainers in a TAP:
• Local experts, even those having very high prestige
among the target group, are significantly cheaper than
foreign experts. They have lower honoraria and no travel,
hotel or per-diem expenses.
• Our Lithuanian team describes a TAP for which, exceptionally,
financial data are available. The project was implemented by a
foreign organization. Curriculum and training material already
existed, but adaptation was necessary, and it was made by local
experts. The materials were then translated, and all the training
courses were run by local trainers. Even with such a distribution of
labor, expert fees for local experts was USD 8,400, while fees for
foreign experts was USD 79,161. In other words, almost 10 times
more was spent on foreign consultants.
• As was argued in the section on training content, a key
success factor in any TAP is that those identifying train-
ing objectives and developing the training materials are
familiar with the needs and institutional, legal and cul-
tural specifics of the beneficiary. This is one weakness
of many—maybe most—foreign experts, but it can be
corrected by involving carefully selected and managed
local experts.
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Comparative Table 14
Selection of Experts
PHARE Local experts play a relatively small role in preparation of curriculum and training material for PHARE TAPs. But local
trainers often play a significant role in the actual training delivery. One reason for this may be that PHARE TAPs are
frequently large-scale training events. Carrying out such activities with foreign consultants would increase costs to such an
extent that the bidder would loose the competition for the project. Nonetheless, PHARE procedural rules generally
prohibit civil servants of the beneficiary country from taking part as paid experts in TAPs—even though these civil
servants often possess most of the relevant knowledge. Similarly, if the direct beneficiary is a civil service training institution
of the recipient country, employees of this institution are also prohibited from acting as paid TAP experts.
DFID DFID relies quite strongly on U.K. experts and trainers. The reason may be that most of their projects are sustainability-
type TAPs. This was the case in Hungary and Lithuania. In Ukraine—in a project that was less clearly designed for
sustainability—the implementing organization relied to a greater extent on Ukrainian trainers.
USAID It seems that USAID is relatively active in involving local trainers in actual training delivery. The reason for this may be
the rather large-scale training that they support and the fact that training venues are often far away from the main airports
and hotels, because USAID mostly runs courses for local governments.
CIDA CIDA seems to rely mostly on Canadian experts. The main exception is that of a Ukrainian project where Baltic instructors
were used extensively. But the reason for this exception was that the Ukrainian participants did not speak English.
Conclusion Involvement of local trainers varies among donors. It seems there is a general tendency among projects that use local
experts that these experts are only used in actual training delivery, rather than in elaboration of curriculum. In general, it
seems to be a problem that donors expect employees of the docking and beneficiary organizations will take part in the
TAP activities without any reimbursement, since it is their regular job responsibility. But these employees carry out TAP-
related activities in addition to their regular scope of work, without any additional compensation. They are therefore not
eager to assist TAPs.
Still, the argument that there is a “lack of local resourc-
es” can be countered with at least two arguments: First, we
can enumerate good examples of available local experts, in-
cluding Romanian NGOs that are ready and able to provide
professional training services for the civil service and the pre-
viously mentioned Lithuanian Institute of Public Adminis-
tration. The services of these institutions are not really uti-
lized by TAPs. The second argument is that foreign trainers
are not necessarily better. The authors themselves have ex-
perienced several training events provided by foreign train-
ers that were quite poor, either in terms of the trainers’ tech-
nique or their knowledge of the specific field. It is quite
common that training is run not by a qualified trainer but
by a consultant.
• The Hungarian team knows about some cases in which TAP courses
ended when the participants unanimously left the course. They
also experienced one training in which the course was only saved
when the Hungarian organizer stepped in and finished the train-
ing, instead of the foreign consultant.
Another, more understandable, reason for the limited
use of local trainers, is that the donors lack control and/or
trust of local experts. This may be an especially serious prob-
lem if the local trainers develop training materials and teach
in the local language.
In this section, and in some previous ones, we looked at
the pros and cons of relying on local organizations and ex-
perts in the implementation of TAPs. It has become clear
that this is a complex problem, with many interrelated
elements and trade-offs. Therefore, despite the importance
of the question, it is impossible to give an unambiguous
assessment of current practices or to give clear guidelines on
improving these practices. However, some relevant corner-
stones can be laid down, and some considerations deserve
the attention of stakeholders. These are summarized in
Table 8.
4.4.4 Transparency of Operations
Accountability for results and transparency of operations is
usually, quite understandably, a major requirement of the
stakeholders of any organization. In the case of activities paid
for by taxpayers, especially in advanced governance systems,
transparency is a prerequisite of the legitimacy of an organi-
zation or activity, and it is often backed by legal norms. The
issue of transparency of TAPs is analyzed separately, not only
because of its general importance, but also because the expe-
rience gained in the field research is surprising and impor-
tant enough to merit a closer look.
In the context of TAPs, like most public programs, var-
ious types of evaluations are used to ensure a sufficient level
of transparency and accountability. In the following section,
therefore, an overview of donors’ evaluation practices is giv-
en first. Then we look at the transparency of the operations
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of a donor, as indicated by the availability of simple and
general project information, that was sought during the field-
research phase of the present work.
Evaluation Practices
A fundamental function of evaluation is ensuring feed-back
on the results of a project, and thus allowing organizational
learning.49 A second key function is to ensure accountability
for the achievement of goals and efficacy of the assistance,
thereby creating transparency and legitimacy for assistance
operations. These functions have an especially important role
in such a dynamic and complex environment as the public
administration systems of the CEE region.
All donors carry out some type of evaluation. In this
regard, we find a major difference between TAPs and na-
tional civil service training systems. As we have already not-
ed, evaluation as a specific technique is largely unknown and
unused in the national civil service training field. But even
though donors do seek evaluations, they differ greatly in the
type, form and regularity of these evaluations.
In the following paragraphs, evaluation practices are
viewed from three aspects:
• methodological approach of donors to evaluations;
• soundness of evaluation procedures;
• public availability of evaluation materials; in other words,
the extent to which donors use evaluations for internal
management versus external accountability purposes.
Table 8
Arguments for and Against Relying on Local Resources in Implementing TAPs
Arguments Argument applies
to beneficiary side:
Contractors  Experts
Arguments supporting reliance on beneficiary-side actors:
The costs of using local actors are a small fragment of those related to Western implementers. ! !
These costs include fees and related costs, such as travel, accommodation and per-diem costs.
Problems related to the language of the training. !
These problems were discussed in the relevant section earlier.
Local experts are familiar with working in the local context, including knowing how beneficiary-side !
actors think, how these actors are motivated, how these actors communicate, how to identify
the target group, how to recruit trainees, etc. This knowledge is crucial for flexible, effective and
non-wasteful implementation.
Knowledge and familiarity with the local institutional, legal and cultural context is a crucial, !
but often missing, prerequisite of designing a meaningful training project.
Arguments opposing reliance on beneficiary-side actors:
Control of the actual TAP activities can be problematic, because the soundness of internal management ! To some
and control and/or the integrity and sincerity of business practices can be doubtful.  extent
Familiarity with, and acceptance of, the management culture and standard procedures of the donor can !
be missing, but it is important for the smooth and efficient running of the project.
The methodological approach that donors take with eval-
uations, and the implied function of those evaluations, make
it clear that, in the four-stage framework of the classical train-
ing evaluation based on Kirkpatrick and set out in Chapter
2, the participant questionnaire contributes only to the first,
least-relevant, stage to be measured.50 In the case of TAPs,
this measure is especially problematic, because trainees in
the region tend to give much higher scores than they really
believe the training deserves.
• Our Lithuanian country team notes that a DFID project was eval-
uated by 97 percent of the participants as “useful” or “very useful,”
while another survey found that the same indicator is only 62 per-
cent. Eighty-six percent of the participants indicated that they will
be able to use the newly acquired skills in their workplace, but an
alternative survey found the applicability of the skills and knowl-
edge was at 27 percent.51
• USAID also relies heavily on trainee questionnaires. In that re-
gard, Bakenova notes: “USAID recognizes that there are problems
with participant evaluations (especially in CIS countries) that have
been, and continue to be, characterized by participants tending to
be polite and often unwilling to criticize either the program or the
provider. Usually, not less than 80 percent of participants tend to
regard programs as being relevant, objectives met.”52
Trainee questionnaires may be dubious sources of in-
formation for measuring immediate satisfaction. And these
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questionnaires are surely not reliable for measuring longer-
term effects and the utilization of transferred skills or knowl-
edge. It is our general experience that TAPs frequently gain
high evaluation scores on trainee questionnaires because of
the “luxurious” circumstances of the training, rather than
the inherent value of that training.
• A PHARE training event on EU Structural Funds in Hungary
was evaluated highly by most of the trainees. The variance was due
to two factors. Those who had some substantial background in EU
Structural Funds were less satisfied, because they realized that the
knowledge transferred could only be utilized after Hungary’s acces-
sion, in other words, several years after the training took place.
Another, even more relevant explanatory variable was the quality
of additional services, such as catering. In fact, most of the com-
ments on the training were related to this. The majority complained
that no coffee was provided in the afternoon break and that there
was not enough mineral water.
• With regards to USAID, Bakenova found that, after a new guide-
line was introduced that limited the services—and especially the
cash allowances—provided to the participants, the participant sat-
isfaction rate dropped significantly.53
For the sake of comparison, we note that participant
questionnaires are now being used more often in national
civil service training programs. Although we cannot prove
it, we suppose that this practice is, to a great extent, an effect
of TAPs. Before 1990, such questionnaires were hardly in
use in the regions’ national civil service training systems. But
national civil service training programs differ greatly from
TAPs in that several of them, and most of the compulsory
ones, end with an exam, which is quite rare among TAPs.
This feature of national civil service training may be viewed
as a deficiency, because it indicates a concentration on knowl-
edge instead of skills and a lecture style of training. Still,
national civil service training with exams is at least one level
higher than TAPs, on Kirkpatrick’s four-step evaluation pro-
cess mentioned above, because it measures the amount of
knowledge transferred.
With regards to soundness of evaluation procedures, the
rankings are shown in Comparative Table 15.
Public availability of evaluation results is vital from the
point of view of the transparency of operations and account-
ability of the management for successes and failures. The
crucial question is how evaluation results/materials are actu-
ally used: Whether they are only reviewed internally, by se-
nior management, or they are made available for the nar-
rower or broader community of external stakeholders, which
is, after all, the public.
The findings in this regard are indicated in Compara-
tive Table 16.
Comparative Table 15
Soundness of Evaluation Procedures
1. PHARE PHARE seems to run the most sophisticated evaluation system among all donors. A wide range of randomly selected TAPs
are evaluated by external evaluators, using a standard evaluation format: “Operational Monitoring and Assessment System”
reports. Additionally, in-depth evaluation is provided for a number of TAPs. The other donors rarely rely on external
evaluation. Evaluation is usually left up to the donor’s responsible official or to the implementing organization’s reports.
2. USAID USAID also runs a sophisticated evaluation system, which relies partly on trainee questionnaires. It is interesting that,
according to available information, USAID is the only donor among the four that attempts to assess longer term impact
on a regular basis: Participants may be approached about six-to-nine months after the course for a follow-up survey.
USAID also measures outputs against their own strategic objectives.
3. DFID According to the stated procedural rules of DFID, detailed quantitative evaluation, including impact assessment, must be
carried out on every project that costs more than GBP 5 million. But projects in the CEE/CIS region hardly ever exceed
this amount. We have no knowledge of TAPs that would have been systematically evaluated. It seems that DFID relies
mostly on reports submitted by the implementing organizations. Our Lithuanian team noted that the participant
questionnaire played a crucial role in evaluation of projects. Additionally, consultants of the implementing organization
conducted an evaluation that was carried out in a professional manner and later verified by an independent consultant. In
a Hungarian project, a qualitative process evaluation was carried out by an independent expert in the first half of the
project as a result of major deficiencies and dissatisfaction from both sides. Recommendations were formed and, later on,
were followed up on, thus contributing to increased efficiency. Participant questionnaire results were referred to in the
quarterly project reports.
4. CIDA “Participant questionnaires and ex-post evaluation by contracted consultants is the most frequent form of evaluation […]
CIDA does not have any specific and strict guidelines on the conduct of training evaluation. Most of the information that
CIDA receives regarding achieved overall project results comes from the reports of executing organizations, who usually
obtain this information on the bases of their own evaluation procedures. However, executing organizations’ approach
toward training evaluation also differs.”54
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Comparative Table 16
Public Availability of Evaluation Results
1. PHARE PHARE is definitely the most transparent. A
large number of evaluation reports, some of them
quite critical towards the analyzed projects, are
publicized on the internet.
2. CIDA CIDA also publishes a great deal of evaluative
and related materials on a regular basis.
3. DFID DFID is less transparent. This donor publishes
only very general information, which does not
include evaluative information on specific
projects.
4. USAID USAID seems to be the least transparent of the
analyzed donors. Only the “success story
database” is available for the wider public.
Experience of the Field Research:
Availability of Project Documents
The amount of TAP information we were able to gain in the
process of our field research depends on two independent
variables: first, the extent, to which such information exists;
and, second, the extent to which the donor is willing to share
that information. Although this distinction is theoretically
quite clear, in practice it is difficult to decide whether a giv-
en request for information was refused for the first or the
second reason. It is noted here that, in the final analysis, the
effect on the transparency of donors and TAPs is the same.
The “only” difference is that in the former case, an addi-
tional, unfavorable impression is given regarding the regu-
larity and soundness of the administrative processes of the
given donor.
Because the impact of either variable is the same, our
assessment of donor practices avoids a clear distinction
between the soundness of project documentation and the
willingness of donors to share basic project information
for the purpose of an evaluative research project like the
present one.
It is clear that, if the beneficiary government cannot
obtain items like the list of participants of a TAP, any
type of human resources planning is jeopardized, as is the
rational utilization of skills and knowledge transferred to the
trainees by the given TAP. This is especially so in the case of
sustainability-type projects, or any project which is expected
to produce trained trainers for use by the national civil ser-
vice training system. This consideration seems to be self-
evident, and it would probably not be disputed by any
donor.
Given the obvious importance of basic information
about TAPs, our findings are especially surprising. We dis-
covered that, in the majority of cases, no list of participants
is available. It was also an exceptional case if the curriculum
and training materials were available. This is so, even with
the sustainability-type projects, which were designed so that
the courses will be run later on by the national civil service
training system.
Comparative Table 17
Availability of Training Outputs, Including List of
Participants, Curriculum and Training Materials
PHARE PHARE, despite its large and uniform administ-
rative capacity present in all the beneficiary
countries, is no better than other donors. It is a
frequent critique that lists of participants, and
frequently even the number of trainees, is not
available. The same holds true for details about
curriculum and training materials. In the past
few years, the record of PHARE in this regard
has improved somewhat.
DFID In Lithuania, where the project was run at the
central training institute of the country, curricula
and training materials were left at the institute
and thus are available. By contrast, in Hungary,
where four, mostly government (i.e. not training)
institutions were involved as beneficiary organi-
zations, most of the curricula and the training
materials are not available.
USAID The list of participants is available to the donor.
We found no evidence that the training materials
were practically available.
CIDA The curriculum and training materials are avail-
able to the donor. We found no evidence that
the training materials were practically available.
Conclusion Availability of project documents is quite humble.
This, however, is not solely the fault of donors.
Beneficiary organizations have not made any
significant effort to collect TAP materials and
utilize them by making them available for the
country’s public administration.55
Our personal experience is that, once a project ends,
and especially once the donor leaves the country, it is diffi-
cult to even find out if there were TAPs run by the given
donor, let alone what the content was, how many people
were trained, how long they were trained or exactly who was
trained.
Except for a few cases, it was usually impossible to ac-
cess data concerning the break-down of project costs into
such elements as training design in relation to effective train-
ing provision, local versus foreign expert fees and related
expenses, etc. Differences between the four analyzed donors
are reviewed in Comparative Table 18.
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Comparative Table 18
Availability of Budget Data
1. CIDA Budget data were available in Lithuania, and the headquarters staff provided our reporter not only data that allowed
calculation of unit cost but also quite detailed budget breakdowns, consisting of information that was considered “sensitive”
or a “business secret” by other donors.
2. DFID The donor does not have a clear policy in this regard. Thus, besides the general tendency that the beneficiary’s administrative
culture influences the level of secrecy, a lot depends on the implementing organizations’ practices. The Lithuanian team
could obtain budget breakdown data that was not available for the Hungarian team. The Ukrainian team could not
obtain any relevant budget information.
3. PHARE TAP budget data, and especially budget breakdown data, are usually not available, because most of the projects are mixed ones,
with some TAP elements. Inputs are defined in great detail, but input costs cannot be related to TAP outputs. Thus, irrespective
of the large bureaucratic apparatus and procedures, no reliable detailed TAP budget data were available. Only Hungary
had a database for PHARE training activities. In this database, some, though not all, records contained sufficient information
to calculate at least unit costs. This data included overall training budget, number of trainees and number of training days.
4. USAID Overall budget data were available. No other budget breakdown data were provided, even via personal telephone interviews
with the headquarters.
Conclusion TAP budget data availability depended most of all on the beneficiary’s administrative culture. Data were least available in
Ukraine and Romania. If the donor did not have a clear policy in this regard, a lot depended on the implementing
organization. Large and precisely regulated project administration does not assure greater transparency in this regard. For
example, PHARE could not provide basic budget data, whereas CIDA could provide detailed budget break-downs.
PHARE TAPs, including external evaluation reports that
are available on the internet, we were able to obtain valuable
additional information from the local PHARE offices, and
even requests for hard copies of some documents from
Brussels proved successful. Nevertheless, most of the evalu-
ation documents complain about the limited availability of
training documents. In fact, evaluators found that, quite
frequently, the available documents do not even identify the
number of trainees and total training days. These gaps in
information are especially shocking in the case of PHARE,
because the extremely detailed procedural rules are supposed
to ensure accountability and the prevention of waste, fraud
and corruption. If very basic pieces of information on out-
put are not available for PHARE’s own evaluators, ques-
tions can be raised about the positive aspects of the whole
procedural system—which has already-identified negative
aspects, such as slowness, a lack of flexibility and responsive-
ness, etc. More relevant from our present point of view is
the fact that PHARE runs—mostly at the expense of the
beneficiary—a large and unified organizational system whose
sole responsibility is to administer PHARE projects, pro-
duce and keep files in order, etc. If there is a donor that has
the necessary organizational size and structure to keep TAP
documents in order and available for all stakeholders, this
donor is PHARE. Yet even PHARE has a poor record in
that regard.
If we found more evaluation reports criticizing PHARE
than other donors, it is probably because only PHARE TAP
evaluation reports are widely available—not because other
donors would be any better. In fact, the overall picture with
Another major finding is that, even information that
obviously exists, such as number of participants or overall
budget, is often consciously kept in the strictest confidence
by some donors or their field offices. Our teams’ limited
access to such information is even more peculiar if one con-
siders that these researchers themselves were intimately in-
volved in working with TAPs in the respective country—as
experts, project coordinators, members or managers of host
organizations, etc.
It was also surprising to discover that it is not so much
the donor as the beneficiary that determines the variance in
secrecy versus transparency. For example, in Ukraine, and
to a somewhat smaller extent Romania, data on TAPs are
not available for “outsiders.” It seems that donors follow the
general practice of the beneficiary country’s government. If
secrecy in a country’s government is wide-spread, TAP
information will not be available either.
As to the level of secrecy in beneficiary public adminis-
tration systems: In Ukraine, responsible national authorities
collect data on compulsory training activities. This data is
not available for the public, nor to our country team leader,
who otherwise works in a managerial position within the
national civil service training system. Furthermore, the same
person could barely obtain relevant information on TAP
activities. Our Romanian team faced similar difficulties.
Though the situation is far from perfect in Hungary or
Lithuania, our teams in those countries still usually achieved
access to aggregate data that was available with the authorities.
Undoubtedly, PHARE proved to be, by far, the most
transparent in all regards. Along with information on
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other donors is worse than with PHARE. The authors par-
ticipated in a sustainability TAP run by DFID. We found
that about a third of the trainees’ lists were not available,
from either the donor or the local coordinator. In most
cases, we found no training materials on the basis of which
the courses could subsequently be replicated. Major docu-
ments of study trips were not even available in the library of
the beneficiary organization, whose management participated
in the trip.
None of the other donors seem to be as transparent as
PHARE. Field researchers in the beneficiary countries faced
severe difficulties in collecting even the most basic inform-
ation. Our Ukrainian team member, who at that time actu-
ally participated in a DFID project, did not have access to
such information as the overall number of trained persons
or the overall budget of the analyzed TAPs. USAID seems
to be the most reluctant to provide information on their
activities, though this may be a result of the events of Sept.
11, 2001.
As mentioned above, there is a specific but important
aspect, or consequence, of availability of project informa-
tion. Namely, access to certain kinds of TAP information—
such as the list of participants, the subject and detailed
content of the training and the training materials produced—
has a fundamental effect on the chances of utilization and
sustainability of the given TAPs. The unavailability of this
information may render a TAP useless.
Despite this fact, donors show surprisingly limited
interest in changing the current, sub-optimal situation. For
example, one solution to this problem could be to set up a
central database somewhere in the beneficiary countries’
government structure, possibly at the organization responsi-
ble for civil service or civil service training. This database
should allow the structured storage of information in elec-
tronic and hard copy form, and it should contain all rele-
vant pieces of information, most importantly, the list of TAP
participants and the field they were trained in. It is surpris-
ing to see that no donor seems to have considered financing
the establishment of such a central database to facilitate the
increased utility of all TAPs for the beneficiary governments.
Moreover, not even the existing structures are utilized for
this purpose.
• One example of a lost opportunity to maintain TAP records is in
Hungary, where the Ministry of Interior operates a Central Civil
Service Database, containing all the relevant data for over 100,000
civil servants. The database, which is mentioned in the Hungari-
an civil service law, includes data on major training courses in
which the civil servants participated. We have no evidence that
any donor ever initiated a process by which its TAPs would be
entered into this database. In addition to this potential resource,
there is also a database of accredited civil service trainers in Hunga-
ry. Nevertheless, we have no knowledge of any TAP that was planned
and implemented in a way that the trained trainers would be add-
ed into this database.
• Initiatives of the beneficiaries to improve this situation are received
with little enthusiasm. For example, when the difficulty of main-
taining sustainability became clear to the Hungarian Institute of
Public Administration, which is a hub institution for national civil
service training, they submitted a proposal to a major donor’s small-
grants fund, requesting USD 4,000 to set up an appropriate data-
base. The staff of the institute would have collected the documents
of the TAPs in order to provide information to the professional
public. Unfortunately, the requested funds were not granted.
4.4.5 Administrative Burden
on the Beneficiary Government
Practically all TAPs require some in-kind contribution from
the governments of beneficiary countries. Even though this
contribution is rarely recognized by either the donor or the
beneficiary, it may be a significant burden on national au-
thorities. This administrative burden can be considered as a
factor of TAP efficiency, since costs born by the beneficiary
should be, from a normative point of view, also counted.
Information with regards to the administrative burden put
on beneficiary governments by the individual donors is sum-
marized in Comparative Table 19.
The beneficiary’s burden is further increased by donors’
attempts to get the most senior person possible as the local
head of each project. The ultimate goal is usually a minister,
but donors are frequently satisfied in the end with a deputy
minister. Donors usually provide a seemingly rational ex-
planation for this behavior: They say that the public admin-
istration system of the beneficiary countries is disorganized
and that high-level leadership is necessary to ensure that that
project is supported and implemented on the beneficiary side.
But the logic of this explanation is flawed. If, as is indeed the
case, the public administration system is disorganized, then
the higher up an official is in the hierarchy, the further they
are from the actual project administration—and the lower
their influence on implementation. This is generally true of
the minister, too. And even if the minister potentially has
greater power, he/she is likely to be less interested in the
project, because of the large number of similar, or more
important, projects and issues that a minister must deal with.
If these “theoretical” explanations are not convincing enough
to show the weakness of seeking high-ranking local leader-
ship for a project, the practical experience, including a con-
stant failure to ensure leadership by “going high,” should
make the case forcefully.
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Comparative Table 19
Administrative Burden on the Beneficiary
PHARE PHARE is generally considered the donor that places the largest administrative burden on the beneficiary. PHARE re-
quires that beneficiary governments set up, run and finance a large set of organizations, which are uniform in all countries
and solely serve the purpose of PHARE administration. The Hungarian team found that the cost of financing this set of
organizations is about 2 percent of the total yearly PHARE budget. But the relative proportion of the administrative
burden is higher on smaller projects, and TAPs are usually such small-budget projects. Indeed, the administrative burden
for DFID TAPs was estimated at 6 percent, and PHARE surely requires more administrative work. Thus, it is most likely
that the administrative burden is well over 6 percent of the total PHARE TAP budget.
DFID No clear tendency could be identified. It seems that a lot depends on the implementing organization’s practices, as well
as on the practices of the beneficiary organization, because, in several cases, division of this burden was a result of implicit
or explicit bargaining. In Hungary, the implementing organization employed a person who was responsible for several
administrative and even managerial activities. This solution seemed to be successful and efficient.
USAID USAID and its implementing organizations strive to control project activities as much as possible. Thus, TAPs of this
donor place an especially small burden on the beneficiary.
CIDA CIDA seems to place a below-average administrative burden on the beneficiary. CIDA usually requests a 10 percent con-
tribution from the beneficiary in the form of an in-kind contribution. It seems that, except for a Ukrainian project, out of
the three analyzed projects, this contribution was fulfilled, even though the management at the docking organizations did
not realize this was so.
Conclusion Calculations of the administrative burden were based on the civil service wages in the region, which are small in comparison
to TAP expert fees. Still, we found that the donors place a relatively large burden on the beneficiary, though this burden
is supposedly not more than 10 percent of the total TAP budget. It seems that managers at the docking organizations are
usually not aware of this burden, let alone the value of their contribution to the project. Another burden that we could
not systematically analyze, even though it was raised by most of the country teams regarding most of the donors, is that
civil servants must spend time explaining basic issues for foreign consultants every time a new donor, or else just a new
implementing organization, appears on the scene.
High ranking officials agree to play the leading role be-
cause they feel it is their obligation, otherwise the TAP, which
brings foreign money, would not come to the country. But
these officials are too busy to participate regularly in leading
the projects. If we consider the relatively low number of
ministers in a country, and the relatively large number of
various foreign projects, and assume that taking a leading
role in a project may require at least one day per quarter, the
problem becomes clear. We may conclude that ministers,
especially in countries where donors are quite active, may
hardly have time for any other activities beyond their duty
of leading various assistance projects. The fact that some or
most donors request the establishment of steering commit-
tees staffed with high-ranking officials escalates the problem
by:
• requiring the time of several high-ranking officials for
the same project;
• and failing to recognize problems of availability that
result either in the committee regularly having  no quo-
rum or in lower ranking officials attending on behalf of
the minister.
– DFID ran a TAP in Hungary, with six main elements, between
1998 and 2002. The total project budget was about USD 1 mil-
lion—a relatively small amount, even by Hungarian standards. A
steering committee was set up, led by the minister for the Prime
Minister’s Office, the most powerful cabinet minister. The com-
mittee members were mostly state secretaries or deputy state secre-
taries. But the steering committee never really met, and this greatly
hindered the operation of the project. Finally, a so called coordina-
tion group was set up, consisting of the directors of the ministries
whose units were responsible for project administration. Later on,
the directors were represented by those lower-level officials who ac-
tually run the project in the ministry. The British project leader
attended both the coordinating and the quasi-steering committee
meeting, which were held at around the same time. By then, most-
ly the coordinating group members attended the so-called steering
committee meetings, too. Once this setup stabilized, the project start-
ed to function. As we write this, the project is reaching its end, and
a major closing event is being organized. It is hoped that the offi-
cial steering committee members may meet there, for the first time.
We quote the above example not because it exposes an
exceptionally severe case. One could list several similar, or
even worse, cases. The example is remarkable because it
exhibits not only the problem but also a potential solution.
Nonetheless, the question still remains the same: Why do
donors insist on high-ranking steering committee members
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if that rarely ever works as it was intended and if it fre-
quently endangers the functioning and effectiveness of the
whole project? Apparently the answer is that high-ranking
officials are used to promote the prestige and image of the
project, the implementing organization and/or the donor,
even if this does harm to the project on the ground.
4.4.6 The Personal Element
In the sections above, we considered several structural and
procedural issues regarding the managing of TAPs. We
described some general tendencies and factors that have an
impact on TAP efficacy. But there is one major element,
which we will call the “personality factor,” that seems diffi-
cult to analyze exactly, or even define. There are no general
rules that can be applied regarding the personality factor.
If the person who manages the TAP is devoted to the
task, that may ensure TAP success. On the other hand, a
“business as usual” approach, even if it includes professional
TAP management, often seems to lead to failures in the
region.
• CIDA’s project in Lithuania seems to be quite a successful one.
Bakenova mentions the project manager at the implementing
organization, who was a university professor, not even a profes-
sional consultant or trainer, and who devoted great effort to the
project. It is generally agreed that the project’s success was to a great
extent due to this person’s sensitivity and devotion.56
• A qualitative interim evaluation ordered by the donor compared
two TAPs run in Hungary by DFID in the 1997-2000 period.
Significant differences were found in the efficiency of the two TAPs.
It was somewhat surprising that the least successful TAP was run
by a professional public administration training and consulting
organization. The more successful project was run by a university
and managed by a university professor, who was personally inter-
ested in the country’s public administration reform and devoted to
the development of civil service.
4.5 Technical Features of Training
The technical features of how training projects are actually
implemented have a major effect on the efficacy of TAPs.
The importance of these features is increased by the fact that,
often, large losses in efficacy could have been avoided through
the observance of some relatively minor technical consider-
ations. Below, we look at three such technical features: the
language, the style and the geographical location of the TAPs.
4.5.1 Language
Problems of language naturally occur during the implemen-
tation of TAPs because the training material is usually
“imported” from a foreign language and because the pre-
dominantly foreign consultants and trainers employed by
TAP implementing organizations hardly ever speak the
local language.
Theoretically, there are several ways to circumvent the
language barrier. One of them is for TAPs to utilize local
trainers, who offer training in the local language. From the
point of view of the quality of training this solution might
have some adverse effects, because it limits the implement-
ing organization’s control over the training course’s content
and activities.
• A solution to the problem of offering training in the local language
without losing control of local trainers was provided by a DFID
TAP in Hungary. Trained trainers ran courses in the local lan-
guage. Foreign trainers also sat in on the course, and they were
provided with simultaneous translation. This allowed them to
follow the process, to provide feedback to inexperienced local train-
ers and to step in, if that was necessary.
Another way to handle the language issue is to run the
training in a foreign language. This is a widely used practice.
The advantage of this arrangement is clear. It allows direct
communication between the trainer and the trainees while
allowing the implementing organization to maintain con-
trol over trainers. At the same time, there are potential dis-
advantages in this arrangement, including the following:
• The most obvious problem is that participants may not
speak the language well enough to be able to get the
maximum benefit from the training.
• The overwhelming majority of civil servants do not speak
foreign languages. The proportion of those who do speak
another language is even smaller among the older
workers—a group that includes most senior civil ser-
vants, to whom the majority of TAPs are addressed.
• The small group of civil servants who do speak Western
language(s) can end up taking part in several courses of
very diverse content, such as public finance for local
governments, policy-making in central government,
management of EU SAPARD programs, ethics codes,
motivation of employees, urban development, etc. The
result can be the creation of a small group of “pro-
fessional training participants.”
– One problem with the creation of “professional training partici-
pants” is that they may not pay much attention to the various
courses they attend. This was apparently the case when a follow-up
survey was conducted among former DFID TAP participants. Five
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participants out of 56 interviewed one-to-24 months after their
participation in a training event could not recall the fact that they
actually participated in the TAP, even after they were informed
about the topic, date and venue of the TAP in which they partici-
pated.
• Those who speak foreign languages are usually more
valued by the private sector. Due to the low civil service
wages, they may easily leave the civil service soon after
the end of their training. The training itself may con-
tribute to this process, especially if it provides skills, like
management, communication, etc., which are useful in
the private sphere.
A third solution to the language problem is the pro-
vision of translation. This solution, while solving the
problems identified above, raises several other ones. For
example:
• Interpretation hinders the communication between
trainer and trainee. The communication will be slower
and “noisier.” This is especially true if the training topic
is not well known in the country. Sometimes the new
terminology introduced is not yet present in the local
language, or the interpreters do not know it.57
• Interpretation is not only a barrier in conveying the
“message” but it also hinders the utilization of the ad-
vantages of interactive training. It is quite difficult to be
interactive when the question-answer process is ex-
tended into a question-interpretation-answer-interpre-
tation chain, with some necessary clarifications of mean-
ing added.
• Training with interpretation is not only less effective but
also more expensive.
Despite all these drawbacks, donors seem to insist that
TAPs are run mostly by foreign trainers, or consultants.
There are cases when donors even seem to forget about
the fact that languages other than English are spoken in the
beneficiary countries.
• Our Lithuanian team reports an especially remarkable instance of
ignoring the local language: “In the case of [a DFID project car-
ried out by the British Council] the project plan did not foresee the
need for a fund for translation of the training courses into Lithua-
nian, which, as it was later realized, could have been a major
obstacle in reaching the audience. On his own initiative, the train-
ing program manager approached UNDP, which in turn pro-
vided funds for the translation. As it turned out, the fact that the
program was delivered in Lithuanian was considered to be its main
advantage in comparison to other training programs developed and
provided by the foreign donors.” We note here that the project in
question was intended to train 324 civil servants from a budget of
more than USD 300,000.
• CIDA’s project in Ukraine had to be completely restructured,
because it “became clear” only in the implementation phase that
hardly any Ukrainian officials speak English.
In sum, the language barrier appears to be a major fac-
tor limiting TAP effectiveness. It seems that all solutions
applied have serious drawbacks that are practically impossi-
ble to avoid. The only solution that has a potential to solve
the problem without substantial negative side effects
—employing local trainers—is rarely utilized.
4.5.2 Training Methodology: Lecture-based
versus Interactive Training Methods
The importance of training methodology stems from its
assumed positive impact on training effectiveness. Whether
this assumption is supported by empirical evidence or not is
examined in Chapter 5. Regarding the methodology applied
in civil service training, one can differentiate between inter-
active and lecture-type training. In this regard, the main
dividing line is between national civil service training pro-
grams, which tend to use lecture-type training, and TAPs,
which tend to use interactive training. But there are differ-
ences among TAPs, as donors tend to utilize the interactive
training method to a significantly varying degree as well.
With regard to the extent to which conventional, lecture-
based training is used, instead of interactive methods, the
“ranking” shown in Comparative Table 20 can be set up:
Comparative Table 20
Ranking of Donors by Style of Training
—from Lecture to Interactive
1. PHARE Due to the fact that many, if not most, PHARE
TAPs aim at familiarizing local civil servants with
EU legal regulations, it is understandable that
PHARE projects rely to a greater extent than
other donors on lectures. Indeed, even if the
content is not law, it is usually some kind of
knowledge, rather than skills.
2. USAID According to the available data, USAID also relies
heavily on lecturing techniques. This, somewhat
uncertain, statement seems logical, because the
average USAID training courses last two-to-four
weeks, which suggests something more like
education than brief, on-the-job training sessions.
3. CIDA CIDA projects seem to combine pure education,
which may be carried out in a university environ-
ment, with some highly individualized training.
4. DFID DFID seems to rely more extensively on inter-
active training techniques. For example, their
Hungarian project was based solely on that style
of training, and it exhibited a high degree of
professionalism.
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4.5.3 Geographical Location of TAPs
The geographical location of the actual training course is
important for two reasons: First, location can have a signif-
icant impact on the costs, and thereby the efficiency, of train-
ing. Second, location reflects significantly different approach-
es to training, and thereby involves a varying potential to
realize the maximum possible benefits of training.
There are three main arrangements regarding the loca-
tion of training:
1) In-country training, that is training that takes place in
the beneficiary’s country.
2) Donor-country training, in which the training takes
place at a venue in the donor’s country. Within this
category, we may further differentiate between three
typical approaches:
• In-practice training, where the trainee is located in
a work environment in an appropriate authority in
the donor country. This is a kind of placement train-
ing, in which the trainee learns from peers or his/
her “personal tutor” at the workplace, as well as
from practice.
• Conventional training taking place in the donor
country. “Conventional” here means that the train-
ing takes place in a pure training/classroom setting.
• The third arrangement is the frequently utilized,
but rarely if ever defined, “study tour.” These
events usually resemble tourist excursions more than
they do professional training, both in form and
content.
3) Third-country training, that is training organized in a
third country, other than the beneficiary or the donor
country. This category may also be divided into two
sub-categories:
• Third-country training aimed at utilizing the spe-
cific experience accumulated and available in a third
country.
• Training sessions that are organized only for practi-
cal reasons, convenience, lower prices, etc., in a third
country.
Below we discuss how frequently the various donors
utilize these three types of training, as well as the advantages
and disadvantages of the various location arrangements.
Most of the analysis provided in this book refers to in-
country training. In the following paragraphs, we discuss
one lateral issue related to geography that we call the price
paradox. Then, we concentrate on analyzing the potential
advantages and disadvantages of the other two options listed
above.
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Comparative Table 21
How donors utilize various training location opportunities
PHARE In the case of PHARE it is theoretically difficult to differentiate between donor-country training and third-country
training, simply because PHARE represents not one donor country but a group of countries. Thus, we differentiate only
between training in donor-countries and in-country training. In that regard, we found that PHARE TAPs, especially the
pure training projects—as opposed to technical assistance projects with some training elements—typically take place in
the recipient country. Other training events within larger projects may, and sometimes do, take place in a different
country. But it is quite difficult to obtain information in that regard. We note here that the so-called twinning arrangement
frequently includes practical training in the donor country, at the twinning organization’s venue. Indeed, it seems that
this is the most typical TAP arrangement among training-abroad sessions. This is a specific feature of PHARE, and we
could not identify any similar training provided by the other three donors analyzed.
DFID DFID relies mostly on in-country arrangements. Yet, quite often, a smaller “elite” group of trainees is brought to the
U.K., typically for a study trip. Other times these elite groups receive “real training” in the U.K., usually participating in
training sessions organized for U.K. officials.
USAID USAID uses all three types of locations. We found that, among USAID projects in Romania, 45 percent of the TAPs took
place in the U.S., 43 percent of the TAPs took place in Romania and 13 percent of the TAPs took place in third countries.
In Ukraine, the proportions were 27 percent in the U.S., 67 percent in Ukraine and 6 percent in third countries.58
Regarding the trends, initially, an absolute majority of TAPs was implemented in the U.S.; subsequently, third-country
training and, recently, training provided in the trainees’ country of residence has become more and more significant.
CIDA CIDA strongly relied on donor-country training, in the form of university-type education provided by the implementing
organization. Another CIDA project in Ukraine also relied on study trips to, and training sessions in, the donor country.
Third-country training is also quite significant, as a major TAP in Ukraine took place to some extent in Lithuania, and it
was resourced by Lithuanian trainers. But, as noted earlier, this situation occurred only because the project had to be
redesigned, due to the lack of English language skills of Ukrainian officials. Otherwise the training sessions would have
taken place in Canada, according to the original design.
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In-country Training: The Price Paradox of TAPs
The “price paradox” refers to the fact that, generally speak-
ing, as we go further from the “West”—not only geograph-
ically but in terms of Western-style economic development—
the difference between TAP and national civil service training
unit costs increase. This tendency is reinforced from two
angles: On the one hand, the unit costs of locally organized
training and training-related costs gets lower as we go fur-
ther into the “East,” because trainers’ and civil servants’ sal-
aries, and most other relevant expenses, are lower. On the
other hand, services that are necessary to run TAPs may cost
significantly more in the “East” than in other countries. For
example, hotels achieving international quality standards are
very expensive in Kiev, less expensive in Bucharest and the
least expensive in Budapest. Similar trends can be found in
terms of appropriate training venue rental costs, etc. Fur-
thermore, experts, especially long-tem experts, request higher
salaries and other benefits for working in an “Eastern” rather
than a “more Western” CEE country.
Thus, the price paradox is that, generally, the less ex-
pensive a typical national civil service training course is in a
country of the region the more expensive the TAP will be in
that country. This may explain the fact that donor, and
especially third-country training, can sometimes be cheaper
than in-country training.
Study Trips
From available project documentation, it is often impossi-
ble to identify the number of study-trip trainees and/or the
venue and purpose of their study trips, not to mention the
costs of these trips. It seems that TAPs are sometimes orga-
nized in a way that suggests these trips have a “bonus” func-
tion for some, but not all, of the participants. Apparently
this type of training serves as a quasi-fringe-benefit for high-
er-level officials involved in the implementation of the project
on the beneficiary side.
This practice has some kind of indirect logic and ra-
tionality: Officials on the beneficiary side, especially in the
higher ranks, are usually not at all motivated to promote the
implementation of TAPs and take on all the necessary bur-
dens, including management and other responsibilities.
Informal benefits in the form of study trips can exert a
motivating effect, which is often indispensable for the suc-
cessful implementation of the TAP. Thus, this practice,
disguised as training, may in fact increase overall TAP effi-
ciency if it is used as a motivator for those working on TAP
management on the beneficiary side. Training abroad may
also be an appropriate method for motivating trainees in a
larger or longer training process. In this case, the best train-
ees—those who participated actively in all training sessions
carried out all their tasks, or passed an exam with flying col-
ors—are entitled to a study trip abroad.
Still, in our experience, these “study trips” sometimes
do not have the function of increasing TAP efficiency. In-
stead, they are intended to promote the image of the donor
or implementing organization—and to “ensure” the appro-
priate evaluation results by offering study trips to partici-
pants who will make up most of the  “stakeholder inter-
viewees” from the beneficiary side.
In-practice Training in the Donor Country
The best-known example of this type of training is the
PHARE “twinning” approach, which has been emphasized
more and more in recent years. Twinning-based training
involves the creation of a direct, but structured, framework
and process of professional contacts. Within this framework,
a purposeful interaction is developed between the beneficia-
ry organization and organization members and one or more
of their EU/foreign counterparts. Because it is not our task
here to give a description or evaluation of PHARE twinning,
we refer readers to the many evaluations of PHARE activi-
ties giving a detailed and balanced overall view of the issue.
The absolute and relative volume of this type of train-
ing abroad, within the broader field of TAPs, is not very
significant. Unfortunately is it often not possible to differ-
entiate between “twinning” programs and other types of
“training abroad” on the basis of available information. But
it is probably not far from reality to say that real “peer-to-
peer type training abroad” represents much less than 5 per-
cent of the total TAP volume.
‘Real’ Training in the Donor Country
The other common type of “training abroad” is “real,” clas-
sical, classroom training, taking place in a top-quality train-
ing setting. The potential gains in terms of training efficacy
inherent in this type of training are obvious because, espe-
cially in the case of longer and more in-depth or specialized
training, ensuring qualified training personnel is often a fun-
damental problem. This problem is even more pronounced
in countries that offer a living environment that is very dif-
ferent from Western standards. Naturally, this type of train-
ing is the least appropriate when it comes to providing ben-
eficiary-country specific knowledge.
This category includes a few important “TAP success
stories,” which indicate the potential of this approach to
improve TAP efficiency. CIDA’s Baltic Economic Manage-
ment Training Program has resulted in quite positive evalu-
ations on both the donor and the beneficiary sides. The unit
costs of these projects are not too high compared to other
in-country training.
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Somewhat surprisingly, these programs seem to be
around the mean in terms of their unit costs. In spite of their
reasonable price, and the potential gains in terms of efficacy,
these types of projects are usually only modestly represented
among TAPs. Available data on the proportion of “school-
type training abroad” is sporadic. The USAID data for
Romania in 1997 can be used as a starting point. There, as a
result of a downward tendency, 43 percent of the TAPs
involved donor-country training. Furthermore, it definitely
seems that other donors rely substantially less frequently on
this type of training. Another important piece of informa-
tion here is based on the case of PHARE training projects in
Hungary (1995–2000), which were already cited elsewhere.
In this instance, 13 out of 83 training events involved a train-
ing venue outside Hungary. But these projects had a strong
tendency towards having less than the average number of
trainees; thus their proportion of participants is probably
less than 5 percent.
Based on these and other, less quantitative pieces of
information, it can be assumed that the proportion of
“school-type training abroad” in general does not make up
more than 10 percent of TAP activity, and it probably
accounts for much less than that. PHARE, the largest TAP
donor, very rarely uses this approach.
Third-county Training
Training may take place in a third country simply because
the third country offers a venue that is more convenient or
cheaper than either the donor or the beneficiary country.
Another reason for relying on third-country training can be
that public administration practices of the third country may
serve as a source of information and experience that can be
transferred by the training. The findings of our research, as
well as the authors’ previous experience, seem to show that
this type of training can be quite useful, effective and suc-
cessful. Civil servants usually learn a lot from the experience
of their counterparts.
• Somewhat surprisingly, it is only USAID that relies relatively widely
on third-country training for the sake of utilizing experience that
has been accumulated during the transition period and that can
be transferred to other CEE and CIS countries facing similar prob-
lems. Bakenova notes the following example from USAID: “Spe-
cifically, Poland serves as a ‘third-country’ example for Ukraine.
Poland-Ukraine-U.S. Initiative (PAUCI), a trilateral effort created
in 1998, facilitates the transfer of Polish experience in economic
and democratic reform to Ukraine, and supports Ukrainian inte-
gration to Europe. […] Several programs were conducted in the
U.S. and in Poland, which enable participants to examine differ-
ent models and practices as implemented in the three countries.”59
There are cases when officers of the privatization agen-
cy of a CIS country were invited to the privatization agency
of a CEE country. The former were yet to tackle large scale
privatization while the latter had already completed the bulk
of the job—so they could share their experiences with their
colleagues about risky points, what is feasible and what is
not, etc. In a number of cases, this type of training can be
the best way to transfer lessons learned from relevant experi-
ence. And when it comes to privatization, CEE experience is
the most relevant. There has never been such large scale and
rapid privatization in any of the Western countries as that
which occurred in the region in the past decade.
We believe that third-country training could be espe-
cially relevant, useful and effective. In fact, unlike other TAPs,
we have not heard of dissatisfied participants from this kind
of training. Unfortunately, though not necessarily surpris-
ingly, this form of “know-how transfer” is relatively rare
among TAPs. But there is a tendency toward increasing reli-
ance on such third-party training projects.
4.6 Some Cross-cutting Issues:
Flexibility and Client Orientation
of Donors
Thus far in this chapter, we have analyzed donor practices
and attributes and made some comparisons among donors.
On the basis of this information, we attempt in this section
to provide a ranking of donors on some overarching issues
related to the overall impact of TAPs. The issues analyzed
below are (a) flexibility and adaptation to local circumstanc-
es and (b) responsiveness to local needs. In this section, more
than in other parts of the book, subjective judgement is re-
lied upon extensively.
Flexibility is a crucial feature of TAP management.
Adapting to local circumstances in terms of the ways and
means of project implementation may greatly increase TAP
efficiency. Responsiveness, on the other hand, refers to meet-
ing local needs through the content, as opposed to the set-
ting, of TAPs. The authors believe that both flexibility in
running TAPs and responsiveness as to the content of TAPs
are equally important.
With regard to the flexibility and adaptation to local
circumstances we set up the ranking that it is presented in
Comparative Table 22.
In relation to  responsiveness to local needs we set up
the ranking shown in Comparative Table 23.
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Comparative Table 22
Ranking of Donors by their Adaptation to Local Circumstances—in Descending Order
1. CIDA CIDA seemed to be flexible in its project implementation in the Baltic states, especially because the implementing orga-
nization had great autonomy and because the donor was open and quick in reacting to local circumstances. CIDA was
ready to replicate the successful Baltic project in Ukraine and was able to respond quickly and restructure the project
framework when it turned out that what worked in the Baltic states may not work in Ukraine. Another Ukrainian CIDA
project was specifically designed to react quickly to Ukrainian small-scale training needs.
2. DFID The British Know-How Fund had a general image of being flexible in reacting to training needs. But the situation has
greatly changed since 1998, and this could be detected in the way DFID projects were carried out in the period observed.
Actually, it is questionable whether DFID is as flexible in the period observed as its image among the “informed public”
would suggest.
3. USAID We do not have much information on the flexibility of USAID or the techniques and methods applied to react on the
variance in space and time of the beneficiary countries’ environment. But our impression is that the flexibility of USAID’s
TAP management is not significant.
4. PHARE PHARE is regarded as by far the least flexible donor. The very detailed procedural regulations, the large and uniform
organizational structures and the careful scrutiny by various EU and member country organizations hardly allow for any
flexibility.
Comparative Table 23
Ranking Donors by their Responsiveness to Local Needs—in Descending Order
1. PHARE Assessing PHARE’s responsiveness depends solely on the viewpoint of the evaluator. In the case of accession countries—
Hungary, Lithuania and, to some extent, Romania in our sample—PHARE satisfies the needs of these countries. All
these countries strive for membership in the EU. This has been one of the few policy priorities in these countries that have
remained intact after numerous elections brought changes in the ruling parties. This policy priority greatly determines
national civil service training priorities. Indeed, in Hungary, where training priorities were made manifest, EU-related
knowledge was ranked as the first priority. In these circumstances, PHARE, which has been accession driven since 1998
and provides training solely on EU related issues for accession countries, meets the most important training needs.
Moreover, it is PHARE, as part of the EU, that may be able to determine what type of training is needed. In this field,
PHARE may know better than the recipient what the recipient needs.
2. CIDA CIDA seemed to be successful because it was responsive to training needs. But a careful analysis shows that CIDA was
sensitive to individual trainees’ needs, and we are only projecting when we say that the donor also understands general
civil service needs. The PAR project in Ukraine, which was designed in a way that responded quickly to local needs and
provides national civil service training with the required training content, is in too early a stage to be assessed.
3. DFID DFID reveals some sensitivity to local needs, though this is decreasing. At the same time, TAP content is, to a great
extent, based on British public administration experience, which may not be so useful for the countries in the region.
Nonetheless, the British way of governing is undoubtedly in the mainstream of public management, thus it would be
understandable if there was an interest in the know-how that can be learned from British trainers.
4. USAID USAID is less sensitive to local needs. Indeed, responsiveness has not been an ambition of USAID. As Bakenova notes:
“USAID regards its training programs as a crucial factor in promoting U.S. ideologies, policies and specific regional
strategic objectives and ensuring [the prerequisites of] an overall influence of U.S. presence in the region.”60 In that
regard, USAID seems to follow its strategic objectives quite strictly, without much responsiveness to specific needs of the
beneficiary civil service.
5. PHARE In contrast to the evaluation above, one could consider PHARE as the least responsive donor. Indeed, long project
planning, overly bureaucratic structures and procedures prevent PHARE from being responsive to local needs in any area
other than EU matters. It may be said that, if PHARE TAPs were about anything else than EU related issues, PHARE
would clearly be the least responsive donor.
(!)
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5. THE EFFICIENCY OF INDIVIDUAL TAPS
5.1 The Approach Used
for Comparing Training Efficiency
Before we start to analyze quantitative “TAP efficiency in-
dicators,” it is necessary to specify what we mean by “effi-
ciency indicators” and how we use them to compare the
efficiency of various training projects. A definition of the
term “efficiency” is provided in Chapter 2. But, in order to
practically define this term more specifically in the context
of this chapter, some further issues must be elucidated.
Efficiency indicators require the determination of the
size of costs and benefits of the given activity. Costs are mea-
sured in money terms, in other words by the total TAP bud-
get, which encompasses all costs of training, including those
related to curriculum and training material development,
etc.61 In the case of so-called “mixed projects”—projects that
also contain non-training elements—only expenses that are
related to training are taken into account.
Determination of benefit measures is much more diffi-
cult, not only for practical reasons of data availability and
measurability but also for theoretical reasons. TAP evalua-
tions typically focus on effects that are related to project goals.
It would be overly ambitious to use the outcome or impact
of the training on the public administration system as an
indicator of benefit. Weighing such a benefit means measur-
ing a longer and more complex chain of causes and effects
related to the given TAP. Simply trying to measure the out-
come of training in the private sphere raises almost unsolv-
able problems,62 but in the case of public administration, an
additional difficulty is raised by the fact that organizational
and social efficacy, as interpreted by Lane,63 may greatly dif-
fer in the public sphere. Thus, even if the positive impact on
an organizational level is identified, the social benefit, which
is the ultimate measure of training benefit in the case of public
administration, is still in question.
The standard practice of TAP evaluations is to compare
key performance characteristics, such as efficiency, effects,
impact and sustainability, with the requirements set forth in
the project plan of the given TAP—or with some general
reference value of the evaluator. TAP evaluation reports—
which are already limited in scope, because they focus on a
given project, and which have limited targets, because they
concentrate on predetermined goals—tend also to be limit-
ed by their qualitative measures and/or expert judgements
expressed in an ordinal scale. For example, PHARE evalua-
tions use a system of expert ratings with values ranging from
one to five.
The authors faced a decision with two major alterna-
tives:
• We could concentrate on the ultimate issue, the positive
social impact induced by TAPs through changes in public
administration. In this case, we can provide only a very
rough, qualitative, subjective and strongly debatable
assessment; moreover, major influencing factors of this
assessment would remain hidden.
• Alternatively, we could settle for the less ambitious, but
still quite challenging, solution of using immediate out-
put data as basic indicators of “benefit.” In this case, we
can provide a quantitative efficiency indicator. But the
ultimate validity of this indicator will still be strongly
questionable.
We chose the second solution, at least as a first step. We
calculate training unit cost data, which shows how much it
costs to train one person for one day. This measure is known
as PTD (participant training day) unit cost. The higher the
PTD unit cost, the lower the “immediate” efficiency of a
project.
The main problem with this measure is that the out-
come or impact of one day of training may greatly vary among
various training events. One training course may induce no
positive impact at all, whereas another may be very useful.
Still, if the latter is somewhat more expensive, the unit cost
will indicate—wrongly—that the former was more “effi-
cient.” Even though it seems impossible to handle this phe-
nomenon completely, we attempt to correct some of the dis-
tortion caused by the limited validity of PTD unit cost by
weighing several factors that may influence training impact.
We will take into consideration a number of—mainly tech-
nical—factors that were identified in the previous chapter
and turned out to be especially relevant regarding TAP effi-
cacy. In this way, we hope to refine PTD as a “crude” mea-
sure of output, so that we can reach an adjusted measure of
output. Some additional factors, whose effect is impossible
to assess, will be discussed in qualitative terms.
In order to produce this adjusted measure, we must iden-
tify all major relevant technical factors that may seriously
influence the level of TAP outcomes. In this process, two
main questions must be answered, possibly in quantitative
terms:
• To what extent is the influential factor present?
• To what extent does this factor, if present, influence the
outcome level of the given training activity?
The following example might provide some intuitive
understanding of the heuristic logic applied: One could rea-
sonably argue—as we did in Chapter 4—that the language
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of training is a relevant factor that influences TAP outcome.
For the sake of simplicity, we concentrate now on TAPs that
are run in a foreign language with translation, and we sup-
pose that the unit cost of these training events is USD 200.
Assessing the impact of this factor, we must first determine
to what extent it is present among TAPs. Suppose we find
that the proportion of foreign-language training events with
translation is about 30 percent. Next we must determine the
effect of this factor on training efficiency. In doing so, we
may assume that translation requires as much time as the
trainer needs to present her point. This means that two days
of a TAP with translation is worth as much as one day in the
native language of the participants. In other words a realistic
efficiency measure for foreign language training would be
not USD 200 but USD 400. Since 30 percent of the TAPs
fall into this category, the calculation of an adjusted unit
cost measure for the entire “population” of TAPs will be as
follows: 0.7 x 200 + 0.3 x 400 = 140 + 120 = 260.
In other words, the adjusted unit cost measure is 30
percent higher than the original one. The real efficiency
measure is, to a corresponding degree, lower than one could
expect on the basis of simple, unadjusted unit cost.64 These
“adjustments,” expressed in percentage values, can then be
calculated for various factors and summed up to calculate
the final adjusted unit cost data, which accounts for all fac-
tors.
The example reveals that a certain level of creativity is
involved in the refinement-and-adjustment procedure. It also
discloses that, in most cases, we use very rough estimations,
rather than precise values. In order to deal with these issues,
we decided to introduce a positive bias toward TAPs when
compared to national civil service training in terms of effi-
ciency. We applied the following instruments to do so:
• First, and most importantly, we only focus on those fac-
tors that potentially increase real training efficiency of
TAP’s, as compared to national civil service training,
and disregard those factors that have an opposite effect.65
• Second, in estimating the actual scale of these positive
effects, we will consistently and deliberately be biased
in favor of TAP’s rather than national civil service train-
ing. These two circumstances may ensure that the ad-
justed efficiency measure for a TAP will be significantly
higher than we originally believed it to be, on the basis
of the simple PTD measure. Still, as we will see, this
fact does not change the ultimate result.
• The third factor that helps us to deal with problems of
uncertain or lacking data also compensates for the pro-
TAP bias. This is the robustness of the initial finding
regarding the vast difference between the unit cost of
the two classes of training projects: TAPs and national
civil service training.
This latter issue points toward a further one, namely,
the standard or benchmark, to which TAP unit costs are
measured. A comparative view of training unit cost is neces-
sary, because, by simply calculating a number as an efficien-
cy measure we still do not answer the question of whether
the TAP at hand is efficient or not.
Determining what is to be compared, and to what kind
of a benchmark, requires similarly careful consideration.
Regarding the question of what should be compared, the
severe constraint on available information, especially on
financial information of individual TAPs, was crucial. Con-
sequently, we had to calculate using “typical” or “average”
TAP unit costs for the four analyzed donors: In other words,
no distinction is made between the various donors analyzed,
but all TAPs are treated as members of the same class.
Regarding the second question, that of what benchmark to
use, we chose the “typical,” or “average” unit cost of nation-
ally organized training courses—those run and funded by
the beneficiary governments. It was relatively easy to obtain
such unit-cost data from the four analyzed countries.
We could formulate some general statements by com-
paring typical unit cost data of TAPs with those of national
civil service training.66 Aside from serving our methodolog-
ical needs, this approach also seems adequate because the
major dividing line is indeed between the unit cost of
national civil service training and that of TAPs.
5.2 TAP Efficiency:
The Basic Finding
The absence of information on training volumes or training
budgets of most TAPs makes it difficult to derive a reliable
overview of TAP unit costs. But first-hand experience, anec-
dotal evidence and data extracted from available informa-
tion sources reassure us that these figures are much higher in
the case of foreign training assistance than in national civil
service training.67
In the course of the research, a significant effort was
concentrated on obtaining comparable unit cost data for
TAPs and national civil service training activities. As we have
noted, this task often was unfeasible, especially in the case of
TAPs. In tables 9 and 10, we present a summary of the work
of the country and donor research teams. This summary in-
formation is based on individual training programs’ cost data,
some of it available from existing program files and some of
it based on plausible estimates. It is natural that unit costs
have a substantial variance, but the definite tendency in the
data is recognizable.
Table 9 presents all the available unit cost figures for
TAPs funded by different donors.
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Table 10 provides comparative information on training
programs run by the national civil service training systems,
supplemented with data from the United Kingdom.
Table 9
Estimated Unit Costs of TAPs Run by Different Donors
[USD/PTD]
Country PHARE USAID DFID CIDA
Hungary 26268 NA 533 NA
Lithuania <475 NA 648 436
Romania NA NA NA NA
Ukraine NA NA NA 350
Typical 300 357* 580 400
* The USAID figure is not based on actual TAP unit cost data but
on an official USAID recommendation regarding training cost
ceilings for third-country training programs, which probably
account for a majority of all USAID TAPs in the observed coun-
tries. The estimation can be assumed to be close to the actual unit
costs, because it is known from interviewees that, as a result of the
introduction of these cost ceilings, actual training costs decreased
by 25 percent.69
Table 10
Estimated Unit Costs of National Civil Service Training
Activities [USD/PTD]
Country Charac- Range of Unit Costs
teristic of National Civil
Value  Service Training Activities
Hungary 20 Mostly between USD 5 and USD 50,
very exceptionally exceeds USD 100.
Lithuania 25 USD 4 is considered “cheap,”
while USD 260 is considered
exceptionally expensive.
Romania 15 USD 10 is considered relatively cheap.
Typical civil service training costs
around USD 10–15. There are some
much more expensive courses.
Ukraine 10 In compulsory training, cost is
estimated at about USD 2, in
non-compulsory training at USD 10.
United 142
Kingdom*
* Source: Calculated on the basis of data provided by OECD (1999)
p.14; the data are for illustrative purposes only.
Clearly, actual unit costs have a large variance. There-
fore, identifying the “characteristic” range or value of the
unit cost of training is not a trivial task. Regarding the do-
nors, this is so most of all in the case of PHARE, where
large-scale training projects in certain cases, such as those
implemented in Hungary using Hungarian training provid-
ers, can cost as little as USD 8–32 per PTD. At the other
extreme, there are known cases of USD 1,000 and higher
TAP unit costs. The unit cost of training events run by ben-
eficiary side actors has a somewhat narrower range.
The problem caused by the broad range of training unit
costs could not be solved by such “traditional” methods as
calculating mean values, because the sporadic nature of avail-
able data does not allow this. As a general rule, extreme
values at both ends of the scale are not counted. Putting
aside these “outliers,” it can be said that, in terms of training
volume, the unit cost mostly varies in a much narrower band.
For the sake of simplicity, the mid-point of these bands are
identified as characteristic values of the unit cost of the
given set of training activities.
Comparing the two tables, it can be said that estimated
average unit costs of training activities run by foreign
donors is about 12-58 (!) times more expensive70 than those
run by the national civil service training providers. In the
case of some countries, for example Ukraine, this dispropor-
tionality can be as high as 2:520. It is remarkable that TAPs
are expensive not only by CEE/CIS national training stan-
dards, but are also expensive compared to training costs in
the British civil service. In this case, the unit cost difference
ranges from 1:2.1–1:4. 71
5.3 TAP Efficiency: In Search of
an Adjusted Efficiency Indicator
The very large difference in raw unit cost, or efficiency, is
one of the fundamental findings of the entire research into
TAPs. As foreseen in the above section on the chapter’s
methodology, the remaining parts of this chapter are mainly
devoted to the identification and assessment of factors that
might reduce this enormous efficiency ratio between TAPs
and national civil service training.
We investigate the following factors that may contrib-
ute to extra TAP efficiency:
1) sustainability strategy;
2) elitist strategy;
3) more efficient training methods (interactive training);
4) training abroad;
5) additional training outputs.
5.3.1 Sustainability Approach
Sustainability-type TAPs, as we described in the relevant sec-
tion of this volume, aim to induce higher value than the
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kind that can be captured by simply counting training days.
It is assumed that, once the TAP ends, courses are repeated
from the beneficiary’s budget, and thus, a much larger num-
ber of trainees than those who participated in the TAP itself
will be reached. The assumed higher ultimate value of out-
puts is used to justify higher input measures. Sustainability-
type TAPs usually involve some additional inputs devoted
to carefully elaborated training curriculum and materials.
Furthermore, a training of trainers is also a standard ele-
ment of this kind of TAP. While all these inputs may appear
as costs, the higher outcome of the TAP is not reflected by
the simple output measure of PTD.
In order to correct our “crude” unit cost measure with
the potential impact of sustainability-type TAPs, we will first
assess the proportions of sustainability TAPs. Then, as a
second step, we assess the amount of positive impact of the
given factor on the value of TAP PTD. Multiplying these
two numbers, we will gain an indicator of the ultimate effect
of a certain factor.
We assume that the proportion of sustainability-type
TAPs cannot be more than 20 percent, and is quite likely
much less. Out of the total budget for PHARE TAPs in
Hungary, only 2 percent went to sustainability-style TAPs.
In Lithuania, the figure was 5.7 percent. It seems that
neither USAID nor CIDA is eager to run sustainability-type
TAPs. In fact it is only DFID that favors this form. We were
only able to obtain relatively detailed information on three
sustainability-type TAPs, out of which two were run by DFID
and one by PHARE.
In two out of those three cases, we found no sign that
the courses were repeated. In the case of the most successful
project, the courses were rerun only once. If we rely on this
evidence, we can conclude that, in fact, 33 percent more
PTD were generated due to the sustainability approach. We
do not dispute this estimation by referring to anecdotal evi-
dence, which suggests that, in fact, sustainability TAPs
rarely sustain. Moreover, we increase the assumed ratio of
sustainability to 40 percent. But we must also take into
consideration that a significant amount of the additional
training that takes place after a sustainable-style TAP is run
once is generated by inputs from the beneficiary side. For
subsequent training courses, beneficiaries must pay a fee for
trainers, room rental, equipment, handouts, etc. Quite mod-
estly, we assume that this would comprise half of the in-
puts72 that produce the additional 40 percent of output. Thus
the impact of a sustainability TAP is 0.4, which is the rate of
additional outputs, times 0.5, which is the contribution of
the TAP to additional outputs—including fees for trained
trainers, detailed trainers’ manuals, training manuals, hand-
outs, etc. Thus the “impact rate” will be 0.4 x 0.5 = 0.2.
Now we can calculate the overall impact of sustainabil-
ity projects on the real TAP efficiency measure as follows:
Eighty percent of TAPs were not specific, so we can count
with a value of “1.” This is a multiplier, and it shows how
the value of a TAP PTD compares the value of a PTD pro-
duced under a typical national civil service training. The
fact that this multiplier is 1 reveals that, in 80 percent of the
cases, the value of TAP output is not different from those of
national training.
However, 20 percent of the TAPs are considered sus-
tainability-type TAPs. And these TAPs are supposed to have
a higher value. As we have calculated, a PTD of a sustain-
ability-type TAP is worth 1.2 times more than a TAP of a
typical national civil service training course.
In sum, the impact of the sustainability approach among
TAPs is:
(80 percent x 1) + (20 percent x 1.2) = 80 percent + 24
percent = 104 percent.
In other words, the presence of the sustainability
approach increases overall TAP output value by 4 percent.73
We will follow a method similar to the one presented
above to assess the impact of some other factors on an
adjusted measure of TAP outcome.
5.3.2 Elitist Approach
The elitist approach seems to be present most of all at CIDA,
to some extent at DFID and to a much lower extent at
USAID, the second largest donor. PHARE, the largest
donor, is not characterized by this approach. We estimate
that, overall, the elitist approach is present in not more, but
rather less, than 20 percent of the cases. Furthermore, for
the sake of simplicity, we assume, quite unrealistically, that
the elitist approach is not present in the national civil service
training.
But we also found that, regardless of the TAP’s original
plan, elitist TAPs practically never reach the intended strata
of top managers. Instead, mid-level managers, or even offi-
cials below that level, are represented among participants. It
can be said that not more, but rather less, than 25 percent of
participants of “theoretically” elitist TAP’s are top civil ser-
vants indeed. This means that the proportion of “real” top
civil servants within the overall population of TAP partici-
pants is, in the final analysis, not more than 5 percent.
Serious doubts were raised in Chapter 4 about the addi-
tional value of this approach in the CEE/CIS environment.
We concluded that, overall, this approach may decrease rather
than increase TAP efficiency. Unfortunately, we could not
obtain any information that could assist us in estimating the
potential effect of the elitist approach. Following our inten-
tion to be “positively biased” in this information vacuum,
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we must go high, and estimate that the additional value of
the elitist approach is six(!) times higher than that of stan-
dard training.
Thus the effect of the elitist approach is:
(95 percent x 1) + (5 percent x 6) = 95 percent + 30 percent
= 125 percent.
In other words, the presence of the elitist approach is
calculated to increase overall TAP output value by 25 per-
cent.
5.3.3 Different Training Methods
TAPs frequently employ training methods that are rarely, or
not-at-all, used by national civil service training activities.
The methods used by TAPs promise more results than tra-
ditional, lecture-type training. These methods—such as more
interactive training settings, possibly coupled with such
elements as analysis of cases, simulations and group exer-
cises—offer a higher level of technical quality and profes-
sionalism.
In most of the CEE countries, national civil service train-
ing is still centered around the more traditional training style,
which involves lecture-type training sessions. This style is
characterized by one-directional, trainer-to-trainee commu-
nication and a relatively large training group size. As the
findings we presented in the previous chapter show, TAPs,
generally rely much more on state-of-the-art, possibly more
effective training methods, such as seminar-type settings,
interactive training, case studies, simulations, group exer-
cises, etc.
It is a widely shared assumption that, compared to more
traditional training procedures, the methods that TAPs
employ are usually more effective in transferring knowledge
and fostering skills development. Furthermore, this assump-
tion seems more valid for the fields of knowledge and skills
that are usually covered by TAPs—as opposed to national
civil service training, which often covers simpler, clerical-
level knowledge. We will therefore acknowledge that TAPs
are, at least in many instances, characterized by a higher
level of methodological sophistication and technical quality,
which could lead to more beneficial effects.
The advantages and disadvantages of different training
methods, like “problem-based learning” or “computer-
assisted learning,” are the subject of an extensive and con-
troversial debate among experts and scholars in the field.
Some important empirical results, serving as a kind of orien-
tation, include the following:
Cromrey-Purdon compares three types of teaching in
the context of college graduate courses: (i) chalk-and-talk,
(ii) so-called programmed learning and (iii) co-operative
learning based on group exercises. The subject of the cours-
es compared was teaching or education methods, the dura-
tion of the study was two weeks, and the research was based
on a statistically powerful, fully experimental research de-
sign. The analysis showed no significant differences between
the effectiveness of the three methods.74 Lake reported on a
comparative study of lecture-only versus active learning
methods on a two-week-long physiology course for physical
therapy students. The study was based on a fully experimen-
tal research design. Active learning was found to be about 8
percent more effective, a result that was deemed statistically
significant.75 Gray-Topping-Carcary conducted another com-
parison of traditional instruction versus innovative instruc-
tion in teaching 16-year-olds about traffic rules. Instead of
lectures, the “traditional” method mostly involved individ-
ual learning based on reading. The “innovative” method was
based on playing a competitive board game. The game-based
learning was 25 to 50 percent more effective than learning
based on reading, depending on whether learning took place
in groups or individually. Individual training proved the most
effective.76 It should be noted again that this latter research
did not involve a comparison of lecturing, but instead treat-
ed individual reading as the “traditional” learning method.
Furthermore, the “innovative” learning technology was not
used on adults, but rather on adolescents, who probably profit
more from learning-by-playing than adults do. Despite these
qualifications, we decided to report on the results of this
survey because it specifically involved the learning of practi-
cal skills.
To sum up: Innovative training methods are probably
between 0 percent and 10 percent more effective when it
comes to knowledge transfer, and these methods may be as
much as 25 percent more effective when it comes to skills
development. Thus, determining the relative advantages of
different training techniques depends on various factors—
most importantly whether the training is focused more on
knowledge transfer as opposed to transfer of skills. When
skills training is involved, one would expect that interactive
and practical training has greater value.77
It is probably close to reality—or else positively biased
toward sophisticated training methods, and thus, TAP effi-
ciency—to hypothesize that more modern, innovative train-
ing techniques can increase training effectiveness by as much
as 25 percent.
But we must determine to what degree these sophisti-
cated training methods are present in the TAP field. We must
take into account that PHARE, the largest donor, employs
interactive training techniques to only a limited extent. Most
of CIDA’s TAP activities consisted of university style train-
ing. In fact, we found that only DFID predominantly relies
on high-quality interactive training methods. Thus, we rather
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overestimate the presence of this phenomenon by calculat-
ing that it is used in 30 percent of all TAPs. Furthermore,
for the sake of simplicity, we also assume that interactive
training techniques are not used at all within national civil
service training.
Given the above assumptions an overall impact can be
calculated as:
(70 percent x 1) + (30 percent x 1.25) = 70 percent + 37.5
percent = 107.5 percent.
In other words, the presence of interactive training meth-
ods increases overall TAP output value by 7.5 percent.
5.3.4 Training Abroad
Another specific feature of TAPs is that various training ele-
ments are run abroad.
For the purpose of assessing the effect of these elements,
we differentiate between the following four types of training
abroad:
1. Study trips: We found that study trips serve as a kind of
holiday or fringe benefit for beneficiary stakeholders,
and they do not constitute real training.
2. School-type training abroad: In this case, the training is
held abroad, generally in the donor country, for practi-
cal reasons. Typically, it is cheaper or more convenient
to hold the training abroad instead of in the beneficiary
country. Naturally, in this case, no additional effect is
intended outside of the reduction of cost. This cost-re-
duction was taken into account in a “crude” unit cost
calculation. Thus, this issue does not require additional
investigation.
3. In-practice training abroad: Learning can be based on
the direct observation of, and participation in, on-the-
job activities of Western peers who have a higher level
of professionalism and technical expertise. This type of
opportunity is especially valuable in the case of complex
learning tasks involving technical, contextual, behav-
ioral and cultural elements, such as senior officials’ train-
ing in emergency management. These TAPs can offer
highly specialized and targeted training for a narrow
spectrum of civil servants. This means of training may
significantly increase the value of TAP output.
4. Third-country training: This training is aimed at pro-
viding officials of CEE/CIS countries with the experi-
ence learned from peers in another CEE/CIS country.
An example is a USAID TAP element in which Ukrai-
nian privatization officers had the opportunity to learn
from their Polish colleagues. The Ukrainians were
facing the start up of large-scale privatization, and the
Polish experts had nearly finished with their privatiza-
tion work. Polish experts were able to offer valuable
information that practically no Western expert could
provide. The authors believe that this type of training,
if carefully targeted and organized, could be of excep-
tional use.
Regarding the above four types of training abroad, we
found that the first has rather negative impact on output
value, whereas the second one was irrelevant in this regard.
The third and fourth options will be assessed below.
Regarding in-practice training, we found that it appears
only in a very small number of cases. In fact, its presence is
assumed to be below 1 percent. Thus, even if it caused a 100
percent increase in output value, its overall impact would be
still only 1 percent. For the sake of simplicity, we calculate
with this value. Thus, the benefits of in-practice training
could be calculated as follows:
99 percent x 1 + 1 percent x 2 =101 percent.
In other words, the presence of in-practice training in-
creases overall TAP output value by 1 percent.
Unfortunately, the same situation exists for third-coun-
try training. Only USAID seemed to use this kind of train-
ing in a systematic way. And even among USAID projects,
third-country training only accounts for a relatively small
portion of TAPs: 13 percent in Romania and 6 percent in
Ukraine. It appears that the number of trainees in these cours-
es is lower than the number of trainees on an average course.
In sum, the presence of this type of training may be even
lower than that of in-practice training. Therefore, if we give
third-country training an especially high value, and assume
that the outputs of such TAPs are worth four times as much
as a typical national PTD, the increased benefits can be cal-
culated as follows:
99 percent x 1 + 1 percent x 4 = 103 percent.
In other words, the presence of in-practice training in-
creases overall TAP output value by 3 percent.
5.3.5 Effect of Different Budget Cost Calculations
between TAPs and National Courses
The extremely unfavorable efficiency ratio between TAPs
and national civil service training may be further improved
if we take a closer look at the actual cost of national training.
In the previous subsections, we sought to show that a unit of
TAP output, measured in PTDs, is worth more in terms of
outcome than a unit of national training output. In this
subsection, we analyze the possibility that the cost of
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national training may actually be higher than we originally
calculated.
TAP budgets tend to contain the costs of training
development, while national civil service training budgets
do not always do so. Indeed, national civil service training
costs do not reflect development costs for courses that were
developed centrally and financed from the central budget—
or courses that are provided by the national training institu-
tions. Undeniably, this is a basic measurement problem.
Still, these costs, even if they were counted, would be
insignificant because of the large training volume and,
primarily, the much lower level of expert fees and salaries.
It is indicative that in Hungary, which is one of the
“more expensive” countries in the CEE region, there is a
regulation of expert fees set by the Council for Civil Service
Training within the Ministry of Interior. According to these
regulations, the maximum honorarium for training mate-
rials and other written expert materials is about USD 25 per
page. In other words, training development funded by the
council cannot include honoraria higher than this figure.
Actually, this figure is higher than the average market price.
This means that total honoraria/fees for 200-pages of train-
ing material is a maximum of USD 5,000. Publication costs
would be around USD 4,000. If we suppose that this mate-
rial is used in a two-day training event provided for 2,800
trainees, which is the number of municipal chief executives
in Hungary, then the material would be used for an output
of PTD 5,600. Including material development costs in the
calculation would increase the unit cost of training by only
USD 1.6.
It can be reasonably assumed that these numbers are
similar in other countries examined, or else the budget fig-
ures are even more in favor of national civil service training.
Both in Romania and Ukraine, the general salary standards
are lower, while the national civil service training “market,”
and thus, probably, average training volumes, are greater
than in Hungary.
Additionally, the problem of not including the costs of
training development surely does not exist in the case of var-
ious training courses offered by organizations not financed
from the central budget of the beneficiary government. These
organizations definitely include training development ex-
penses into their calculations when determining training cost.
Including the cost of training development, we calcu-
late that the unit cost of national training is USD 21.6
instead of, say, USD 20 per PTD. This fact can be trans-
lated into a formula for measuring increased TAP PTD:
21.6/20.0 = 1.08. Thus, we suppose that the presence of
adjusted cost calculation for national civil service training
courses increases overall TAP output value—compared to
the output value of national training—by 8 percent:
100 percent x 1.08 = 108 percent.
5.4 Technical Features Affecting TAP
and National Civil Service Training
Efficiency: A Summary
In the preceding sections, we attempted to correct potential
mistakes that stemmed from using simple PTD output data
as an indicator of outcome or impact. Now, by summing up
these findings, we may get closer to an “adjusted” value,
which includes in the calculation all quantifiable factors that
may make a unit of TAP output worth more than the same
output unit of national training. This exercise can also be
considered a sensitivity analysis, which attempts to test the
cumulative effects of various factors that may improve TAP
efficiency indicators. The results are shown in Table 11.
Table 11
Summary of Major Factors Affecting
Corrected TAP Unit Costs
Factor Size of Estimated
Maximum Effect [%]
Sustainability approach 4.0
Elitist approach 25.0
Interactive training methods 7.5
In-practice training abroad 1.0
Third-country training 3.0
National training cost adjustment 8.0
Total 48.5
In other words, in order to reflect the effect of various
technical features of training that could give TAPs higher
efficacy, the original TAP unit cost being, say, 20 times the
national civil service training unit cost, should be decreased
by 48.5 percent. This means that the original ratio of effi-
ciency between TAPs and national civil service training,
which was figured to be in the range of 1:12 to 1:58, should
be adjusted to a range of between 1:6.18 and 1:29.87.
But we have to remember that, in estimating the effect
of each of these factors, we deliberately tried to be biased, so
that our estimates of TAP unit cost reduction overestimate,
rather than underestimate, the most probable reduction.
When less information was available for an assessment, we
made a higher overestimation. And these biases in favor of
TAPs are added into our total summing up of factors affect-
ing TAPS. This means that the 48 percent estimated effect is
even more biased. In other words, the correct estimate is
surely less than this number. Furthermore, we should re-
emphasize that we assumed qualitative factors had positive
impacts, even in cases where they might actually have nega-
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tive effects. For example, contrary to our assumptions,
the sustainability and elitist approach, or even training
abroad, may easily turn out to be less effective than standard
training.
5.5 Factors Not Quantified
One may reasonably argue that, out of several factors that
were identified in Chapter 4 as independent variables of TAP
efficiency, only a few, and not necessarily the most impor-
tant ones, were assessed and then summed up in Table 11.
Indeed, quite a few such relevant factors were omitted.
Some of them were omitted on the technical basis that we
either could not identify or measure them. Others were
omitted on the theoretical basis that we were looking solely
for factors that have at least a chance to induce a positive
effect on the TAP efficiency indicator. Table 12 lists the
omitted factors, along with the reasons behind these factors
and their assumed qualitative implications from the point of
view of TAP efficacy.
Out of the listed factors, we found two that are un-
doubtedly a weakness of TAPs compared to national train-
ing: Critical mass strategy and language. Critical mass strat-
egy, while apparently the most adequate approach in the
region, is not utilized to the full extent in TAPs. Another
factor, rational planning and management, seems to be in
favor of TAPs. We believe that the potential effect of ratio-
nal planning in the case of TAPs is debatable. National civil
service training gradually, in an incremental and somewhat
“unconscious” process, seems to adapt to changing needs.
Still, more conscious, more sophisticated planning in na-
tional training systems could surely further induce efficacy.
We could not identify clearly the effect of two addition-
al factors. With regards to these “questionable” factors, we
can say the following: TAP implementation arrangements
are seemingly more “professional” than the management of
national training. However, even though we cannot quanti-
fy this factor, we believe that the professionalism of manage-
ment does not contribute much to the overall efficacy of
TAPs.78 The questionable factor of content may make the
real difference between national training and TAPs. And we
must admit that we could not offer more than theoretical
assumptions and some empirical considerations presented
in Section 4.3. Undoubtedly, we could not estimate con-
tent’s effect on overall TAP efficiency. But we can ask if the
TAP content in general could be so unique and, at the same
time, so useful that it alone is enough to counterbalance a
more than 600–3,000 percent efficiency advantage of na-
tional civil service training, as calculated above.
Table 12
Omitted Factors and their Potential Effect on TAP Efficiency
Factor Effect Comments
Critical mass – This is the “default” approach to training. And naturally, this is the approach of national training.
strategy It seems more adequate to the specific CEE/CIS environment than the other two approaches,
which TAPs often use.
Language – Clearly language differences have a negative impact on TAP efficiency.
Implementation ? The project-style implementation framework has several advantages and disadvantages.
arrangement It seems that, in the CEE/CIS environment, this framework reveals some serious weaknesses.
Additionally, limiting the bidders/experts to organizations and individuals of the donor country may
endanger the adequacy of training and necessary flexibility and responsiveness. Still, we judge the
effect of this factor not as negative, only as “questionable.”
Content ? The major advantage of TAPs is supposed to be the uniqueness of their content. Yet we have shown
that uniqueness is not so much present as donors state and that, even if the content were unique,
it could actually reduce the effectiveness of a TAP. We could not determine if overall TAP PTD
is of higher or lower value in this regard than that of the national training. Admittedly, this issue
introduces the largest amount of uncertainty into our calculation.
Rational + TAPs are usually carefully planned, and the goals, objectives and target group are identified before
planning and implementation starts. Needs assessments are usually carried out, and some type of evaluation
management exercise is present. Most of these characteristics are not detected in national training.
But needs assessments of donors seemed to be either biased, to find out what the donor intended
to offer, or were taken into consideration only to a limited extent. Evaluation did not seem to be an
effective tool. Still, the lack of strategic thinking in national training is a deficiency compared to TAPs.
But the positive effect of this factor is limited.
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CIDA is important from another perspective as well:
Because CIDA has such a modest training volume, it cannot
achieve an outstanding overall impact, even if it has good
projects.
We admit that it was an important preliminary suspi-
cion of the authors that PHARE is among the least effica-
cious donors in the public administration technical assis-
tance field. Therefore, the findings of the research came as a
surprise, and the initial hypothesis had to be in part refined
and in part substantially altered. While PHARE’s weaknesses,
such as its ponderous and bureaucratic operational proce-
dures and inflexibility, are undeniably present, these features
are supplemented and put into a different light by some other
findings:
• PHARE TAPs usually emphasize the “critical mass”
strategy while de-emphasizing the “sustainability” and
“elitist” strategies. This means that the dominant strat-
egy of PHARE usually fits the CEE preconditions
better than other strategies.
• Along with taking the “critical mass” approach, PHARE
sometimes allows much cheaper local service providers
to participate in the implementation, which results in
substantially lower unit costs and thus higher effi-
ciency. The relatively low average unit cost of PHARE
TAPs can also be attributed to the fact that PHARE is
able and willing to finance large-scale training projects,
a practice that results in quite high direct efficiency.
Furthermore, this is the only donor among those ana-
lyzed that was able to run a few training events as cheaply
as a national training event.
• From the point of view of their content, PHARE TAPs
mainly convey standard practices of the EU. This is
important because this topic is typically less alien from,
and more applicable to, the CEE/CIS administrative
cultures than most of the Anglo-Saxon concepts that
are often conveyed by the other three donors. The focus
on EU practices is also important because approaching
EU standards almost “at all hazards” is a number one
policy priority of all accession countries, and this prior-
ity remains relatively stable in space and time. With a
grain of cynicism, one could say that, if PHARE TAPs
were about anything other than EU accession related
issues, PHARE would clearly be the least efficient
donor.
Despite the above considerations, it has to be noted that
a substantial disadvantage of PHARE, which is indicated by
the study results, is that PHARE procedures place an enor-
mous burden on national public administration. For exam-
ple, as noted earlier, in Hungary, the administrative burden
may be easily more than 10 percent of the TAP budget. This
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6. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS
AND CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, the results of previous findings and analyses
are used to build some further conclusions and lines of argu-
ment, some of which go beyond the scope of the questions
examined so far. This is done in three issue areas: First, we
attempt overall synthesis of findings regarding the ultimate
efficacy of donors. Next, we review dominant strategies of
the various donors, from a broader perspective. In the end
of this chapter, we look at the latent interests of various ac-
tors, to explain a number of controversial findings made ear-
lier regarding TAPs.
6.1 Evaluation of Training Assistance
for the Civil Service:
Summary and Synthesis
Previous analyses showed that there are, indeed, significant
differences between the TAPs of different donors. In trying
to synthesize an overall picture, it has to be admitted that
the “goodness” of a donor, or the “goodness” of a given TAP,
is a multi-dimensional notion. Much of what we have tried
to measure was boiled down to “direct efficiency” of TAPs
and donors. In this regard, we found that, when compared
with beneficiaries’ national civil service training events, most
TAPs, and most donors, generally achieve a very low level of
direct efficiency.
Obviously, there are other factors that have not been
measured. These include responsiveness to beneficiaries’
needs, the quality of training materials and trainers and ef-
forts made to ensure that the training activity leads to sus-
tained beneficial effects. Assessing policies according to mul-
tiple and conflicting criteria is a traditional “quadrature of
the circle” in policy analysis and evaluation. Not wanting to
further quadrate this circle, we attempt, in the following
paragraphs, to present some overall, synthesizing, yet still
impressionistic, assessments of the donors.
If we try to give an overall ranking to the four donors,
CIDA seems to be the most successful. A comparatively ac-
ceptable level of unit costs is coupled with high responsive-
ness to individual trainees’ needs and a real commitment to
quality. But we must emphasize that this assessment is based
on a relatively narrow empirical basis: There have been only
a few, rather small-scale projects involved in the analysis.
Maybe it is the modest size of its operations and the corre-
sponding “small-scale manufacture” attitude that contrib-
ute to the fact that CIDA managed to avoid the numerous
traps inherent in its—fundamentally risky, elitist—domi-
nant strategy. The comparatively small overall presence of
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cost seems to be so prohibitive that, apart from EU related
issues, the national government might have been better off
if the administrative expenses were spent on nationally
organized training rather than on hosting PHARE TAPs.
With regards to its gross impact, the importance of
PHARE is strongly increased by the sheer volume of PHARE
funds poured into training civil servants. It is interesting
that—after Continental European bilateral donors present
in the initial years of the 1990s disappeared—PHARE
remained as the only significant non-Anglo-Saxon donor in
the public administration technical assistance field. Apart
from PHARE, the CEE/CIS public administration techni-
cal assistance field is clearly dominated by Anglo-Saxon
donors, who convey concepts and practices that are often
somewhat alien to the Continental European public admin-
istration systems and cultures of the region.
DFID revealed some flexibility and responsiveness to
local needs. Still, we found that DFID TAPs are particularly
frequently supply-driven rather that demand-driven. DFID
was quite active in presenting training in methods of New
Public Management, methods in which the British govern-
ment is making innovative inroads. But this strength may
be a problem in a setting where there is not even a reliable
“old public administration.” Furthermore, there are a num-
ber of significant examples of DFID TAP failures that usu-
ally stem from the lack of knowledge—or perhaps interest
in—local circumstances. What makes DFID especially vul-
nerable to this general fallacy of donors is the fact the DFID
TAPs are characteristically designed as sustainability projects.
USAID projects seem to be carefully planned and pro-
fessionally and efficiently run. It is only USAID that intro-
duced training unit cost standards and ceilings for the CEE
and CIS region. As a result, USAID TAP costs dropped by
about 25 percent within a year. But it seems that, in the area
of “responsiveness,” USAID, to some degree, lags behind
the other donors. USAID seems to be unique in running third-
country training courses—for example, when Ukrainian
privatization officers had a chance to learn from experience
of their Polish colleagues. This is important, because, we
believe, third-country training has a high potential value.
The study also identified some apparently unintended
beneficial side-effects that arise due to the practice of using
TAPs. These positive effects do not come from individual
TAPs—which are limited in scope, time span and number
of civil servants trained—but instead are due to the accu-
mulated outcome of a host of various TAP activities. These
benefits include the following:
• TAPs help the beneficiary countries understand the
importance of training as a human resource develop-
ment tool and a means of public administration reform.
This appreciation of training was, and to some extent
still is, missing in the beneficiary countries.
• TAPs introduce new approaches to running public
administration. Throughout the region, a lack of sys-
tematic approaches, and a corresponding abundance of
ad-hoc and controversial decisions and actions, is a fun-
damental feature of the daily functioning of public
administration. In addition, in many of the beneficiary
countries, an overly legalistic approach toward public
administration prevails. Public policy and management
approaches, which are the subject of much TAP con-
tent, may play an important role in gradually renewing
approaches, techniques applied and attitudes toward
public administration in the beneficiary countries.
• TAPs initiate a new, rational-purposive approach to
training. In this approach, training goals and objectives
are defined first and content and methods are chosen
accordingly, the level of goal attainment is measured via
monitoring and evaluation, and other beneficial prac-
tices are followed. This approach is generally missing
from national training systems.
• TAPs introduce new training techniques that may in-
crease training efficiency in terms of transferring knowl-
edge and skills and enabling civil servants to use the
newly obtained knowledge in their everyday adminis-
trative practice. Here we refer to the dissemination of
the interactive training approach and application of
related techniques, such as case studies, role-play, group
work, individual problem solving, etc.
6.2 Assistance Strategies
for CEE and CIS
Certain interrelations of TAP strategy and TAP content that
were analyzed earlier deserve closer attention, because they
might help us understand why and how TAPs and their do-
nors succeed or fail.
Viewed from a geographically and historically broader
perspective, post-World-War II technical assistance was typ-
ically offered by the technologically and economically de-
veloped countries, in both the West and the Soviet Bloc, to
underdeveloped nations of the Third World. In the post-
war era, engineers, economists, planners and other technical
experts of the donor countries participated in solving im-
portant problems of the beneficiary countries—such as plan-
ning and building infrastructure, setting up various govern-
mental processes and institutions, etc.
As we have already noted in the section on TAP strate-
gies, all these activities were based on two major, strategic
assumptions: i) that the technical expertise in the donor coun-
tries for solving these problems is clearly superior to the ex-
pertise available in the beneficiary countries; and ii) that this
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technical expertise can be brought into the beneficiary coun-
try and utilized without any specific problems or consider-
ations—in other words, that this expertise is transferable
between the donor and the beneficiary country.
When it came to the kind of “classical” infrastructure
and institutional problems that the traditional post-war tech-
nical assistance sought to address in under-developed coun-
tries, the truthfulness of these two assumptions was usually
so self-evident that even their explication was unnecessary.
In other words, the plausibility and legitimacy of the classi-
cal technical assistance philosophy was relatively straightfor-
ward in this context. In the context of civil service training
assistance, this conceptualization of the classical approach
to classical assistance is basically identical with the so-called
sustainability strategy as it was described in Chapter 4.
In this section, these two classical assumptions of tech-
nical assistance are examined from a slightly broader per-
spective. We seek to identify general and theoretical argu-
ments showing that these assumptions are not so valid in the
context of “East-West public administration technical assis-
tance.” Instead of providing a full-fledged analysis, we only
seek to identify some key general arguments that can be app-
lied in judging the viability of various assistance strategies.
The knowledge transfer occurring in the course of tech-
nical assistance of any kind can be seen as a process taking
place in a two-dimensional space. This process originates
from one point of this space, representing the know-how
offered by the donor, and leads to another point of this space,
representing the know-how available for the recipient.
One dimension of this space is the absolute level of ad-
vancement of knowledge or know-how. This refers to the
extent to which the given expertise is able to successfully
handle the problems faced—in other words, to manipulate
the natural and social environment of the actor applying the
given knowledge. There is, however, a second dimension,
which we might call the “national/cultural specificity” di-
mension. This dimension is, in some cases, of minimal im-
portance—for example when it comes to expertise in tech-
nical fields. But in other cases it becomes increasingly
important.
Viewing the transfer of public administration knowl-
edge as one starting from one location of this space and end-
ing in another location, it is possible to make the following
statements:
• The larger the distance between the donor and the re-
cipient in the first, “advancement” dimension, the higher
the potential value of transferring the given knowledge
to the recipient.
• The larger the distance between the donor and the re-
cipient in the second, “national and cultural specificity”
dimension, the lower the potential value of transferring
the given knowledge to the recipient.
The second of the above statements is one that received
increased attention during the past decades with regards to
the realm of public administration development. From a
theoretical perspective, public administration, both as a so-
cietal practice and as a field of academic study, is, to some
extent, clearly a “business,” characterized by marked national/
cultural differences and a corresponding non-universalistic,
“nationalist” approach and focus of interest.79 This part of the
problem complex became obvious during empirical studies
and theoretical work conducted under the auspices of the
Comparative Administration Group. The group highlighted
a number of important—and often missing—preconditions
of “administrative development,” as well as preconditions of
the transferability and sustainability of expertise and “tech-
nology” that is supposed to help realize this development.80
The effect of cultural differences on transferability of
administrative institutions and “know-how” is a major ques-
tion, not only from the narrower point of view of public
administration technical assistance but also from a broader
perspective of the study of public administration and man-
agement. For example, this issue is a focal point of discus-
sions concerning the meaning, originality and applicability
of New Public Management concepts and methods in ad-
ministrative systems other than those of the Anglo-Saxon
countries. Unfortunately, the issue of national and cultural
differences is not often discussed in relation to the public
administration reforms of the transition countries.81
In sum, the importance of the “national and cultural
specificity” dimension seems to be substantial within the field
of the transfer of public administration know-how.
The other statement above, regarding the advancement
dimension, also points up additional difficulties in the con-
text of Western technical assistance to the CEE/CIS region,
because the assumption of technical superiority becomes
somewhat questionable at this point. Most observers, though
not all, would agree that German, American or even Rus-
sian technical experts have important and useful advice to
give to countries of Sub-Saharan Africa in any of the above-
mentioned technical fields. But in an East-West perspective,
at least in the authors’ view, it is much more questionable
whether the assumption of technical superiority, meant ei-
ther on a general level or specifically in relation to public
administration, holds true without any further complication.
Until their political and economic collapse, many coun-
tries of the former Soviet Bloc—and most of all the Soviet
Union—had been clearly in the global vanguard in most of
the key areas of technical and technological development.
Similarly, the state apparatuses of these countries had shown
sufficient capacity to govern, as well as to plan and imple-
ment, governmental actions necessary to achieve the politi-
cal goals set by the ruling elite. (It is, of course, an impor-
tant, but still different question, lying outside the technical
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Partly because of its wider, inter-donor comparative fo-
cus, and partly because of its a priori intentions, the analysis
presented in the previous two chapters went further to iden-
tify some systematic phenomena that cannot be interpreted
as the results of pure accidents or mistakes. These phenom-
ena are obviously counter-productive from the point of
view of the stated goals of TAPs, as well as that of the bene-
ficiary public administration systems—so much so that they
just cannot be fitted into the stated, altruistic and “client
oriented” logic or goal system of TAPs and foreign aid in
general.
The first and the second column of Table 13 summariz-
es the phenomena, or “mistakes” that appear to be so sys-
tematically yet “unexplainably” present in the majority of
TAPs. The third column, which we will discuss more below,
gives possible explanations for these mistakes.
If one looks only at the problematic “phenomena” list-
ed in Table 13, and considers further arguments presented
in the earlier chapters in relation to these phenomena, they
seem very difficult to explain. Even such well-known theo-
retical problems of organization as “goal displacement,”83
“bounded rationality”84 or “administrative behavior”85 are
observed. The authors believe that the above complex of TAP
phenomena would force any detached observer to look for
latent goals behind funding and running TAPs. These la-
tent goals obviously exist instead of—or at least in addition
to—the stated goals.
In our view, the answer to the above puzzle is relatively
simple, at least for those who know the field from practice.
All five “dysfunctions” become understandable and logical
if viewed from the perspective of maximizing the economic
profits of professional and business interests involved in TAP
implementation—a group that includes consulting firms,
free-lance consultants, university faculty and other experts.
This so-called “big secret” of civil service training assistance
is not that secret in the beneficiary countries. It is accepted
as a truism and gives rise to popular expressions like “Hilton
commandos.” As Svetlana Khapova observes: “There was
(and still is) a widely held view […] that [the West] was just
putting money into the pockets of their own experts and
companies.”86
The third column of the above table provides clues as to
how the various “mistakes” in fact serve the latent goal of
increasing economic benefits for beneficiary-side professional
and business interest groups.
It is noted as a postscript that, the conclusion that many,
or most, of the problems located in relation to TAPs can be
attributed to the self-interested behavior of certain groups,
organizations and individuals of the donor country playing
a role in the “TAP business” might seem provocative. This is
especially true for those individuals or organizations that are
involved in TAP implementation and pursue their business
realm of administrative expertise, whether the political goals
followed by the state apparatuses served the “pubic good” of
these countries and fulfilled basic requirements of the rule
of law, human rights or democratic accountability. In these
aspects, the record of these public administration systems
would, naturally, look much worse.)
Given the relatively advanced state of the former Soviet
Bloc in a number of important fields of development, one
has little reason to assume that that the technical, adminis-
trative expertise previously available in these countries was
fundamentally backward, or that this expertise has completely
disappeared since the transformation.82 On the contrary, it
seems much more plausible that these countries’ public ad-
ministration problems, which can be attributed to societal
factors lying far beyond the realm of public administration
itself, left much of the previously available administrative
expertise more or less intact. After all, many of the people
who designed and ran the previous administrative systems
are still alive and active, and many of them are, or could be,
accepted by the new, democratic regimes—though the eth-
nic dimension of this problem, which is especially present in
CIS countries, admittedly brings an additional difficulty.
Viewed from the perspective outlined above, it is easier
to understand why DFID, which handled classical techni-
cal-assistance projects in countries of the Third World
throughout the past decades, tends to run sustainability-type
TAPs, while PHARE, which was established only recently
and has dealt only with transition countries, has much less
inclination to rely on the sustainability/classical technical
assistance approach.
6.3 The  Big Secret’ of Public
Administration Technical Assistance
Previous studies of TAPs and public administration techni-
cal assistance for CEE countries—of which a brief overview
was given in Chapter 1—generally point out a number of
achievements of Western technical/training assistance. But,
at the same time, these studies are usually fairly critical to-
wards either the donor or the recipient, and sometimes both.
These results are usually characterized by two features.
Firstly, they have a relatively narrow focus, usually limited
to individual projects or a set of projects funded by a given
donor. Secondly, they tend to perceive beneficiary related
problems as systematic, predictable and ensuing from diffi-
cult-to-change, cultural or administrative characteristics of
the recipient environment; at the same time problems relat-
ed to the “donor side” of the TAP field are understated or
are presented as consequences of haphazard, contingent
“mistakes” or problems caused by unforeseen, unfortunate
contextual circumstances.
‘
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according to high professional and ethical standards, some-
times even with a degree of altruism. But when this conclu-
sion is viewed from a broader perspective, the picture is dif-
ferent. The phenomenon that certain actors seek to promote
their own interests by diverting governmental operations
from the original goals of those operations is, in fact, quite
common within the broadest spectrum of policy and orga-
nization studies. This same core phenomenon is described
in other ways, including: “rent seeking,” where interest groups
with a high per capita stake in governmental decisions try to
influence these decision to their own benefit;87 “regulatory
capture,” where economic or societal pressure groups, such
as large polluters, “capture” governmental regulatory policy
that is originally supposed to constrain them;88 or the “im-
plementation gap.”89 Carlsson-Köhlin-Ekbom also describe
the phenomenon in the specific context of foreign aid as a
less discussed, but relatively accepted, fact of life.90
Table 13
Controversial Findings in Relation to TAP Management and Implementation
Phenomenon The Problem, from the Point of View The Actual Function, from the Point of View
of the Stated Goals of Assistance of the Latent Goals of Assistance
The sustainability strategy is followed The strategy has very little chance Sustainability-type projects require that
by many TAPs.  to become successful. a large proportion—often the absolute
majority—of project funds are expended
on expert fees instead of material expenses.
Expert work is very difficult to control
or to account for.
The project-type implementation • This causes rigidity in a highly volatile Applying a permanent implementation
framework is followed. environment. structure would exclude powerful pressure
• Synergy between various projects, groups, such as Western consulting
including the much-needed capacity organizations and “amphibious”/free-
for organizational/policy learning, lance experts. In addition, contracting
becomes very limited. out is also a requirement of the Zeitgeist.
Implementing organizations and experts • These experts are very expensive. Obviously, to be contracted is a major
contracted for implementing TAPs are • There are language-related problems. prerequisite of realizing profits, and the
“strictly” from the same country of origin • There are problems related to training higher the fees/costs included in the
as the donor. content, but there was a higher contract price, the higher the profits.
technical quality of training, especially
a few years ago.
Donors/TAPs seem to exhibit minimal Such relatively cheap but effective True sustainability of the results of a TAP
interest in ensuring the sustainability of solutions as setting up a working data are not necessary to realize the profit
sustainability-type projects, especially system preserving TAP outputs, or inherent in the TAP—unless another
after the project itself has ended. repeating previous, successful sustainability-type or consultancy project
sustainability-type projects, are missing is launched “to ensure the sustainability”
from the TAP spectrum. of the previous TAP.
The transparency of activities is often Transparency is a major and strictly applied It is a common interest of implementing
minimal, and there seems to be a criteria in most domestic policy fields of organizations, experts and the donor that
“negative correlation” between costs and the donor countries, and it is an important the image of TAPs be attractive and that
transparency. policy priority for donor organizations. the pursuance of latent goals doesn’t
Yet, there is a high discrepancy between become too obvious.
the importance given to transparency
and the practice of some donors.
7. SOME RECOMMENDATIONS
In the section below, we formulate a few recommendations
for both beneficiaries and donors. To make recommenda-
tions of any kind it is necessary to have a normative or value
basis, from which the given recommendations are formulat-
ed. The present study was intentionally designed and imple-
mented with a degree of “beneficiary orientation.” This, as
explained in the second chapter, primarily means that the
interests and concerns of beneficiaries are given greater em-
phasis than is usual in most similar work. Recommenda-
tions, on the other hand, require the identification of specif-
ic problems—or deviations between the desired and the actual
state of affairs—and they also require that specific solutions
to these problems be devised.
A consequence of our beneficiary orientation—but also,
as the authors believe, a relatively established finding—is
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that most of the problems that are implied or identified in
the previous chapters are related to the donors and the im-
plementing organizations contracted by them. On the other
hand, it is emphasized that this doesn’t mean everything func-
tions well on the beneficiary side, or would function well if
the donor-side situation were improved. For example, our
findings and conclusions regarding problems resulting from
the practice that donors contract practically exclusively West-
ern organizations does not mean that the solution to this
problem would be to give grants solely to the national civil
service training organizations of the beneficiaries, or to award
all contracts to organizations and experts of the beneficiary
countries. In the authors’ view, which can be to some extent
inferred on the basis of Chapter 3, in several cases this would
probably even increase the present problems.
The recommendations below are in part based on our
findings and conclusions presented in earlier chapters and
in part on other, practical observations and considerations.
In order to make sure we convey the key message of the
recommendations, we will not use detailed arguments to
explain how they were formulated. Instead, we employ sim-
ple statements and, possibly, some robust examples.
The same issues may appear from various angles, from
a donor and from a beneficiary aspect, and this may occa-
sionally create what appear to be redundancies. Still, we take
the risk of being repetitious because we believe it is better to
give the same advice in two ways than to leave out an impor-
tant piece of advice. We hope that the readers will find at
least some of the recommendations useful.
7.1 Recommendations
for the Beneficiary Side
Most of the deficiencies on the beneficiary side stem from
general issues that cannot be changed within the narrower
scope of TAP issues. Such general problems include low civ-
il service wages, the high level of uncertainty in the transi-
tion period and the fact that neither individual nor organi-
zational actors within the national public administrative
system are really interested in turning TAPs into activities
that are truly useful for the country’s public administration
system. Therefore, the potential to significantly change how
TAPs are hosted by beneficiaries is limited. But some things
can be improved.
Recommendation 1
The potential of TAPs to improve the civil service training sys-
tem should be utilized to the greatest extent possible.
1.1 The value of training as a tool of human resources develop-
ment needs to be recognized and acknowledged.
The importance of training is usually significantly un-
derestimated in the beneficiary civil service systems—
more so on the level of daily practice than on the level
of policy declarations. Efforts need to be taken to en-
sure that decision makers on all levels, and practitioners
in general, accept that the importance of efficient train-
ing is not just a myth.
1.2 Beneficiary civil service training systems could be substan-
tially improved by adopting certain elements of the content
and style of TAPs.
Advanced elements of TAPs might be worth adopting.
The following elements especially need consideration
in this regard:
• purposeful and structured planning and implemen-
tation of training activities;
• interactive training style, versus pure lecturing, and
other advanced training methods;
• emphasis of training on skills improvement and at-
titude change, instead of simply focusing on trans-
fer of theoretical knowledge;
• a management and policy approach of public ad-
ministration, as opposed to a legalistic approach.
The first element is especially important in developing
national civil service training programs: It should be clear
what a particular training activity is aimed at, how the activ-
ities will lead to the achievement of objectives, what inputs
are necessary and what the risks are. Some, or all, of these
elements are usually missing from planning for national civ-
il service training.
Recommendation 2
In deciding whether to host a given TAP or accept support from
a donor, not only the benefits, but also the costs, of the TAP
should be considered.
2.1 Recipients should have a clear training strategy and prior-
ities, and they should try to put these priorities forward in
any TAPs that will be launched.
Donors often look for formal human resource develop-
ment/training strategies of beneficiary governments.
Such a strategy is not only useful for helping to “locate”
and fine-tune TAPs: It is also a major, still largely miss-
ing, prerequisite for the effective development of public
administration. Such a strategy, in turn, can help pro-
mote the beneficiary country’s own interests in the pro-
cess of designing and running specific TAPs.
2.2 Recipients should be more aware of, and use, their
bargaining power with donors and implementing organi-
zations.
It is often the case that the donor or its representative is
particularly interested in running a given TAP or set of
TAPs. Failure to launch or successfully implement a TAP
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thus can have negative consequences not only for the
beneficiary, but also for the donor. This gives a certain
degree of negotiating power to the beneficiary in decid-
ing what the TAP is about and how it is designed. By
being informed about the range of potential donors, the
donors’ TAPs and their standard practices, the benefi-
ciaries can improve their chances of not being “force-
fed” the TAP that the implementing organization has
“on stock.”
2.3 Administrative and similar obligations, and the resulting
beneficiary costs related to hosting TAPs, should be speci-
fied and considered in advance.
Most TAPs place a burden on the beneficiary public
administration. These costs include both monetary
and—especially—in-kind resources, such as the time of
senior executives spent on meetings, as well as report
writing and operational management. Additionally, the
working time of civil servants sitting in on the training
should also be taken into account. The potential bene-
ficiary should be ready to refuse TAP proposals when-
ever he/she thinks that costs outweigh benefits.
2.4 Care must be taken to avoid the possible harm that some
TAPs can cause to the beneficiary public administration.
TAPs are usually welcomed by the beneficiary, who
assumes that, even if a TAP is not useful, it is surely not
harmful. The authors of this book believe that training
may actually be counterproductive, by inoculating man-
agement solutions or ideas that are inadequate for the
beneficiary’s context, or by offering one-sided assess-
ments of management solutions.
2.5 Requirements of national security should be observed in
dealing with TAP implementers.
In the course of planning and implementing TAPs, con-
sultants and other employees of the implementing
organization or donor often have uncontrolled access
to information that is sensitive from the point of view
of national security. Some of this information is classi-
fied, and access to it is restricted, even for citizens and
most officials of the beneficiary country.
2.6 Large-scale TAPS should be given priority over small-scale
TAPs.
Donors often prefer to run “pilot courses” for a few
dozen civil servants. These usually are not of much use.
A “critical mass” training approach is more likely to be
useful for the beneficiary public administration system.
In addition, many expenses, both on the donor and the
recipient side, grow at a reduced rate as TAP size in-
creases, so that it appears certain “economies of scale”
are definitely present with regard to TAPs.
2.7 Appropriate trainee attendance should be ensured for train-
ing courses.
Training money is frequently wasted because of inap-
propriately targeted selection of trainees. To prevent this
problem:
• Training opportunities should be “advertised”
widely. Otherwise, there will be several civil ser-
vants who would have attended but did not have
the opportunity. In lieu of interested workers, those
who are not interested or motivated will be forced
to fill empty chairs in the course.
• Trainees should participate from the beginning to
the end of a course—otherwise, most courses are
useless. Appropriate attendance at training sessions
can often be ensured only by somewhat “extra-
ordinary” measures, including holding training in
remote areas, controlling presence of trainees,
giving sanctions for non-attendance, etc.
Recommendation 3
Those personally involved in hosting TAPs should be more
familiar with the management and communication culture of
donors and TAP implementing organizations.
3.1 Obtain the necessary skills and attitudes to communicate
effectively with donors.
Officials of the beneficiary who serve as counterparts to
donors often lack the necessary abilities and skills to
effectively present and promote beneficiary interests
vis-à-vis donors. The skills and abilities that they need
include assertiveness, appropriate communication skills
and negotiation skills. In more detail:
• Assertiveness involves the ability to express needs,
standpoints and opinions in an effective but emo-
tionally neutral manner. The most typical problem
stemming from the lack of assertiveness is that crit-
ical views are not expressed about the donor and its
performance. Both officials and trainees feel uncom-
fortable expressing their honest opinion if it is neg-
ative. Beneficiary parties may be afraid to say “this
is not the type of training we need,” or “I cannot
use what I have learned here in my job at all,”
because they feel that they would hurt the feelings
of the donors’ representatives or the trainers. But
this situation leaves the donor in an information
vacuum. The donor/implementer does not get the
feedback they need to improve their performance.
• Communication and negotiation skills include lan-
guage skills but are much more than that. It is of
key importance that the parties are able to get their
real message through and can receive the other’s
message with as little misunderstanding as possi-
ble. This ability is especially important in getting
across your interests during negotiations. But good
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communication is also vital in the course of effec-
tive project planning and project implementation.
3.2 Not only the communication style, but also the motivation
system and management practices of donors/implementers,
should be understood.
It seems that a lot of misunderstanding stems from the
simple fact that words and concepts might mean differ-
ent things to the two sides. It is useful if beneficiaries
are prepared for these types of misunderstandings and
even know the typical key points of misunderstanding.
Relevant examples in this regard might be how differ-
ently verbal pledges, deadlines, obligations to complete
certain tasks, etc. are conceived on the two sides of the
TAP “game.”
3.3 Having a devoted and motivated team, with appropriate
competencies, authority and infrastructure for effective TAP
project management, along with centralized “docking” of
foreign technical assistance, could significantly increase the
efficacy of running TAPs.
Donors and implementing organizations usually work
with a devoted, or at least motivated, team on TAPs.
Beneficiaries rarely have such teams. More commonly,
the choice of who deals with TAP activities is quite ran-
dom. Turnover, lack of motivation—especially due to
the very large pay difference between donor and benefi-
ciary side experts—and lack of appropriate skills and
experience greatly hinder effective management of the
TAP processes on the beneficiary side. Aside from mon-
etary incentives, one solution for increasing motivation
could be to set up a small team of young, qualified peo-
ple, who will exert a greater effort in this area because
they want to work in a foreign-language environment,
and are perhaps even hoping to find a Western scholar-
ship or job opportunity in the longer-term.
It may be useful to create a central “docking” organiza-
tional unit for managing governmental activities relat-
ed to foreign aid, or at least technical assistance, for
public administration development projects. Aside from
realizing savings and increased efficiency from econo-
mies of scale, a further advantage might be that the or-
ganization can accumulate and utilize relevant experi-
ence. Furthermore, higher-than-average salaries can be
paid for the small number of people who are involved
in a daily relationship with foreign consultants. Donors
also prefer a counterpart with whom they can effec-
tively communicate and on whom they can rely perma-
nently.
7.2 Recommendations
for the Donor Side
In this section, we formulate recommendations that may be
utilized either by the donor organization or an organization
carrying out the project on an operational level. We differ-
entiated between these two entities earlier, but this does not
seem necessary in this section. Our main message to the donor
side actors includes the following recommendations:
Recommendation 4
TAPs should be planned and managed with an awareness of
the recipient’s specific circumstances; in other words, one size
does not fit all.
4.1  In identifying beneficiaries’ needs and in devising solu-
tions, donors and TAP implementers should be prepared
for the formidable difficulties of understanding and deal-
ing with different administrative cultures.
Most TAP failures directly or indirectly stem from the
fact that either the TAP planners, or the implementers,
or both, were unfamiliar with the specific circumstanc-
es of the recipient country or the wider region. The ap-
plicability of knowledge and solutions that are appar-
ently successful in one administrative context is often
very strongly limited in another one; certain solutions
might even be counterproductive. Instead, TAP plan-
ners, and especially implementing organizations and
experts, should:
• accept the fact that developed countries’ ideas and
practices of good governance have a limited validi-
ty;
• not try to introduce sophisticated management tech-
niques in countries where the simplest type of ad-
ministration does not yet function;
• be aware of not only administrative but also cultur-
al differences relevant in how trainer-trainee inter-
actions are perceived; interactive training style, for
instance, may result in frustration and aggression
on the trainees’ side.
4.2 Already existing training solutions and—especially—con-
tent should be adjusted to meet the client’s actual needs.
It seems to be quite a general strategy that needs assess-
ments are biased in a way that the donor can sell what it
wants to sell, in other words what it already has, instead
of what the beneficiary wants to buy. Another form of
the same mistake is made when the donor confuses ends
and means. Several TAP objectives identify problems as
the lack of a certain solution. In such cases, the objec-
tive of the TAP becomes to find a problem for the
given, already existing solution, such as performance
appraisal systems, municipal bond schemes, etc. This
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approach should be avoided by constantly and con-
sciously focusing on what needs the given client actu-
ally has.
Recommendation 5
TAP goals should be realistic and achievable.
We have frequently seen such project objectives as “forming
a consumer oriented civil service ethic” or “introduction of
performance management” in country X. Yet these ambi-
tious goals are often set by projects with a modest budget
and a project period of three years—which is, of course, much
less time than it took to introduce the given solution in the
donor country. These types of projects, not surprisingly, fail.
Instead of such over-ambitious project goals, it is important
to observe “theoretical” and practical difficulties before de-
ciding what to do and how to do it.
Recommendation 6
Project implementation arrangements should be geared more
towards ensuring better understanding of the beneficiary envi-
ronment.
As noted above, understanding the specificity of the benefi-
ciary environment is crucial in ensuring TAP success. There
are some solutions that might assist donor organizations in
coping with this challenge.
6.1 Co-operation among foreign consultants working in a giv-
en country on various projects should be promoted.
During typical TAP implementation, foreign consult-
ants go into a country that is mostly unknown to them,
work on the project for some time and then leave, often
without ever going back. Our experience indicates that
it can be quite helpful for understanding local circum-
stances if consultants working for various donors and
various projects share what they have learned. The les-
sons gleaned by “old hands in the field” are invaluable,
and taking advantage of their knowledge can save a great
deal of project and expert time—and even prevent pain-
ful failures.
6.2 Involvement of local experts in both the planning and im-
plementation phase of TAPs should be promoted.
Local experts familiar with the specificity of the benefi-
ciary’s public administration system are of great use. We
believe that TAPs should neither be planned nor imple-
mented without such experts.
6.3 Permanent experts, at the donor and implementing orga-
nizations, should be relied upon more often.
The donor organizations themselves may employ some-
one who is expert in the region and expert in its politi-
cal and governmental system. A good example, in this
regard, could be the matrix structure of DFID.
6.4 Donors should consider whether the “project arrangement”
is always the best way to implement TAPs.
Contracting out project implementation may have
several advantages. But if the chosen implementing
organization has insufficient knowledge and experience
of local circumstances, this may lead to problems rather
than benefits. More permanent organizational arrange-
ments may, in some cases, be more beneficial. A good
example is the permanent consultants of OECD/
SIGMA.
Recommendation 7
Reducing training unit cost and, correspondingly, increasing
training volume may significantly increase TAP effectiveness.
TAP unit costs are exceptionally high by any standards. Be-
low, based on our findings, we suggest some ways in which
unit costs can be decreased with no decrease—and possibly
an increase—in TAP impact.
7.1 It should be carefully considered whether it is a good idea
to launch “sustainability-type” projects. Instead, large-scale
training courses may often be more fruitful.
For many reasons, most of which we have reviewed in
this book, “sustainability-type” projects hardly ever work
as expected.91 Instead of employing such a strategy, train-
ers can have a higher impact by training as many civil
servants from the target group as possible. The unit cost
of training can be greatly reduced in this way. For ex-
ample, the unit costs of a PHARE training program of
3,000 Hungarian civil servants on “basics of EU” was
just a little higher than that of a typical Hungarian na-
tional civil service training course. Aside from being cost-
effective, “critical mass-type” training can have a higher
impact than a sustainability-type TAP.
7.2 Reliance on local resources can decrease costs.
In some cases, trainers who are familiar with the local
culture and have a command of the local language can
prevent the kind of shocking failures that stem from
cultural misunderstanding between trainer and train-
ees. In other cases, local trainers can increase training
impact and efficiency. Training courses of local service
providers, with content identical to that of a planned
TAP, are often available on the local market. These
courses are good quality and cost only a fragment of the
typical TAP cost. Nonetheless, ensuring that insufficient
control, sluggish management and fraud do not endan-
ger the achievement of TAP objectives is a crucial—and
in some cases difficult—task.
7.3 Successful projects should be repeated, because this is often
more effective than elaborating new and questionable
projects.
Even if they are very successful, TAPs are very rarely
repeated by the donors. This fact is surprising, because,
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by repeating successful TAPs, the donor could simulta-
neously avoid the risks of an unknown project and sig-
nificantly decrease costs by eliminating expenditures on
training development.
Recommendation 8
The implementing organization should try to control as many
aspects of TAP implementation as possible.
Compared to the West, public administration in the CEE/
CIS region operates in an extremely uncertain and volatile
socio-economic, political and cultural environment. The
same is, therefore, true for TAPs themselves. This means
that, every segment of TAP operational management that is
not controlled by the donor may easily go wrong. Some ways
of reducing the risks inherent in this context, and thereby
ensuring effective project implementation, are suggested
below, in ascending order of importance.
8.1 The “advertisement” of the TAP should not be left up to
the beneficiary. Instead it should, at least in part, be han-
dled by the implementing organization.
The motivation and ability of the beneficiary to do a
careful job in recruiting trainees might be limited, though
this is a crucial part of implementing a TAP. If recruit-
ing is not done properly, the organizers may easily end
up with either uninterested trainees, who consider their
required attendance a punishment from their bosses, or
with people who expect a TAP on a completely differ-
ent subject. The TAP could also experience increasing
trainee dropout.
8.2 The selection of trainees also requires special attention.
As with proper advertising of the TAP, ensuring appro-
priate trainee selection can lessen the risk of having train-
ees who lack the personal competence and skills neces-
sary for the TAP. These skills might include language
skills or relevant previous experience, such as training
experience in a train-the-trainers course or communi-
cations skills.
8.3 Donor and implementing organizations should try to im-
prove communication between various stakeholders on the
beneficiary side.
Communication among beneficiary-side stakeholders re-
lated to the launching and implementation of a given
TAP is not always smooth and efficient. Because trivial
problems in this area can seriously endanger the success
of a TAP, pertinent information should be circulated to
all relevant stakeholders.
8.4 Whenever possible, projects should be started a few months
after elections, or at least not before elections.
There is high turnover in the civil service, especially in
managerial positions, after elections. This may have a
negative impact on TAPs, because the contact/mana-
gerial counterpart may be replaced with a newcomer
who knows nothing about the project or is even suspi-
cious about it as something belonging to the “old re-
gime.” On the other hand, increasing tension and fidg-
etiness as election-time approaches may divert attention,
participants and other vital resources from your TAP.
Another argument in favor of this tactic is that trainees
are frequently selected from managers, who may leave
the civil service following an election. If they are trained
after the election, they may at least be expected to be in
their positions for a few years.
8.5 Collaborators on the beneficiary side should be sufficiently
“motivated.”
The basic problem here relates to the organizational ca-
pacity of the docking organization dealing with the TAP
at hand. If the local collaborating official is overbur-
dened, they may exhibit only limited enthusiasm for
dealing with the extra obligations that the given TAP
adds to their usual duties. This is especially true because
they may have a monthly salary of, say, USD 150. Tens
of thousands of dollars in consultant time are frequently
wasted because the national counterparts were not avail-
able, did not arrange meetings, did not provide the nec-
essary materials or data, etc. It is perfectly understand-
able if donors are reluctant to pay local civil servants
monetary incentives that may be seen as tips or a bribe.
Still, from a practical point of view, it can be argued
that local counterparts need to be motivated in some
way, with study trips, scholarships, etc. Actually, this
technique is widely used in TAP implementation, but
the “target persons” of these incentives are often those
rather high ranking officials on whom the evaluation of
the project depends and who could assure positive feed-
back. We admit, however, that it is often difficult to
identify the appropriate target group, and that, even if
the right target group is identified, those in higher posi-
tions can easily “capture” the benefits.
8.6 Long-term utilization, or sustainability, of the TAP should
be ensured.
Many TAP results are lost in the long term, even if the
training was successful. Most of the training materials
and curricula are not available a few months after the
TAP, even if the central aim of the given TAP was to
transfer know-how incorporated in these materials. Fur-
thermore, the lists of trainees are not available or do not
exist. More care should be taken to document and pro-
vide this information to the beneficiary government.
A good, though never implemented, solution could
involve a database containing all relevant information
on TAPs. The database could be kept at an embassy or,
potentially, at a central place within the beneficiary gov-
ernment structure.
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Recommendation 9
The beneficiary should not be saddled with an excessive and
useless administrative burden.
TAPs frequently place an enormous burden on the local civ-
il service in terms of management and administrative tasks.
TAPs place a burden on beneficiary governments in several
other ways, too.
9.1 Steering committees should be made truly functional.
It is a general practice that the beneficiary is required to
set up a steering committee for an assistance project.
The problem is that donors want to have the most se-
nior persons in their steering committee. This usually
serves a symbolic purpose rather than a practical one.
From a practical point of view, having ministers in the
steering committee is quite dysfunctional, given that the
most likely scenario is that they will not attend any of
the meetings, thereby jeopardizing the project. The prob-
lem could be partly solved by the arrangement intro-
duced in a DFID TAP in Hungary: An operative body
was set up, from among the officials who were responsi-
ble for effective implementation of TAPs. Operative level
decisions were made by this group.
9.2 The number and duration of “stakeholder interviews,” and
the like, should be limited.
Consultants working on TAPs strive to meet high rank-
ing officials for various reasons. Our impression is that,
if all these requests were accepted by, say, the prime
minister of a CIS country, practically no time would be
left for him to deal with any other issues. Foreign con-
sultants and donor representatives consume large
amounts of precious time of high-ranking officials, time
that could be better utilized in other ways. It is an espe-
cially dubious technique of consultants to request the
time of civil servants so they can ask simple questions
that they could have answered by reading the civil ser-
vice law or other easily obtainable literature. Similarly,
we have met civil servants who said they were tired of
explaining the same trivialities to newly arrived consult-
ants again and again. Instead of imposing on the bene-
ficiary’s civil service, a local expert should be relied upon
to answer basic questions.
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